



The Intervention Zone

***Youth Violence and its Extremes in Canada:
Prevention and Enforcement in a New Zone of Opportunity***

Final Report from the Institute for Strategic International Studies

ISIS 2009



Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police

Leading Progressive Change in Policing

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

In January 2009, seventeen senior police leaders began a research project on behalf of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) under the guidance and framework of the Institute for Strategic International Studies (ISIS). The team represented ten police agencies of varying sizes that spanned the country. Four teams traveled to nine international locations on three continents in addition to completing on-line research over an eight month period. The CACP provided the timely topic of *Youth Violence* and ISIS 2009 was challenged by CACP President Steven Chabot *to produce a significant contribution of value to the Canadian Criminal Justice System.*

In this final report, a new *pre-criminal intervention approach* to youth violence is recommended, resulting from ISIS 2009's global comparative study themes of Community Profiles, Roles and Responsibilities, Strategies, Initiatives and Programs, Community Perspectives, Local Tolerance for Violence and Future Plans. This proposal is based on similar observations, gathered independently from around the world, and will give Canada the opportunity to act early to avoid what many other nations have encountered. If adopted, Canada has an opportunity to build on the capacity challenges highlighted last year by ISIS 2008 by refocusing policing efforts and embracing this pre-criminal intervention model. It will also represent a natural continuation of Crime Reduction Models currently in use and will allow police to further harness the skills of both police and their *coalition* partners from across Canada to strategically prevent youth violence and criminality. This challenge will require strong leadership and vision. ISIS 2009 is convinced that it is the only model with a real chance of ensuring a healthy future for Canadian youth and public safety for all Canadians.

“Police and non-police groups have universally recognized that youth violence is a societal issue requiring a coordinated, integrated response and police resources alone are insufficient to solve the issue of youth violence.”

ISIS 2009

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ISIS 2009 Specifically Recommends:

1. That the CACP continue in its efforts to educate police services and their governing authorities that strict adherence to a traditional, reactive policing model is financially unsustainable and ineffective for modern Canadian police services; a view which consecutive ISIS research studies have shown is now widely shared by police agencies internationally. The status quo is not effective for dealing with youth anti-social behaviour and youth violence.
2. The advancement in communities across Canada of a new *Intervention Zone* of opportunity for a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary approach to early interventions for youth well-being and youth violence reduction. When youth feel socially, mentally and physically empowered, they are less likely to become involved in criminal activity, and ISIS 2009 reinforces the value of the 40 Asset Development Model as an effective framework for a local crime reduction strategy. Further, ISIS 2009 asserts that the approach it has described offers a concrete representation of, and consistency with, the aims of problem-oriented policing.
3. Adoption in these communities of an *Intervention Zone* model that is structured with clearly defined roles, responsibilities and accountability to ensure that multi-agency and multi-disciplinary partners are equally and meaningfully engaged for the long term. This includes the development of a clear and consistent language among all social system actors in order to facilitate the building of trust, and to prevent misunderstanding.
4. That police services undertake to educate their officers toward greater understanding that *Intervention Zone* partnerships and activities are designed to prevent and reduce youth anti-social behaviour and violence; not to engage officers in social work.
5. That police services conduct strategic internal analyses of their current youth focused partnerships and programs to ensure that police are fulfilling proper police functions, and to ensure that police services are not inheriting community-based social development programs merely through default.
6. That the CACP acknowledge that the ISIS 2009 research supports the philosophy of the 2003 CACP report, *Towards a Crime Prevention Coalition: The Police Role in Crime Prevention through Social Development*, and moves that important work forward by providing relevant and realistic strategies to accomplish its aims.
7. That the CACP acknowledge that the *Intervention Zone* approach enhances the broader development of a progressive Canadian policing model by supporting the Six Principles of Modern Policing as defined in the CACP *National Framework for Progressive Policing (NFPP)*. The ISIS 2009 research provides a foundation from which to inform the continuing work of the NFPP, including discussions with community partners at the national level.
8. That the CACP take a lead role in educating political leaders and the media of the long-term commitment required of a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary approach as envisioned in the *Intervention Zone*, in order to produce the long-term benefits to all communities from an effective and continuing reduction in youth anti-social behaviour and youth violence.

Youth Violence in Canada and Around the World

The CACP expressed the 2009 research topic for ISIS as *Youth Violence and Radicalization*, combining related issues of broad concern in Canada today. Events of extreme violence and gang activity make frequent news in many areas of Canada today, and few but nonetheless high profile, recent and highly troubling incidents of apparent radicalization made this a universally relevant study topic. The team's research into policing statistics revealed that youth crime may be decreasing along with crime in general in Canada. However, the same statistics also indicate that Canada is seeing increasing levels of violence in many specific locations. The evident impact such a trend is having on the general fear of crime in those locations, and by extension, even into areas less directly affected, also played an important role in ISIS 2009's focus.

Canada is part of a world system and as such, what happens elsewhere can and often will happen here. We cannot live in isolation, which is even more apparent when the current and projected demographic situation in Canada was closely examined by ISIS 2009. Canada is a country that relies on immigration as a means to thrive, and new immigrants bring their experience, history, and culture. For the most part, these cultural differences and experiences add to the social fabric, but they can sometimes bring younger new Canadians into conflict with Canadian values and social norms, since cultural traditions and individual community standards of violence often differ greatly around the world. When coupled with social, economic, and modern contextual challenges faced by both aboriginal youth and traditional, multi-generational young Canadians, the issue in this country becomes very complex. ISIS 2009 was mindful of this complexity, and thus set out to identify study sites which might inform its research into youth violence across a broad and diverse range of social, cultural and economic factors.

In addition to the primary global focus of the study, ISIS 2009 members drew on their own *youth violence* policing experience by examining communities across Canada, including (but not limited to) Surrey, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal and Halifax, *twinning sites* which were selected deliberately for comparison and to serve as points of reference. International study sites were chosen with care to ensure there would be comparison communities, regions, or experiences similar to those across Canada to reflect upon and from which to learn. In addition, ISIS research coach Dr. James Sheptycki suggested that data found in communities that were very dissimilar to Canada would also enrich the results. ISIS 2009 was also instructed by its Program Advisors to ensure results were relevant and actionable to front line police officers, and not merely an academic exercise. After a great deal of discussion, research, consultation, and guidance from Dr. Sheptycki, the following emerged as the primary research statement for ISIS 2009:

“Deconstructing Modern Youth Violence and its Extremes: An International Comparative Perspective for Policy and Program Considerations in Canada”

ISIS 2009 formed four separate study teams to target chosen research sites in South America, Europe, Africa and the United Kingdom. During these visits, social development programs and traditional police intervention models were studied. Some local cultures and police models were observed that are very similar to Canada, but some were completely different based on the form of government, religious differences, and historical challenges. It should be noted that the situation found in the teams' on-line research and the reality found in the field were often vastly different, and in some cases, early impressions from afar proved to be clearly false on the ground. The research teams' approach in speaking with many different resources was es-

sential in developing an accurate picture of what is happening in the case study countries. It was also noted in many examples that while the police to population ratio might have appeared quite favorable when compared to our own, policing outcomes were surprisingly disappointing. For example, the South African Police Service has 180,000 police officers and a *cop-to-pop* ratio of 1/372, yet they have some of the highest incidents of violent crime involving youth in the world.

In all instances, ISIS 2009 met with police organizations that faced daunting challenges. And in response to these challenges, virtually all are implementing non-traditional approaches of pre-criminal interventions for youth. By comparison, ISIS 2009 members observed that while Canadian policing can perhaps cite programs with similar intentions, approaches here are often piece-meal forays into what is predominantly regarded as the social development field. Such approaches tend to be rejected by police traditionalists in Canada, because police often become the drivers and leaders of these initiatives, inheriting projects through default and assuming responsibility for work that reaches beyond the scope of policing. Police are then criticized, both from within and by outside agencies, for extending beyond their traditional roles. Another major challenge and a potential deterrent to effective, pre-criminal police involvement in Canada is the need to share information about young citizens and their troubles with the law between social agencies and the police, which Canadian legislation currently precludes. Thus, ISIS 2009 members observed that, *“in Canada, exaggerated police involvement in social matters often tends to flow from the 24/7 availability of the police, rather than from the effective and well-conceived partnerships seen elsewhere.”*

The findings of this study uncovered a common theme and demonstrate that Canada has an opportunity to move into an evolved policing role using a model which will have relevance in any community across Canada, regardless of its size or socio-economic situation. This new role will recognize that much has changed over the years, and our impact using traditional methods has been much less than what Canadians might have hoped for. Traditional policing methodology will continue to play an important role. However, ISIS 2009 believes a new approach must be embraced to address emerging trends in youth violence, and that Canada must act before the country is faced with a youth violence problem that is insurmountable. ISIS 2009 cautions that if Canada reaches the point where enforcement is seen as the only option in response to youth violence, as is now the case in some countries studied, police here risk eroding years of community policing efforts and making the re-establishment of important relationships a significant challenge for the future. Canadian policing has other options and can build proactively upon the experiences of the policing community around the world.

“Canada is a reactive country – we need to change the policing and governance cultures towards preventative measures and earlier interventions.”

Assistant Commissioner Mike McDonell, RCMP-GRC

Global Studies

Observations from Africa

Egyptian police have poor relationships with youth, non-government organizations (NGO's) and government organizations. There is very little evidence of meaningful partnerships among the agencies. Egyptian police are widely mistrusted, considered by many to be corrupt and brutal. It was suggested by some that crimes committed by an Egyptian youth would be dealt with by police less harshly than a similar crime committed by an immigrant youth, such as the Sudanese, who are often deported back to their country of origin under the loosely defined pretext of "National Security". The Egyptian police have a very high enforcement mentality and high visibility was evident in both Cairo and Luxor. Many Egyptian police are poorly educated and trained, in addition to being poorly paid. However, they are present in high numbers, particularly in tourist areas.

The Egyptian nation is somewhat unique because there are relatively low incidents of violence, despite high populations of poverty and poor quality policing. This difference may be attributable to the homogeneous society, strong Islamic religious influence in daily life, and apparent and strong family unity. The challenge of youth crime is more related to high numbers of petty property crimes, as opposed to violent crime. The existence of alcohol related crime appears to be minimal due to the religious forbiddance of the consumption of alcohol. Youth violence involving firearms and illicit drug use and trafficking are not prevalent in Egyptian society, despite the country being a transportation hub for international trafficking. In short, Egyptian policing is a very repressive regime that has strict enforcement as its primary option. Egyptian authorities seem to operate with little accountability on issues of human rights. Whether intentional or not, it seems evident that fear and mistrust of the police plays a role in obtaining civil obedience. ISIS 2009 believes this is clearly not reflective of the Canadian policing reality.

In South Africa, youth crime is a result of the development and replication of a *culture of violence* over the past thirty years. This reality stems from a normalization of crime and violence amongst an underclass of negatively socialized and socially excluded youth who constitute a significant proportion of South Africa's population. South Africa is struggling with some of the highest rates of violent crime in the world, in particular murder and sexual assaults. It is not commonly known outside the country that South Africa's youth, aged 12-22, are generally victimized at twice the rate of adults, and at rates even higher for violent crime.

"The cycle of trauma without intervention at a young age, sets the stage for future abuses."

Patrick Solomons
Child Rights Activist
Molo Songololo, NGO South Africa

Young people experience assault at roughly 8 times the adult rate; theft at 5 times and robbery at 4 times the adult rate. High populations of informal, poor communities, and historical political challenges such as Apartheid, add to the unique character of South African society, and represent vast challenges for police in regards to crime.

In response to this challenge, South African Police have recognized the need to partner with non-government organizations, government agencies, and non-profit groups in dealing with youth issues. In some instances, the South African Police Service (SAPS) financially supports

A Culture of Violence

In 2005 / 2006 there were 302,000 rapes endured by young people under the age of 18. This statistic can be added to the 1,075 reports of murder of children, 20,879 reports of assault and 4,725 reports of indecent assault against children. With the reported homicide numbers over 20,000, clearly crime has become a priority in South Africa. Of significant concern is the fact young people constitute a considerable percentage of both victims and perpetrators of crime, and in particular, violent crime in their country.

these groups. Despite a cop-to-pop ratio approximately double of most Canadian police agencies, SAPS continues to struggle to bring violent youth crime under control. They have recognized that typical enforcement strategies and police resources alone will never be adequate for the task.

Observations from South America

Chile is currently in a state of change with regard to youth issues and has made significant amendments to its laws concerning youth since June 2007. Overall, the unemployment rate in the country is approximately 9%, rising to 30% for youth in areas where higher crime rates are found. Social class disparity is remarkable in Chile.

There has been an increase in students using violence in attempts to resolve their perceived problems. The lower the socio-economic scale, the higher the violence. The country has seen an increase in domestic violence (*husbands are killing wives at epidemic rates*) and also violence against young children. Fifty percent of Chilean children are born into single parent environments. In summary, many children are exposed to violence at

home, at school, and they tend to drop out of schools early, giving them little hope for decent, lasting employment.

Since 2005, the civilian, academic, and police organizations in Chile have been concentrating on youth intervention strategies and training, however they do not seem to be integrated into a global strategy. These groups work in silos and do not share their actions and/or their results. Communication between the diverse groups is limited, which limits the establishment of a common and coordinated intervention strategy toward youth issues.

The most well known program in Chile, and one which became significant to the ISIS 2009 team, is the *24-hour Program*, which is coordinated by the government as a multi-agency response to individualized youth issues and focused on interventions in the youth's community. *SENAME* (Service Nationale Des Mineurs) contributes in an important way to this program with two complementary goals: to address both the needs of youth in difficulty with the law, and those who are victims of crime.

In Colombia, officials are trying to set up social intervention programs aimed at the fundamental rights of individuals, especially youth. It is a country where the social classes are highly stratified, and inequalities are vast because a large part of the population lives in extreme poverty. Drug cartels are very strong politically and financially and threaten the proper governance of Colombia. The country must deal with youth violence issues that

“If I was offered more money for police resources, I would tell them to put it into Social Development.”

Mzwandile Petros
South African Police

stem from forced recruitment of youth into the drug wars. The authorities in the country are working to improve the youth situation. However, some local contacts described a generalized attitude among officials, one which tends to ignore the problems of the country, making meaningful change almost impossible. Nonetheless, numerous promising initiatives provide opportunities for the community to participate in activities reinforcing societal values such as family, respect, work, and equality. And, in order to address the youth violence problem, various organizations are concentrating their activities within communities in hopes of creating connections between the population and the social control structure. But, programs are independent, isolated, and do not appear to share information with each other. Each city adopts initiatives that are not evaluated in terms of their effectiveness. In general, policing and non-policing resources available to deal with youth issues appear largely insufficient to address the problems of the country.

“The police can’t be expected to deal with social problems, they are not prepared to tackle these things. This is mainly the responsibility of the local government. Police could help with youth violence issues by highlighting the main elements that link youth to the criminal activity”.

Lucia Dammert, Applied Researcher
FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales)

Observations from Europe

In France, the trend is towards an integrated response of stakeholders with national direction and intervention in concert with local level interventions. There is a high level of complexity evident in their efforts to understand youth violence. Cause and effect factors are not easily identified as only minimal numbers of youth in similar socio-economic conditions participate in violent crime. Mayors are responsible for leading an integrated prevention model in their towns and cities, a common model which includes schools, police, social services, public transit, social housing, health care providers and others. Local community officials are directed by the national government to initiate and implement these programs.

One situation in France which ISIS 2009 found to be of particular significance was the Préfecture de Évry in the Sécurité publique de l’Essone, originally built as a model community for upwardly mobile commuters. After ten years of demographic change due to in-migration of newly landed French residents and a corresponding return to the city by more traditional resi-

“Your foreign sources appear to have determined that cop-to-pop numbers are not the problem – the problem is outcomes – they have recognized that they are not getting the outcomes with policing alone”

Captain Stephen Moore
Canadian Forces Provost Marshal

dents, the social conditions in the community have changed dramatically. Today, there are dominant crime groups in the community and many are involved in violent criminal activities. To these groups, the police are viewed as a *problem* that threatens their ongoing criminal enterprise. Youth violence is mostly described as organized neighbourhood groups who fight against one another. However, they also fight against the police and firefighters, particularly when a member of a criminal group is

arrested by police. Fires are frequently started as a strategy to attract the fire department and then to enact violence against the firefighters. In response, the police routinely accompany the firefighters in order to protect them from attack. The criminal groups have answered back by increasing their use of fires as a diversion in efforts to diffuse the police presence while they continue to commit other criminal acts such as drug trafficking elsewhere in the community.

“With regard to demographic and social change, we are France – that’s us (Canada) in a few years – and this could be a disturbing picture of our own future if we don’t take this opportunity to act now”

Debra Frazer
Director General
Ottawa Police Service

Fifteen years ago there were virtually no violent acts targeted to police in Evry. The community now produces fifty to sixty violent attacks against police personnel or equipment per year.

In Den Haag, the Haaglanden Juvenile Police program begins with a police call-for-service, where potential problems are identified in the family environment or youth group setting, and information sharing and/or liaising with partner agencies is undertaken to ensure a situation-specific intervention begins in a timely fashion

In terms of youth violence and crime prevention in Utrecht, local research supports a blended developmental and situational model. According to local officials, the developmental model should start with effective information sharing among partners from the point of pregnancy. In their view, such coordination can identify and develop preventive strategies and interventions for parents to reduce the risk for potentially high-risk individuals. Officials there also note that while there is often an apparent and assumed correlation between economic opportunity and youth violence, some research does not support the *economic opportunity hypothesis* as a primary cause and effect relationship. Dutch researchers strongly believe there are a wide variety of factors unique to youth offenders, and that a multi-agency intervention approach is needed.

Observations from the United Kingdom

The demographics of Glasgow and London are most similar to those in Canadian cities than of all the other international sites visited. Immigration patterns are similar to many other large cities in Canada. Both Scotland and England have committed in recent years to the philosophy of a legislated, multi-agency approach to addressing youth well-being and child care with a view to reducing anti-social behaviour and youth violence.

In Scotland, the problem of extreme youth violence has been compared to a disease, with parliament mandating a *public health approach* to the issue through the Violence Reduction Unit Program. This national priority creates formal plans with performance measures and funding to move towards the long-term change in the current culture of violence in Scotland. This is a ten-year plan focusing on attitudinal change, multi-agency response and enforcement through: primary prevention before youth violence and anti-social behaviour begins; secondary preven-

“The worst thing we can have is a generation without hope.”

Mzwandile Petros - South African Police
Western Cape Provincial Commissioner

“Why is violence important from a public health perspective?”

... youth violence is the first manifestation of health inequalities in a life course resulting from hugely traumatic life backgrounds of drug and alcohol abuse, frequent neglect, physical and sexual violence witnessed from a very early age, and repeatedly.”

Dr. Peter Donnelly
(former) Deputy Chief Medical Officer of Scotland

tion to halt any progression through early detection and diagnosis; and, tertiary prevention through rehabilitation once violent behaviour and criminality have begun.

England enacted the Crime & Disorder Act in 1998 and created a new system of youth justice in the country with the legislated formation of Youth Offending Teams (YOT's). These are multi-disciplinary teams consisting of police, health services, children's social care services, education and probation that are mandated to deal with youth anti-social behaviour and crime from a multi-agency perspective. There is a push towards a multi-agency approach due to the realization that the police cannot reduce violence in the long term on their own, and that government agencies providing services to youth must be engaged with police, each other, and youth to find solutions.

The Safe Schools Partnerships (SSP) program from 2006 is a joint initiative between the Department for Children, Schools and Families, the Youth Justice Board and the Association of Chief Police Officers. The broader benefits of the program include improved community cohesion, a stronger sense of citizenship among children, an increased quality of life and opportunities for young people, their families and the wider community. Police officers based in the schools work with school staff and other local agencies.

CONTEST is England's national counter-terrorism strategy. The policing agenda operates under the related PREVENT strand, and incorporates the National Community Tension Team (NCTT). International tensions are monitored at the national level to identify which issues might manifest into community disruptive behaviours throughout the UK. Focusing on community tension issues relates to early identification of youths who are heading toward or are deemed most likely to fall prey to *radicalization*.

“Community engagement between the police and the communities is the bedrock of receiving any information. If communities trust you, they are far more likely to come forward with information, and that's not just about extremism, but anything. If you lose that trust then you can guarantee that your information flow is going to decrease.”

Inspector Marc Lyall
London Metropolitan Police
PREVENT Delivery Unit

Global Studies: The ISIS Perspective

It is apparent from ISIS 2009's research that traditional policing enforcement methodologies alone are not effective in curbing youth violence. ISIS 2009 witnessed examples of communities that had gone to the edge and could not make it back – where violence was being suppressed with an ever increasing level of force from policing authorities, costly efforts which could not be sustained as a long term solution. In some cases, ISIS study teams saw societies where the gap between those concerned with enforcement and those concerned with social development was so wide that information on youth violence could no longer be trusted. These circumstances demonstrated a breakdown in the relationships between police and the community. Could this be the future reality for Canadian police agencies? It was not the reality for one community in France just ten years ago, but now it is.

In all of the countries studied, ISIS 2009 observed that police were not well positioned and did not possess the resources to be agents for pro-social development in the community at large. This was seen as a role better suited for those in the community whose skills were better aligned to this type of activity - educators, health care workers, community development workers and social workers.

The ISIS 2009 field research identified a number of promising programs designed to impact youth violence in various ways, but this was not a quantitative study where specific measures of effectiveness of individual programs were closely examined. Rather, ISIS 2009 conducted qualitative research which allowed for a step back to examine what was learned, analyze what it meant, and to discover that a new reality was emerging. Many of the programs studied had been created out of necessity – because traditional enforcement and social development programs targeting youth were not an effective use of police resources and were not sustainable. Critical analysis of the full scope of ISIS 2009's studies caused a new model to emerge – a model which calls for the creation of a new form of police and community engagement – a model which provides the framework for dealing most effectively with youth, especially those at -risk for being victims of violence or perpetrators of violence.

The ISIS 2009 *Intervention Zone Model*

ISIS 2009 research and field studies reinforced the common view that children will follow generally healthy, pro-social development paths in life, with little or no negative contact with law enforcement, when they have proper societal and familial supports throughout their life.

Lacking these supports, pockets of *at-risk youth* tend to emerge and often begin to engage in *expressive* forms of anti-social behaviour stemming from negative life influences and frustrations caused by such conditions as poverty, socio-economic disadvantage, family problems, real or perceived marginalization, family and social system dynamics, educational system dynamics, a lack of hope, boredom, and modern cultural influences. ISIS 2009's research included an examination of *The Search Institute's 40 Asset Model*, which has been successfully adopted and applied by police and social system actors in some Canadian communities. ISIS 2009 believes that model represents a useful foundation for understanding the conditions which can prevent – or conversely, lead to – these early patterns of expressive behaviour.


It has been observed that some of this expressive behaviour may be *adolescence-limited*, meaning the behaviour normalizes over time as the youth progresses into adulthood. But, for many, there is *a line in the sand* where these milder or transitory types of expressive behaviour can become more concrete, more *instrumental* in nature, and difficult to change as some young people head further down problematic paths.

One such path represents the majority of criminality and violence which youth choose for some *instrumental* purpose. This path is often chosen in order to deal with such things as:

- survival
- territorial power
- to gain a sense of belonging
- for fear of not belonging
- being intimidated, coerced, or recruited into criminal involvement
- for immediate economic gain (or leveling) to satisfy the marked difference between *haves* and *have-nots*

Another, somewhat less common path, represents anti-state violence and *radicalization*, where anti-social youth are driven by or towards anti-state sentiments and political forces. This path can also become instrumental in efforts to keep *the cause* going. The ISIS 2009 international research revealed that radicalized violence was only identified as an active and major concern in the United Kingdom.


Figure 1
The Origins of Youth Violence:
A Traditional Polarized Approach



In researching youth violence issues in Canada, ISIS 2009 observed a tendency toward polarized views, characterized as two specific and somewhat isolated zones of activity and responsibility. One is *the social development zone*; the other is *the traditional enforcement zone*, familiar to most who work in policing and criminal justice. Both domestic research and global studies tend to reinforce that when police interfere too much in the social development zone, they risk being labeled as an extension of the repressive state, and might even increase perceptions of marginalization among some citizens, which in turn can raise the risk of anti-state motivations for youth. Such unwelcome interference can also lead to public charges of *racially biased policing* or *over-policing*. It can also lead to mistrust among the various social system actors as they struggle to understand others' roles and motivations, which can in turn impact lasting, effective partnerships and information sharing. Internally to policing, excursions into the social development zone can cause already over-extended police members to ask why they must fill gaps left by others, and to object that *this is not real policing* and *police cannot be everything to everyone*. Such views are well supported by the parallel sentiment that police are not properly equipped, adequately resourced, or even well enough trained for this zone to make a meaningful difference.

ISIS 2009 research findings show there is an opportunity to re-think the way Canadian policing responds to youth violence and anti-social behaviour. The *Intervention Zone* represents the critical area where the child or youth first comes to society's attention and could potentially continue down the wrong path. Intervention needs to occur at this point before the actions become cemented and a change in life direction becomes too difficult to achieve.

Figure 2



As envisioned in the *Intervention Zone*, police enforcement becomes redefined. The *Intervention Zone* represents a reconceived field of engagement where police can work with other social system actors in a new service delivery model. Engagement here does not mean police are becoming social workers. Instead, they are using very specific preventive strategies as a form of law enforcement. To be effective, such a focus requires a very specific group consisting of police, education, medical, and social work expertise, and it means using interventions targeted at individual offenders within their own specific sphere, family and social sub-system. As practiced in many other countries, this type of engagement calls for multi-actor solutions that are well co-ordinated, and is one where the actors are fully informed about each other's roles and responsibilities.

The focus in the *Intervention Zone* is on self-identified individuals – youth already exhibiting conflict with the law and others – not on broad social groups. And, it is best realized by drilling down to the specific needs of the child or youth, not focusing on the deeds that were committed. The aim is to understand and deal with the underlying factors that caused the youth to express in the manner they did, and to put something positive in place so anti-social behaviour does not reoccur and become established as a negative path. In the *Intervention Zone*, police and social agency partners engage in a new type of enforcement to demonstrate society's intolerance for violence and anti-social actions. Through this type of coordinated, community response enforcement model, experimental and expressive adolescent behaviours can be deterred from continuing. With regard to radicalized violence, the intervention may consist of removing the connections between the youth and the opportunists and ideologues who would exploit them.

“All that is policing is not attributable to the police.”

Robert Reiner
Professor of Criminology
London School of Economics

Strategic Roles for Police

The Intervention Zone model is not a call for more police resources. It is about shifting police thinking and currently misapplied resources to work more intelligently with other partners, and re-thinking and re-casting our efforts into new opportunities. In the social development zone, the police can continue to be a contributor and information provider. Police should learn from social development trends and practices and should contribute via selected investments in such things as Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), sharing of best community and family safety practices, and education programs. Police should learn what other system actors are doing within this realm, and engage in trust building exercises. However, in recognition of the limits upon police resources and capabilities, even when police become legitimately involved in this social development zone, they must do so as a visitor, and they must have an exit strategy to ensure they do not get caught in what should be another partner's role.

The enforcement zone is native ground to the police, and it is natural for police to continue being both strategic and tactical leaders in intelligence, prevention, investigation, and enforcement. Here, police are also partnered with other justice groups such as Crown prosecution and with supervision and rehabilitative sectors such as Probation and Corrections. Police must also continue to be focused on internal partnerships in support of National Security initiatives.

ISIS 2009 findings on Youth Violence link directly to the CACP's National Framework for Progressive Policing in Canada and the Six Principles of Modern Policing adopted in 2008, reinforcing several key themes as follows:

1. The needs of Canadian citizens have increased in terms of public safety and protection from crime and disorder, especially in the area of youth violence. Citizens expect professional, consistent, integrated and quality intervention regardless of the capacity of the various organizations, including the police.
2. Policing in Canada is predominantly governed by locally-elected officials who are the stewards of public funds. Government and citizen input into police service design, priority setting, and objectives are critical. Police are accountable to local realities and expectations and must respond to changes in service demands.
3. Modern policing requires extra-jurisdictional response capability. Effective and efficient use of all available resources is vital since demands greatly exceed capacity. Service delivery must be based on intelligent approaches to meeting local, regional, national and global needs. There must be participation of all levels of government to facilitate and ensure inter-agency cooperation concerning public safety risks and threats.
4. Assets, including those invested with the police, must be optimized nationally by sharing resources and best practices, and by removing impediments in order to fulfill local, regional, and national obligations.
5. Reciprocity and synergy are essential for achieving efficiency and effectiveness in modern policing, especially when dealing with large scale issues such as youth violence. Reaching out for additional support to maximize the effect of all the available resources has become the new reality across all Canadian police operations. The seamless exchange of information, experience, support, and skills from all agencies, not just within policing, are essential.
6. Ongoing, unrestricted, and legitimized collaboration, integration and collective decision-making among agencies are essential to sustaining and optimizing modern intervention practices. There must be adequate, appropriate, and workable mechanisms, together with a compatible and supportive policy framework from governments who accept their responsibilities in responding to youth violence.

In the *Intervention Zone*, police can be both strategically and tactically involved as an active and equal partner with clear roles and expectations, defined alongside those of other partners. If effective, such partnerships will then be directed toward individualized and context-based problem solving, and troubled youth will benefit from very personal and specific aid and programs to deal with their issue(s). Thus, police have a vital role as leaders in intelligence and early warning intervention methods, and must challenge other system actors to also become strategically focused on lasting prevention and remedial measures.

“When young people face a system that denies their opportunities and their access to resources, they can build up their own ‘anti-system’ reference groups as a way to obtain those things”.

Youth, Violence and Public Policies in Latin America
United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UN-HABITAT

To be effectively realized as a solution to Youth Violence in Canada, this calls for a program with a national scope and broad commitment among police leaders. But in practice, each *Intervention Zone* must be locally coordinated and locally driven. In the *Intervention Zone*, solutions are designed to come out of the youth’s own community and be specific to their unique problems and circumstances. Thus, the ideal leaders of this type of coordinated effort are the locally elected public officials of the communities who are closest to the problem. They can coordinate and mobilize the resources needed to deal with the issue. Globally, this was seen as the most effective approach throughout the ISIS field studies. With strong local leadership and active engagement of community leaders, ISIS 2009 believes this model can be applied to any community in Canada regardless of its size or the type of youth violence issues being faced.

To summarize ISIS 2009’s three zone concept, police need to actively minimize their involvement in strictly social development issues except for contributing to key areas as identified by *police*. Traditional enforcement in the third zone must obviously continue and legitimately belongs to the police. In the *Intervention Zone*, the ideal state proposed is a synergistic and deliberately-focused partnership with other actors, with leadership and accountability embedded at the local level. As a whole, the *Intervention Zone* model demonstrates a proactive way of dealing with youth violence issues and could be applied to any form of law enforcement initiative that requires a multi-discipline approach.

“The intervention and management of citizen security policies by local authorities are based on the principle of proximity. The idea of proximity refers not only to be physically close within a territory, but also to social accessibility of a service in human scale. This means a better knowledge of the reality, the most effective management possibility, daily monitoring and the possibility of local connection with social policies”.

Youth, Violence and Public Policies in Latin America
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The ISIS 2009 Executive Learning and Research Process

During the ISIS 2009 residential research sessions, the group selected their international study sites. These sites were chosen based on research which led ISIS 2009 to choose countries that had many similarities as well as those with vast differences to Canadian society. The ISIS team was convinced a varied cross-study would produce the most effective results related to the study of youth violence and its extremes. The following international travel sites were selected:

- United Kingdom - England, Scotland
- Europe - France, Netherlands, Spain
- South America - Chile, Colombia
- Africa - South Africa, Egypt

In order to develop a complete and broad perspective of youth violence each ISIS 2009 travel team conducted a range of interviews consisting of individuals representing the following groups:

- police
- academics
- non-governmental organizations
- social program workers
- youth
- parents
- formal and informal community leaders

In addition to our international travel research, ISIS 2009 researched potential Canadian “twinning” cities in an effort to draw relevant comparisons of our international sites back to a Canadian context.

The ISIS 2009 Team committed to a high level study of youth violence, relying on a qualitative study model. While numerous programs, initiatives and strategies related to youth violence were studied, the focus was not on quantitative data related to these programs but rather how these programs fit into the overall societal strategy and values related to youth crime. In framing the ISIS 2009 field research, the team identified six broad topic themes:

- Environmental Scan - Community Profiles
- Roles and Responsibilities
- Strategies, Initiatives, Programs
- Community Perspectives
- Violence - Frame of Tolerance
- Future

A series of research questions were developed within those themes and then used in the field interviews. The ISIS 2009 team embarked on their travel study locations with no pre-conceived assumptions or anticipated conclusions. Rather, the group relied on the information obtained during their international studies to establish their conclusions and recommendations. The travel teams were committed to learning from not only the successes of other countries but also their failures.

Post-travel collaboration between the four individual travel groups revealed differences among countries in regards to individual programs and strategies aimed at combating and preventing youth violence. However, a consistent finding emerged from all travel groups' interviews. **Police and non-police groups universally recognized that youth violence is a societal issue requiring a coordinated, integrated response and police resources alone are insufficient to solve the issue of youth violence.** It was evident that effective coordination required police agencies to restructure their resources beyond traditional police strategies, toward an earlier stage of intervention. This recognition formed the basis of the ISIS 2009 recommendations.

ISIS 2009 Global Sites and Agencies Studied

Team Africa

Egypt

Andalus Center for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies
Alliance for Arab Women
Canadian Embassy-Public Affairs Office
Egyptian Association Against Torture
Egyptian Organization for Human Rights Services
El Nadim Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture
El Nadim Center-New Woman Research Foundation
Egyptian Police Service
St. Andrew's Refuge -Youth LEAD Project
Teacher - Abraham IPRAHIM
Hotel Steinberger- Customer Service Representative

South Africa

Johannesburg / Pretoria, Guateng Province Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Johannesburg.
South Africa Police Service – Johannesburg
Headquarters
Training Division
Detective Services
Research and Curriculum Development
Crime Prevention
Center for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP), Pretoria.
South Africa Police Service – Gauteng Province
Provincial Headquarters
Department of Community Safety
Mayors Council Representative
Division of Training
Field visit to Sedibang and Sharpville
Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV)
Canadian Consul General, Cape Town
South Africa Police Service – Western Cape
Safer Schools Program
Department of Social Development
Department of the Premier, Western Cape
Chrysalis Academy-Department of Community Safety,
Department of Community Safety-Social Crime Prevention
Molo Songololo, NGO
Shiloh Community Service NOP
Center for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP)
Over the Rainbow Foundation
Eisleben School, Nyaga Region
Bambanani for Social Development, Langa, Nyaga and Lower Crossroads Region
University of Cape Town, Institute of Criminology

Team South America

Chile

University of Chile
Alberto Hurtado University
Fondation Paz Ciudadana
SENAME - Service Nationale Des Mineurs
FLACSO - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
Carabineros
Carabineros - Department of Criminology
Défensoria
Canadian Embassy - Chile
PDI – Policia de Investigaciones de Chile

Colombia

Government of Colombia
Canadian Embassy - Colombia
Organisation Internationale pour la migration - OIM
Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe
National Police - Colombia
Can Pro Hockey Club
Sécurité urbaine
Agence Canadienne de Coopération Internationale (ACDI),
Familias Del Santo Rosario, Communion Apostolic

Team United Kingdom

Scotland

Strathclyde Police-Violence Reduction Unit
Strathclyde Police-Public Protection Unit
University of Glasgow-The Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research
University of St. Andrews-Centre for Studies in Terrorism and Political Violence
University of St. Andrews-Bute Medical School
University of Dundee-The Scottish Institute for Policing Research

London

Metropolitan Police-PREVENT Delivery Unit, Community Tension Team
Home Office-Tackling Knives Action Programme
Metropolitan Police-Safer Neighbourhoods Unit
Youth Justice Board of England and Wales

Team Europe

France

Major Alain Rousseau Groupement de Gendarmerie, Département des Yvelines, Commandant la Brigade de Prévention de la Délinquance Juvenile

Ministère de l'Intérieur de la Sécurité Interieure et des libertés locales, Direction départementale de la sécurité publique de l'Essone, Préfecture de l'Essone-Évry

Stéphanie Boissard, Commissaire de Police, Chef dela Division de la Coopération Internationale.

Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales Institut National Des Hautes Études de Sécurité (INHES)

Gendarmerie Nationale-La Brigade de Prévention de la Délinquance Juvenile

The Netherlands

The Haaglanden Juvenile Police

Juvenile Rehabilitation Service-Bureau Jeugzorg

University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands

Spain

(Madrid, Barcelona/Catalunya)

Centro de Reforma Juvenil "Medina Azahara" Fundacion Diagrama, Policia-Mossos d'Esquadra Cuerpo Nacional de Policia (National Police)

Guardia Civil Headquarters

Girona Police Headquarters

Centro de Reforma Juvenil "Medina Azahara"

“We should all be ashamed when an 8 year old commits a crime.”

Mzwandile Petros - South African Police Western Cape Provincial Commissioner

The Intervention Zone: Some Keys to Success

- ISIS 2009 field research demonstrates that these coordinated efforts need to be driven and led locally, in the communities where the issue is taking place. Locally elected public officials should administer the programs with expertise being brought in to assist as needed. Input from youth should be sought in order to understand the dynamics and learn why the problem is occurring.
- There must be clearly defined roles and responsibilities amongst all the actors and each stakeholder must carry out their piece of the solution, doing the right things at the right time, with the right people. The ideal state is to have a coordinated, integrated, multi-sector response that includes joint training and which clarifies the various roles and responsibilities, developing trust between the agencies in the process. Technical expertise capable of problem analysis for each particular issue must be engaged in an environment of open communication and information sharing between the system actors.
- In Canada, current privacy laws prevent the free exchange of information with agencies outside policing. Significant legal and policy changes will need to be pursued so that real and meaningful intelligence exchange can take place between the stakeholders.
- Trust needs to be built among partners. There cannot be any false promises, or hidden agendas, made by any group involved in this effort. Success will come from multiple levels of intervention with community input over the long term.
- Research from the field studies show that the earlier the intervention takes place, the more effective it will be. Some countries try to mitigate issues during the pregnancy period and then follow up through the early formative years of the child. Compelling research shows intervention needs to take place prior to the child reaching eight years of age, or it may be too late.
- Canada must take comprehensive stock of the services and expertise that are available in order to enable a coordinated, collaborative response to youth violence issues. Everyone is responsible for the issue of youth violence, not only those working in criminal justice.
- Additional research will need to be done in terms of how outcomes will be measured and evaluated. Close examination needs to be done to ensure the right human and technical resources remain in place to sustain this type of coordinated intervention.
- A clear national strategic policy is required with the aim of serving the best interests of Canadian children and youth. An inventory of expertise, services and programs needs to be compiled, along with research into possible amendments to the privacy laws in support of this initiative.

“We talk a lot about intelligence-led policing ... they’re talking about assessment-led intervention”

ISIS 2009

**Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
Institute for Strategic International Studies**



ISIS 2009