

GLOBAL THEMES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

THE FINAL REPORT FROM THE CACP INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES RESEARCH PROJECT



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FOREWORD

On behalf of the Executive and Board of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, I am proud to introduce this final report from the International Best Practices Research Project. I also extend our congratulations to the project participants, who have completed a uniquely challenging learning experience while creating a product of importance for the Canadian criminal justice community.

A draft of the report was presented to the Steering Committee in conjunction with the project team's stimulating presentation before delegates to the 2003 Conference at Halifax. The report was officially adopted by the Board of Directors at its November 2003 meeting. Elements of the report have been forwarded to appropriate CACP Committee chairs for discussion and further action. The association will continue to seek dialogue on many of the issues raised in the report over the coming months.

The project represented a bold undertaking for the association and an important advancement in the development of leaders in policing and related fields. The Board extends its appreciation for the valuable contribution made by many individuals and organizations to the project. Their contribution was key to the success of the project.

Chief Edgar MacLeod
President

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In late winter of 2003, twelve Canadian police leaders, representing the senior ranks of municipal, provincial and federal agencies, embarked upon a unique five month learning program. Their five month project would combine online e-learning technology, intensive classroom learning sessions and planning workshops, and an unprecedented international field study spanning 3 continents and 7 countries. The primary purpose of the project was to provide a deep learning experience for current and succession-ready police leaders that would go beyond traditional educational models in building new skills, knowledge and perspectives for the participants and the entire system they represent. The secondary purpose – and the catalyst for the learning – was to study and benchmark emerging trends and practices in policing and criminal justice that could inform, stimulate and challenge the Canadian community.

The project team, sub-divided into three study teams, traveled to Australia, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, The United Kingdom and The United States, and conducted in-depth field interviews with over 20 agencies. The focus of their investigations included Transnational Organized Crime, Counter-Terrorism, Diversity Practices, Emerging Crime Trends, Multi-jurisdictional Policing Models, and Technology-based Crime Prevention.

In this report, the team presents its findings and observations in the form of general themes that emerged, supported by findings by topic, and detailed reports on each agency interviewed. Throughout the report, the team has interpreted their data in order to present challenges for Canada. It is hoped and anticipated that the results of these studies will present Canadian leaders in policing and criminal justice with new perspectives, new questions, and new ideas for further discussion and exploration.

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SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION

Background

In November of 2002, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) announced the introduction of the International Best Practices Research Project and began accepting nominations for participation. The project was conceived and developed as an executive learning opportunity for current and future leaders in policing and criminal justice at the most senior levels. Built upon an experiential learning model, the project would feature a global benchmarking study to identify noteworthy trends and practices that could inform, challenge, and stimulate the Canadian criminal justice community. Central to the learning experience was the requirement that the participants would be challenged to define, plan and execute the study within a broadly defined framework. Furthermore, they would formally present their findings and their views on the challenges for Canada to the CACP Executive Board and membership at the 2003 annual meeting in Halifax, and would ultimately produce a comprehensive report to serve the needs of their colleagues throughout the community. This is their report.

Project Milestones

The initial concept of an intensive and unique executive learning experience outside of traditional police learning boundaries was explored with CACP President – Commissioner Gwen Boniface and Past President – Chief Larry Gravill early in 2002. They endorsed the concept and championed the project.

The concept was outlined to the Board of Trustees of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Research Foundation who provided a research grant to develop the concept and create a proposal for consideration.

The ‘proposal’ was presented at the 2002 annual Trustee’s meeting in Quebec City and the Trustees recommended that CACP adopt the program and initiate the project immediately.

The CACP Board of Directors concurred and created a Steering Committee to oversee the project. A Technical Design Team was assembled, representing leading police educators from across Canada and approved by the Steering Committee, and work began on the development of the project in October 2002.

The Steering Committee approved the final project content and methodology, and endorsed the broad study framework on March 18, 2003.

Concurrent to the work of the Technical Design Team, invitations to participate were distributed to member agencies across the country. Participants were identified and the multi-mode program of learning began on April 1, 2003.

The project execution spanned five months, and included the following elements and activities:

April through August	Online exercises, assessments, learning modules and interaction via a dedicated learning forum
April	10 day intensive workshop
May-June	Planning and execution of field studies (Tours ranged from 12 to 21 days duration)
June	5 day intensive workshop
July – August	Development of presentation and report via remote interaction
August	Presentation to CACP at Halifax

Composition of the International Best Practices Project Team

At the outset of the project, participating agencies and ranks represented were as follows:

➤ Major*	Canadian Forces	Ottawa
➤ Superintendent	RCMP.	Ottawa
➤ Chief Superintendent	RCMP.	Charlottetown
➤ Superintendent	RCMP	Milton
➤ Chief Superintendent	RCMP	Surrey
➤ Inspector**	Durham Regional Police	Oshawa
➤ Deputy Chief	Waterloo Regional Police	Cambridge
➤ Inspector	Hamilton Police	Hamilton
➤ Deputy Chief	Ottawa Police	Ottawa
➤ Provincial Commander	Ontario Provincial Police	Orillia
➤ Deputy Commissioner	Ontario Provincial Police	Orillia
➤ Superintendent	Edmonton Police	Edmonton

* Unable to complete program due to illness

** Unable to complete 'field study' phase due to illness

Defining the Study

Based upon the broad framework approved by the Steering Committee, the participating project team was challenged to define and narrow the focus of three separate field study tours within the following criteria:

- To meet the learning goals, the study phase must be sufficiently challenging, broad, and diverse in design.
- To meet the product goals, the study topics must reflect current priorities and deliver high value to the community.
- To meet the 'best practices' goals, sites must be sufficiently rich in innovative practices, recognized achievements, and/or unique challenges to serve as robust sources of learning and comparison for the Canadian context.

- To meet the project’s budget goals, sites must be selected and organized in a manner that permits logical and efficient travel plans for the study teams to follow.

The team recognized that while all sites might yield information and insights of a general nature, each site was to be selected and examined as a robust source for specific topics of priority interest to the Canadian community. The team settled upon the three tours, and on the primary topics of focus for each, as follows:

Team One	Transnational Organized Crime and Counter-Terrorism	Germany and The United Kingdom
Team Two	Diversity and Emerging Crime Trends	Australia and New Zealand
Team Three	Multi-jurisdictional Policing and Technology-based Crime Prevention	USA, France (Interpol) and Italy

Through a variety of exercises and assessments, team members were ultimately matched to the tours to form three Study Teams. Throughout the 10-day April workshop, the participants were provided with a variety of supports, tools, and learning inputs to enhance their knowledge and abilities as researchers. Each team was challenged to develop a research plan that would make efficient and effective use of their limited field time, and would elicit and produce findings that would be meaningful, valid and useful to the ultimate goals of the project. On April 30, the proposed study framework was presented to members of the Steering Committee and was approved. The teams completed their travel planning and coordinated their tours with the assistance of the International Liaison Officers of the RCMP.

Organization of Study Results and Report

Upon their return from the field, the teams assembled in Ottawa for a week-long workshop to analyze and synthesize their respective data and findings. In keeping with the learning goals of the project, no specific report framework was provided to the team, and the studies had been conceived as open-ended. The collective team now faced the challenge of drawing from their extensive research into diverse topics in diverse locations to produce a coherent and high-value report for their community. As a result of their work together, a format for the final report was determined. Individuals and sub-teams assumed the task of writing and assembling the components of the report.

After the collective analysis of the study findings, the project team elected to organize and present four different types of data and interpretations for the consideration of readers across the community, as follows:

Global Themes	Five major themes emerged either from all or from some subset of all of the field studies. The project team presents these as the core results and as the most significant implications for Canadian criminal justice policies and practices derived from the project’s international research.
Findings by Study Topics and Tours	Each team provides a summary – by study topics and region – of significant lessons learned and of areas where further investigation may be warranted.

Snapshots

A number of “practices of interest” were identified through the studies and these are offered for consideration and to stimulate further discussion in the community.

Site Visit Summaries

Each team provides detailed summaries of all agencies and locations visited, including assessments of major practices and significant driving issues identified. Additional references, quotations and in some cases, contacts are provided with these summaries.

In addition, the report features an extensive bibliography of the materials and reference sources identified in the field study and/or used by the team throughout the project. The Acknowledgements section recognizes the many contributors to the project, both in Canada and in the many host agencies involved.

SECTION 2 – GLOBAL THEMES

Introducing the Global Themes

Each of the following five themes emerged from the full team’s synthesis of findings from the full range of studies. In some cases, evidence was cited in support of the principles, philosophies or practices that comprise the theme from all three study teams. In others, the evidence was most compelling in only a few of the sites or agencies, but was deemed significant in the context of the overall priorities that guided the project.

Each theme section ends with a “Challenge for Canada” for how the team’s findings and observations in the theme might guide continued development of similar ideals and practices in Canada, or might serve to stimulate dialogue and challenge us to new ways of seeing our future. While each theme speaks to a specific collection of ideas and practices, it is also clear that the themes reflect and reinforce each other throughout. As such, the team presents these five global themes, collectively, as a summary of “best practice” ideals for policing in the Canadian context.

Global Theme # 1 – Recognized Drivers and Clear Mandates

Introduction

The Canadian Oxford dictionary defines the word “DRIVE” as *“to urge in some direction, esp. forcibly, to compel or constrain forcibly or to force into a specified state”*. Thus “drivers” for the purposes of this report shall focus on those things that forced or otherwise produced a change to achieve a specific result. The Canadian Oxford dictionary defines the word “MANDATE” as *“an order given to a person, organization etc. to carry out a certain task”*.

Many of the organizations visited by the project team were found to have redefined themselves by adopting a new mandate or by repositioning themselves in the field of law enforcement. In addition it was found that several of these were in fact “driven” to adopt their new role either by events occurring outside of their control or by legislation enacted by governing authorities. In some cases the organization clearly could not address the increasing expectations of clients without specific changes to their structure or method of operation.

Not unlike our situation in Canada, law enforcement around the world has been hampered in its response to ever increasing responsibilities by the limits placed on funding and resources. Increasing public expectations of service and accountability continue to challenge organizations to find ways to respond to new demands without resource enhancements and yet continue to deliver existing services as well. In these cases some have responded by restructuring the way they operate or respond to all services. Some specialized organizations (eg. DNA, DIA in Italy) were created by pooling resources from several agencies to deal with specific issues thus limiting the impact on individual organizations.

In other cases (eg. Interpol), the agency has redefined itself to better serve its member agencies. Unable to be all things to all people a restructuring has led to a more specific

focus while still maintaining valuable services. In effect, Interpol has adopted a role as facilitator and broker, preferring to ensure member agencies share necessary information to combat crime rather than Interpol itself being the warehouse of information, or the expert in the field.

Focused Response

Many organizations have been either created or re-focused specifically on priority issues. The creation of the European Union, for example, led to the creation of Europol, while the threats and assassination of judicial officials in Italy led to the creation of the DNA and the DIA. Other examples include the BKA in Germany, which was created in the early 1960's to focus European cooperation and counter emerging terrorist groups, and the National Crime Squad in the UK, which emerged in 1996 in response to a growing recognition of organized crime operating across various boundaries. There are many more examples which clearly demonstrate the notion that to be successful one must focus or dedicate resources to specific threats.

Impact

External or internal influences sometimes are pivotal to the direction of governments and police organizations. At times these influences can be considered “drivers” in the sense that they cause the police to react, reorganize or shift their mandate to accommodate the need to focus their response on these issues.

The following represents a summary of “drivers” and the powerful and sustained impact they have had on the function or mandate of the organizations involved:

- **Bundesgrenzschutz or BGS (German Federal Border Patrol)**

As the political, military and economic imperatives of Europe have changed so have the mandated tasks of the BGS. The BGS is an internal police force now focused on border security and the protection of government officials, property and general security at airports and other government facilities. Despite the elimination of physical borders, the BGS was able to re-define its mandate within a series of value added enforcement initiatives consistent with this new role. The BGS still focuses on border integrity and on specific offences such as international smuggling operations, but they have also created a strategic belt around Germany through influence with partner agencies in the countries that surround Germany. The BGS works very closely with these partner agencies and conducts evaluations of other countries to determine if they comply with European Union standards. The philosophy behind this is to proactively set up a first line of German border integrity beyond the physical borders of their country. In essence, when the physical borders came down, the border police reinvented their mandate to provide value added services to the people of Germany. (*see also Outer Border Philosophy*)

- **Bundeskriminalamt (BKA)**

The BKA is the federal criminal policing agency that focuses on national and international crime. One of their main priorities has been organized crime. This agency acts as a conduit for information and intelligence sharing for national and international organized crime initiatives. The BKA has historical experience with national terrorism and has also had a focus on this activity since the 1970's. Post 9/11, a number of

resources were shifted from organized crime and other areas to work on anti-terrorism activities. Terrorism has become the number one priority for this agency.

- **MI5 British Security Service**

This agency, which is responsible for counter terrorism activities throughout the UK, has extensive experience in this area primarily from working on terrorist acts committed in Ireland. Due to demographics and the retirement of senior staff, MI5 is undergoing considerable change. The average age of members is between 24 and 34 years of age and the majority have no police training or background, which is somewhat problematic. An internal review was conducted with many recommendations for change being implemented. One of these includes exchange programs with police organizations in the UK to facilitate cooperation and information sharing.

- **Her Majesty's Customs Service – UK**

To reduce time in court and assist in alleviating disclosure issues, HM Customs Service focuses on the disruption of organized crime groups. They believe this type of approach has more impact. This focus of operations has created significant debate amongst law enforcement. (*see also Snapshots: "Disruption vs. Dismantling"*)

- **National Criminal Intelligence Service – UK**

The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) was created pursuant to Police Act legislation in 1997. It had been recognized that a gap existed between crimes being committed and the resources needed to investigate. The National Intelligence model was developed to introduce Intelligence Led Policing to police agencies in the UK for the purposes of attending to this crime problem. The NCIS mandate is to prepare national threat assessments and recommend priorities and to facilitate the flow of intelligence to and from agencies.

- **Australian Crime Commission**

In response to an effectiveness audit by the Commonwealth Government looking at ways to better respond to organized crime and emerging crime issues, the Australian Crime Control Commission was created. The Commission is an amalgamation of three former agencies - The Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, The Australian Crime Authority and The Office of Strategic Crime Assessments. The amalgamation was also driven by a view that Australia did not have a coordinated and focused way of managing information, analyzing intelligence and targeting groups or issues on a national level. Companion legislation now also provides unique powers of inquiry to the Commission. The creation of this new agency is seen as creating a foundation to improve overall crime management for the entire country as well as a cohesive overlay for the various state police agencies.

- **Australian Federal Police**

The AFP is currently undergoing a significant redesign brought about by a changing focus to issues outside of Australia. The philosophy adopted most recently is to disrupt crime syndicates and other transnational crime where it originates, and certainly before it reaches Australia.

- **New Zealand Police Service**

The New Zealand Police Service has been actively responding to the New Zealand Government's commitment to its treaty with the Maori people. This treaty requires a significant focus on Maori issues and has led to changes in the approach and focus by the New Zealand police. This focus is comprehensive and ranges from embedding the Maori culture within the police service to ensuring the workforce reflects a target-driven diverse workforce.

- **Central Intelligence Agency**

The CIA has modified service delivery since the terrorist events of 9/11 in the United States. While still focused on foreign intelligence, they have created linkages with many federal agencies in the U.S. to facilitate the sharing of relevant information and intelligence with domestic law enforcement.

- **Regional Information Sharing Systems (R.I.S.S.)**

The R.I.S.S. projects have shifted from providing facilities to member agencies to facilitate the exchange of information to significantly enhancing its ability to connect member agencies with each other. Their primary focus to accomplish this has been to create an enhanced web-based secure intranet for member agencies to use. This new network links all federal, state and local member agencies who, following 9/11, were seeking a means to quickly and effectively share information related to terrorist and other crime activities.

The Challenge for Canada

The terrorist attacks in the United States which occurred on 11 Sep 2001 have had a tremendous impact world wide. New units have come to life, some agencies have changed their focus, and others have concentrated on making sure they eliminate gaps to properly address terrorism in a proactive way. There is a particular focus on intelligence gathering and sharing with a renewed emphasis on ensuring interoperability between agencies on a practical level and specifically by means of technology.

Some attempts at integration using different models have met with varied success mainly because these models have relied upon the full trust and cooperation of involved agencies. This is not to suggest that most agencies do not trust each other or lack some desire to cooperate. But, many human and political factors appear to limit to these qualities, and unfortunately also limit the success of these ventures.

In our observations, where success has been sustained, the drivers have been recognized and absolute. And, the resulting mandates are clear to all concerned.

In Canada the issue of integration has not been clearly defined. It is obvious to most that we need to work together, to share information and to cooperate to achieve the desired results. It has even been said that Canadians might be better served by having one police agency for the entire country. In some respects this notion would relieve some concerns, but would it create others? Is this the "integration" needed to be truly effective?

In Canada today we also see a renewal taking place spawned, for the most part, by the events of 9/11, but will we be successful at sustaining this renewal? Will more integrated units or joint force operations bring about true collaboration, and true cooperation, or true “integrated” policing? Will we truly find solutions to the ages old issue of information sharing?

We have come a long way and are enjoying some success. Judging by our findings throughout this project, Canadians can and should be proud of what we have accomplished in the realm of law enforcement. But is this enough?

Our research would suggest that there is no magic solution, no silver bullet nor “golden fleece”, which we can use as a guide to shape the future of policing in Canada. But, our “DRIVER” should be our collective desire to provide the best possible service to the public we serve. The public expect us to work together, to share information and to cooperate to the extent needed to get the job done.

Our study indicates that we must crystallize our commitment to such a course. This message repeats itself throughout each of the themes which follow in this report, and time and again, it is clear that to fully achieve the best practices we seek to apply, we must fully harness the driving forces around us. If we are not successful in this, legislators, or events, will no doubt provide the “drivers” for change.

The question we most often found ourselves discussing after all of our site visits was, “Do we have to wait for a 9/11 to occur in Canada?”

Global Theme #2 – Integration

“We are increasingly living in a global village.” - Marshall McLuhan

Introduction

When analyzing the results of the various site visits, it became quickly apparent that our counterparts around the world have come to terms with the reality that serious crime is no longer simply a local phenomenon, nor one that can be dealt with by solely one agency. This explains the fact that one of the most consistently observed and salient qualities of the various agencies studied was their commitment to the principle of integration.

The term “integration” as used herein means *“to combine two or more things in order to become more effective”* (Cambridge International Dictionary of English). In this regard, we were able to observe and document numerous instances of integration that resulted in a significant improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of the agency and agencies in question.

Notable Examples of Integration

- **BGS (German Federal Border Patrol)**

The BGS (German Federal Border Patrol) utilizes Liaison Officers who are deployed in countries which have the greatest impact on Germany's border integrity. The Liaison Officers work with the BGS' partner agencies in these other countries and facilitate both the sharing of information and the analysis of relevant intelligence. There is a move within the European Union to one day extend this strategy so as to create a unified European Border Police. As one BGS official stated, *"Good will is not sufficient. Joint structures are required."*

- **BKA (German Federal Criminal Police)**

The BKA (German Federal Criminal Police) utilizes Liaison Officers in fifty- six countries to facilitate investigations and the exchange of intelligence relating to serious crimes, particularly organized crime and terrorism.

- **Multi-Agency "Information Boards"**

Germany makes use of multi-agency "Information Boards" in order to facilitate the timely sharing of sensitive intelligence. The Boards are comprised of representatives of participating law enforcement and intelligence agencies and are chaired by the Ministry of Justice.

- **European Schengen Information System**

The European Schengen Information System is a multinational database available to law enforcement and immigration officials of those countries who have ratified the Schengen Agreement. The computer database contains information on people who are suspected of being involved in criminal activity. (Note: The stated purpose of the Schengen Agreement is for all participating countries to remove controls at their airports as well as land and sea ports of entry).

- **German ZKA (Zollkriminalamt – Customs Agency)**

The German ZKA (Zollkriminalamt – Customs Agency) applies considerable focused efforts at integrating their enforcement activities with both domestic and international partners. They have acknowledged and accepted that success is dependent on integration.

- **The Home Office's National Policing Plan**

The Home Office's National Policing Plan, which mandates cooperation between police services and other social and community agencies, requires that all police agencies follow the National Intelligence Model. The National Intelligence Model mandates that local, regional, and national crime profiles be developed and disseminated to the various law enforcement agencies. This task is accomplished with the assistance of the National Criminal Intelligence Service.

- **MI5's (British Security Service) Exchange Program**

MI5's (British Security Service) operates an exchange program with British police agencies, other law-enforcement agencies/intelligence agencies as well as their international exchange program with other countries. MI5 has recognized that integration between various law enforcement services is critical to their success (this view is also shared by the London Metropolitan Police and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency).

- **Establishment of the National Crime Squad (Great Britain)**

The establishment of the National Crime Squad (Great Britain) occurred in recognition of the need to create a more coordinated structure for the purpose of improving the U.K.'s effectiveness and efficiency in redressing the problem of serious and organized crime. In this regard, Great Britain long ago realized that serious and organized crime transcends local, regional and national borders. The sworn membership of the NCS is comprised of secondments from police services across the country. Its mandate is national and international in scope.

- **HM Customs and Excise's (Great Britain) Integrated Enforcement Strategy**

HM Customs and Excise (Great Britain) applies an integrated enforcement strategy, which relies in part upon coordinated intelligence gathering/enforcement activities with other countries.

- **Immigration and Nationality Directorate**

The Immigration and Nationality Directorate (under the U.K.'s Home Office) applies a strategy of placing immigration liaison officers overseas in strategic locations.

- **Creation of the U.S. Terrorist Threat Integration Center**

The creation of the U.S. Terrorist Threat Integration Center combined elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI's Counter-terrorism Division, the CIA, and the Department of Defense. The mandate of the TTIC is to *"Integrate terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture"* (Whitehouse Fact Sheet – January 28, 2003).

- **U.S. Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Program**

The purpose of the U.S. Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Program is to ensure the sharing of intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in many locations across jurisdictional lines. It is funded by the federal government and administered by the U.S. Dept of Justice. There are six regional intelligence-sharing centres which operate in mutually exclusive geographic regions.

- **Interpol's Fusion Task Force**

Interpol's Fusion Task Force is dedicated to providing assistance to member countries so as to facilitate both the disruption and dismantlement of criminal entities that play a central role in the funding or support of terrorist activities.

- **Italy's DIA (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia)**

Italy's DIA is mandated to carry out intelligence activities targeting organized crime and to conduct investigations exclusively of mafia and mafia-related matters. The DIA is an example of a successfully integrated agency comprised of members from three federal policing agencies (Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri, and Guardia di Finanza).

- **AFP's Law Enforcement Cooperation Program**

Australia makes use of liaison officers for the purpose of facilitating counter-terrorism and organized crime investigations. Like the German Federal Border Police, the objective is to stop the problem before it arrives in the country. Another priority of the AFP is to become better integrated with the state police.

In all of these examples above, we found a combination of the influence of driving forces upon their sustained efforts and successes. We also made note of some critical risk factors, and gathered many of the lessons these agencies have learned. And, throughout our studies, implications for the Canadian context continued to emerge.

Lessons Learned With Respect to Integration

- ◆ Conducting a strategic planning process without the involvement of partners or proposed partners is ill advised.
- ◆ Failing to ensure police databanks of partner law enforcement agencies can “talk to” one another is counterproductive.
- ◆ Failing to create a single repository for intelligence on terrorism and organized crime and the inadequate sharing of relevant intelligence with appropriate partner agencies (domestic or foreign) hinders law enforcement’s ability to effectively and efficiently deal with these unlawful activities.
- ◆ Failing to develop personal relationships with partner agencies interferes with effective communications: *“In order to overcome most difficulties in cross-jurisdictional situations, you must develop personal relationships with the officers of other countries.” (German BKA Official)*. We would add that this insight is not limited to cross-jurisdictional interaction between foreign states, but applies to domestic relations between diverse agencies. Again, as stated by a BKA official, success is predicated upon *“... reliability, cooperation, trust, relationships and preparedness”*.
- ◆ With respect to interagency cooperation and integration... *“good will is not sufficient. Joint structures are required”*. (German BGS official). In this regard, there will always be agencies that will not participate in integrated activities on their own. In such cases, government policy direction or legislation may be required.
- ◆ A fully integrated agency (e.g. Great Britain’s National Crime Squad, or the American Regional Information Sharing Systems Program) created to deal specifically with regional or national organized crime issues cannot be financed and supported solely through local or regional police services. Independent funding is required to ensure its effectiveness.
- ◆ There is a propensity towards a “closed-shop” mentality in police organizations that impedes a coordinated response to crime issues. It may be that this problem arises because of the unending strain on resources that many agencies struggle with, and the subsequent need to put local issues first. It took the 9/11 terrorist attack to motivate integration and cooperation between many agencies that would have otherwise retained an essentially “command silo” mentality.

Inherent Risks Associated With Integration

The German, English and American officials all made a point of stating the following risks:

- ♦ While integration with law enforcement/ security agencies is critical to success, sufficient care must be taken to insulate intelligence services from police disclosure obligations.
- ♦ The development of partnerships is a critically important form of an integrated response to crime related issues. However, the partnership relationship must be clearly defined so as to avoid duplication of effort on the one hand, and the inappropriate downloading of responsibilities on the other. This is especially true in cases where the partnership involves entities which are not law enforcement agencies.

Implications of Integration for Canadian Policing

The concept of an integrated response to crime is nothing new to Canada. For example, in the first report of the Steering Committee on Integrated Justice Information (Department of the Solicitor General of Canada, March, 1999, pg. 32), the following statement is made:

Governments have recognized that effective cooperation, coordination, and sharing of information among jurisdictions are keys to developing and implementing successful strategies for public safety. Meeting new challenges requires more frequent interaction with our partners, including increased consultation and partnerships with provinces and territories. Working in partnership introduces new perspectives on problems resulting in innovative solutions.

Additionally, all criminal justice professionals are aware of the Bernardo Investigation Review conducted by Mr. Justice Archie Campbell wherein recommendations were made such as:

- ♦ The implementation of a major case management system based on co-operation rather than rivalry.
- ♦ The creation of mechanisms to ensure unified management, accountability and coordination among police forces and law enforcement agencies.
- ♦ The formation of a centrally supported organizational structure based on co-operation among individual police forces that combines unified leadership across police jurisdictions with organized case management procedures and interdisciplinary support from forensic scientists and other agencies.

Many other recommendations made in the Campbell report are based upon the need for greater collaboration, coordination and communication between police services.

Although an *ad hoc* system of Joint Force Operations (JFOs) and Memoranda of Agreement (MOUs) already exists in Canada, and these will always have their place, the creation of formalized and enduring structures would facilitate a more productive integration of resources, and thereby, significantly enhance effectiveness and efficiency.

The Challenge for Canada

In light of the foregoing, including the lessons learned from our foreign counterparts, it is recommended that various jurisdictions give serious and renewed consideration to ideas that will enhance integration, including the following:

- ◆ Establishing specialized investigative bureaus such as the Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia, which is a prime example of an integrated response to the problem of organized crime in that Province (also reference the UK's National Crime Squad whose mandate is to investigate serious and organized crime).
- ◆ The regionalization of police services in larger urbanized areas with adjacent suburbs and towns (e.g. the regional police services of Ontario).
- ◆ The development of regional crime profiles that are shared throughout each province and territory.
- ◆ The creation of Liaison Officer positions. These positions would be assigned to work with partner law enforcement/security agencies. The RCMP Liaison Officer program (in foreign countries) serves as an excellent example that could also be applied domestically and in a reciprocal manner in the larger jurisdictions.
- ◆ Linking law enforcement databases (e.g. the Alberta Public Safety Network project).
- ◆ Ensuring that partnership agreements with non-law enforcement organizations provide a fitting role for the police.

While it may be commonly recognized that integration is the key to increased efficiency and effectiveness, and while there are notable examples where this is practiced in Canada, it is respectfully submitted that law enforcement in this country is not where it could and should be with respect to this issue.

Ultimately, the power to make any meaningful headway with respect to integration may not rest with police executives. The reality is that reaching the appropriate level of integration will require increased funding and legislative changes (i.e. political will). Are tragedies such as the Bernardo case and 9/11 truly the most effective catalyst for positive action? In this regard, it seems fitting to quote this excerpt from a Special Report printed in the Vancouver Sun in September 2001. It is respectfully submitted that the conditions described in this excerpt are not atypical of Canadian policing today:

Two decades after Clifford Olson began abducting and murdering children on the Lower Mainland, B.C. police agencies still face major roadblocks when trying to catch organized, mobile serial predators, a Vancouver Sun investigation has found.

The patchwork quilt of municipal police forces and RCMP detachments across the province often manage their cases differently, lack the specialized training being provided officers elsewhere, and use a wide array of computer systems that are often incompatible with one another.

There are no clear provincial policies to make sure information on major crimes is shared, and no guidelines governing how and when agencies come together to form joint task forces when a predator begins crossing jurisdictions.

A number of police forces also lack the resources to do day-to-day work, let alone commit officers to work on multi-agency teams.

[Excerpt from a Vancouver Sun Article entitled “Special Report: Missing Women: Part Five”, dated Wednesday, September 26, 2001, by Lindsay Kines, Lori Culbert and Kim Bolan]

Again, as declared above, we submit that in Canada we must find and harness our “drivers”, and integration must become a clear and compelling “mandate” for all relevant agencies.

Global Theme # 3 – Outer (Extended) Border Philosophy

Introduction

Over the previous two decades, the political, military and economic imperatives of Europe have continuously changed in order to effectively respond to globalization. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the advent of the European Union (EU), and the opening of eastern European borders, while facilitating economic, social and political assimilation, have also created a series of exceptional challenges for police at the municipal, state and national level.

European policing agencies have implemented, effectively and efficiently, a series of proactive intelligence-led and integrated strategies that are highly adaptable to the present Canadian policing environment. The use of early warning systems in Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), respectively referred to as the “*Outer Border Philosophy*” and the “*Strategic Belt*”, have provided tangible and measurable results in assailing organized crime and terrorism, both domestically and internationally.

The outer border philosophy and the strategic belt both describe a multi-faceted doctrine as practiced by police throughout Europe incorporating the following practices:

- ◆ A respect for the distinctiveness and autonomy of each country within the EU while valuing cooperation and collaboration (“*Solidarity with Responsibility*”).
- ◆ Each participating nation engages their first line of defense beyond traditional geographic borders and false functional walls while striking the necessary balance between self-interest and altruism.
- ◆ Countries establish liaison postings to specific international locations that have issues that directly impact on the sponsoring country, resulting in a clustering of the right people in the right place doing the right things for the right reasons.
- ◆ This network model engages rapid interventions by way of joint structures, standardized processes, cross-functional teams and continuous and unfettered real-time information sharing and analysis of intelligence, in a context of “boundary-lessness” across disciplines and agencies.

- ◆ In addition to a liaison role, the philosophy engages the police in the practices of a target migration and border expansion strategy whereby the police agency of original jurisdiction follows the criminals as they move geographically. Police officers with the greatest working knowledge on a specific group or organization will travel with the criminals as they move from one jurisdiction to another, sharing their expertise and information on the group with the receiving jurisdiction and providing real-time intelligence. This creates previously unrealized opportunities for both disruption and dismantlement that were historically lost due to “jurisdictional disconnect”. This is particularly invaluable in the area of international terrorism where failure to immediately intervene can be unforgiving.
- ◆ Investigational priorities are further facilitated through “Information Boards” comprised of representatives from key agencies who meet once a week in order to accommodate the immediate collection, comparison, analysis, dissemination and sharing of sensitive information. This provides for a single point of contact and a common understanding.

To conquer some of the challenges associated with these endeavours, one senior operational commander in the German Border Police stated that, “. . . *to overcome most difficulties in cross-jurisdictional situations, you must develop personal relationships with the officers of other countries*”. Once the policing issue has been mitigated, liaison personnel will transfer to the next geographic “hot point”. Cooperating countries adopt a common standard for enforcement (laws, documents, legal foundation) and are subject to continuous evaluation for compliance to the standard set by a council representing the European Union.

Tangible and measurable results of this philosophy are exhibited within practices of Her Majesty’s Customs Service (HMCS) and the German Federal Border Patrol, each of whom have established partnerships and information sharing in their fight against organized crime at the domestic and international levels. They effectively utilize intelligence, electronic surveillance and technical support in dismantling or disrupting a criminal organization, consistent with their government’s strategic direction.

An example of the philosophy is founded within Project “Airbridge”, which involves liaison officers working in cooperation with international partners in the apprehension and suppression of suspect individuals en-route to the United Kingdom (UK). Here, a passenger manifest is reduced to a compact disk and provided to HMCS, in the UK, prior to the flight’s departure for the UK. Contents of the manifest are processed through a common database and suspect individuals are identified prior to arrival at destination. This process has been highly successful for the removal of couriers at source, and facilitates prioritization at a higher level within the criminal organization.

In Germany, the Federal Border Patrol (BGS) are responsible for protecting Germany’s borders, which include the Czech Republic and Poland. Of greatest concern is the international smuggling of drugs, goods and illegal immigrants. Their “Outer Border” philosophy involves international inter-agency secondments with a central coordinator creating a single touch-point for facilitation. German police train the trainers, further developing leaders in the respective organizations and enhancing relationships in foreign jurisdictions. This heightens the level of competency in border integrity within their own country and that of their neighbours, which in turn increases German border

security. Since 1999, this partnership with Poland has seen a twenty-five percent (25%) reduction in the number of illegal immigrants arriving in Germany.

In Australia, we also discovered evidence of this philosophy in practice. The AFP have placed liaison officers throughout the South Pacific to provide an outer border of early detection and interdiction of criminal activity that may be bound for their shores.

The Challenge for Canada

In combating organized crime and terrorism, the use of early warning systems such as the “Outer Border Philosophy” and the “Strategic Belt” provide tangible and measurable results. This is exemplified in Project “Airbridge” involving Her Majesty’s Customs Service and international policing partners, as well as in the German experience through the utilization of intelligence gathering, border expansion and enforcement standards on an international scale. Enhanced leadership, competence, cooperation and quality of investigations are only some of the by-products of early warning systems that serve to facilitate increased border integrity. While a deeper examination of the details of this philosophy may be necessary within our geographical and political contexts, both examples cited appear to have clear adaptability within the Canadian context.

Global Theme # 4 – Cultural Competency

Introduction

The concepts and challenges in addressing cultural diversity are neither new nor unfamiliar to Canadian police services. However, the term “***culturally competent policing services***” was coined, during the first day of interviews in Australia, by the Cultural Diversity & Aboriginal Coordination teams of the New South Wales Police. It defined their mission. This phrase both captured the study team’s collective imagination and later seemed to confirm and define the objectives of our research in simple and powerful terms.

To set proper context, policing structures in Australia and New Zealand are somewhat different. In Australia, policing – both municipal and rural – is provided by police services in each of the six federated states and Northern Territory. The study group visited New South Wales and Victoria state police services.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is the Commonwealth’s criminal law enforcement arm specializing in organized and transnational crime, illicit drug trafficking and other national cross-jurisdictional interests. The AFP also provides more traditional policing services exclusively to the Australian Capital Territory (Canberra). The group researched AFP offices in Sydney, Melbourne and the headquarters in Canberra.

Policing in New Zealand is provided by a single national police service - the New Zealand Police. Sites visited included the National Headquarters in Wellington, District offices in Wellington, Palmerston North, Rotorua, Auckland, and the Royal New Zealand Police College.

From the Australian and New Zealand perspective, diversity is the quality of being different and unique at an individual or group level. Valuing diversity is recognizing and respecting the importance of human difference. Diversity encompasses gender, cultural and linguistically diverse backgrounds, sexual orientation, as well as people with disabilities.

As in Canada, Australia and New Zealand are desired destinations for people emigrating from other lands. And, not unlike Canada, there exists a history of poor relations between indigenous peoples and the police in both Australia and New Zealand. Indigenous communities continue to view their relationship with the police as confrontational and perceive that bias and discrimination are linked to the visibility of their people in public spaces.

During the study of these various agencies, each facing complex challenges in diversity, we observed a range of progress and success. From the most impressive examples, a number of sub-themes emerged and gave meaning to this concept of cultural competency: managing change, training members, engaging diverse communities, encouraging confidence in police services, and building organizations that reflect the communities they serve. Taken collectively, we believe these sub-themes speak to and help to define a fully integrated commitment to “Cultural Competency” that goes well beyond policy statements and individual programs and initiatives.

Engendering Change

Since change is a constant in modern policing, facilitating and managing progressive change begins with strong leadership and flourishes in an environment of collaboration and understanding.

Police services studied in Australia and New Zealand possess policies, programs and action plans designed to generate change in their respective organizations. The most effective motivators involve either federal or state legislation, or are as a result of commissions of inquiry.

In Australia, organizational priorities have been established based on various Royal Commissions dealing with police corruption and significant issues between Aboriginal peoples and police (an example of which is the issue of Aboriginal deaths in police custody).

The Australian State of Victoria recently endorsed the Wur-cum barra strategy (‘work’ in the Wathawurrung Aboriginal language). The strategy commits the public service (including the Police) to double the number of jobs for Indigenous Victorians. As a result, Victoria Police established strategic hiring targets.

The Victoria Ministry of Police sought to facilitate significant change when they hired the first female Chief Commissioner of Police in Australia. Chief Commissioner Christine Nixon has commenced a progressive series of actions to ultimately change the face of her police service. In addition to State legislated hiring goals for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, she has set organizational targets for women, people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, and people with disabilities.

The Treaty of Witangi was drawn up and first signed by 46 Maori chiefs in 1840, and the treaty remains the foundation of race relations in modern New Zealand. In the mid 1990's, the New Zealand government made a commitment to the terms of the Treaty, requiring each federal agency to uphold its principles. The New Zealand Police, under previous Commissioner Peter Doone's leadership, made a firm commitment to having a more comprehensive Maori Responsiveness approach. Between 1995 and 1998, a number of reports concluded that negative perceptions and relationships continued to exist between the Maori community and the police. The Service dedicated itself to incorporating positive actions in business planning processes beginning in 1999 and extending to 2006 under the leadership of current Commissioner Rob Robinson. The November 2002 Review of New Zealand Police Service Delivery to Maori determined that more positive steps have been taken to close the gap between the police and Maori communities and encouraged the continuation of partnerships in strategic planning for the future.

Engaging Communities

Engaging communities means developing clear and comprehensive processes for sharing information and concerns between the community and the Police. Mutual understanding, agreement and partnerships are the desired outcomes.

Advisory committees at various levels abound in all the areas studied in both New Zealand and Australia. These consultative committees range from the strategic level, as seen in the New Zealand Commissioner's Maori Focus Forum, and the New South Wales Police and Ethnic Communities Advisory Council (PECAC - chaired by the Commissioner), to local community advisory groups. In New Zealand, such advisory groups exist at both the District and local area levels, where the community has significant input into action plans.

The liaison officer model predominates in both countries as the mechanism of choice to reach out and work with diverse communities. Multicultural, Aboriginal, Women's, Gay & Lesbian, and Iwi (Maori) liaison officers are but a few examples. In some cases, these functions are performed by police officers, and in others by civilian staff hired for the purpose. Organizational commitment ranges from part time sworn staff to full time specialized community based officers. All provide a more tangible link to the diverse communities they serve. The New Zealand Wellington District's commitment to a socio-economically depressed community in Lower Hutt was one constructive example of the effectiveness of liaison officers. The establishment of a Women's Liaison Officer position, staffed by a female Inspector, was done to recruit, retain and increase the acceptance of, and respect for, the role of women in the Victoria Police Service.

In many cases, officers from particular ethnicities were assigned to serve those same communities. Meetings with Lower Hutt Maori community advisors clearly demonstrated that they highly valued officers from other cultures who demonstrated sensitivity, awareness and commitment particularly when the community took responsibility for nurturing and developing the police officers

Community members told us that, in order to be most effective, police services need to have the right people in the right places. To reinforce that need, local area Maori advisory members sit on selection panels for community liaison officers.

The power of appropriate and motivated people is no more dramatically illustrated than in the example of Senior Constable Nick Tuitasi. Senior Constable Tuitasi, of Somoan descent, was transferred to the Youth Aid Officer position in the Mount Roskill area of Auckland. This function was traditionally viewed as a pre-retirement post and expectations were not high. Senior Constable Tuitasi saw the complexity of problems in the community that fostered increased crime and disorder problems involving the Mount Roskill youth. He and a former area politician joined forces with other police and community members to launch the Community Approach Program in 1993. A Massey University evaluation in 2001 concluded that this was a fine example of the police and community working together to promote change for a number of affected families.

Educating the Workforce

In this case, education stands for ensuring that members of police agencies have an awareness of diversity issues and the pervasive effect bias and discrimination can have on communities.

Diversity training was another recurrent theme in the study. Again there was a range of efforts and processes in Australia and New Zealand to work to increase sensitivity to ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity.

The Australian Federal Police and the New South Wales Police offer online learning programs for employees. The AFP 4-hour course is mandatory for all employees and forms part of their individual performance management requirement. A 100% pass mark on the New South Wales Police Intranet Cultural Training self-test is required of all members who seek to be part of the promotion process.

New South Wales and Victoria have cultural diversity & Aboriginal coordination programs in place to deliver disability awareness and cultural training to members of their respective organizations. Maori language training is offered to members in all New Zealand Police Districts.

The most inspiring program involved the New Zealand Police and their integration of Maori culture in various aspects of police member development. Beginning with recruit training at the Royal New Zealand Police College, new officers receive Maori and diversity foundation training. Recruits spend a significant portion of their studies learning about the Maori culture from the community. They have an overnight stay at a local Marai (sacred house of peace) where they will learn about Maori traditions. Their initial training period ends with entire recruit wings performing the awesome Haka (traditional Maori dance) for their families and recruit colleagues.

Encouraging Confidence

Encouraging confidence means demonstrating sustained and real commitment through positive action and accountability.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) have recognized historical tension and worked to break down negative views & perceptions of policing in Aboriginal communities. They celebrate indigenous cultures by incorporating Aboriginal ceremonies at their Training

Academy, involve Aboriginal student interns in a cadet program, and provide information booths during annual reconciliation events and gatherings.

The Australian experience was most compelling in the supports, both internal and external, for the Gay and Lesbian communities. The Australian Federal Police and Victoria Police had strong employee support mechanisms. Both agencies provide a Gay and Lesbian Police Employee Network that both supports members and provides advice on strategies and initiatives relevant to the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender and intersex communities. Since 1997, the AFP has provided both a network of Harassment Contact Officers and a Confidant Program. Both are ways for internal victims of harassment or bullying to seek advice or advise management of adverse situations.

Social services agencies in Rotorua, part of New Zealand Police Bay of Plenty District, have established effective partnerships involving the devolution of program control from police to the appropriate agency/authority with the Police Service providing support. The Mana Social Services Trust is one example of a community agency providing family group conferencing style diversion programs for young offenders from the Maori community.

The Maori Advisory Committee for the Central Police District has developed a Sudden Death response policy for officers attending scenes involving Maori victims. A training package was completed in 2001 with delivery to front line police officers commencing shortly after. An unintended outcome of the training was that it served to reinforce positive models of the Maori community in the eyes of the officers. From the community perspective, the process enhanced trust in the police. Community and police participants agreed that a key factor was that the policy was formulated from scratch in full partnership. Senior Sergeant Gordon Rongonui, a Maori Liaison Officer said, *"It is about how we can help each other, rather than the police saying, 'how can we help you and here is how we can do it'."* Other public agencies are now expressing a keen interest in the policy.

The most telling example of encouraging confidence is the embedding and integration of Maori culture into daily New Zealand Police work life. This was consistently demonstrated in the two standard greetings offered in each location visited. The European/North American style greeting with handshakes and short introductory words of welcome, along with the traditional Maori greeting with lengthy introductions, prayers, songs, and *hongi* (nose and forehead touching). Senior Sergeant Gordon Rongonui, a long-serving Maori officer, explained the significance of the *hongi* was that both participants were acknowledging *'breathing the same air'* and were then better able to understand one another.

Embodying the Community

Embodying the community means having a workforce that reflects the diversity of the community it serves and building an internal culture that is inclusive and respectful of that community.

Recruiting people from diverse backgrounds into police services was a strong theme in all the areas studied. Most police agencies had hiring plans to increase community

representation with New Zealand, Victoria and the AFP having the most accountable goals because of the positive pressure imposed by governing authorities.

The New South Wales Police are in the midst of a process that will increase their sworn compliment. Accompanying that is a commitment to increase their Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander demographic to 2%. They have created a Recruitment Bridging Course arranged in partnership with Adult Multicultural Education Services. This course is designed to effectively prepare aboriginal applicants for the recruitment process.

Victoria Police admitted to having one of the lowest rates of female representation in Australian police services, and in response, they have formulated strong objectives for the increased hiring of women. They are now awaiting a government decision concerning their application for positive discrimination in setting aggressive hiring targets. Victoria Police were about to embark on a review of their recruiting process as part of an overall five year strategic plan. Among the areas to be scrutinized is the current initial interview 'filter'. This interview is conducted by the station Senior Sergeant in the area that the applicant is from.

The New Zealand Police have set projected hiring targets for 2005 that are 12.5% Maori, 6% Pacific Islanders, and 20% women. The Police Human Resources section has plans to look at potential systemic bias in their recruiting system, but have yet to start their review. Additionally, they have no centrally established recruiting priorities and devolve the responsibility for recruiting to selected District-based officers.

The New Zealand Police also have preparatory courses for those from the Maori and Pacific Peoples communities who intend to apply to the Service. A successful example is in the Bay of Plenty District where the Maori recruit preparation course is conducted by a private firm in partnership with the police. Of the 50% of the class that passes the preparatory course, 100% are successful in the police recruit selection process.

The Challenge for Canada

As in Australia and New Zealand, the changing demographic profile of Canada will continuously alter the safety needs of the community.

Most of the programs, initiatives and practices observed would not in themselves be considered novel approaches, particularly to those who have had a broader depth of experience in diversity issues here in Canada. The research team has highlighted some interesting practices, processes and experiences. More significantly, we have sought to broaden the meaning of providing *culturally competent police services* in an increasingly diverse environment.

We believe such a fully integrated commitment is in order in the Canadian context. Cultural competency in a police organization indicates having the capacity to reflect the diversity of the community it serves while embracing a workplace culture that accommodates, supports and celebrates the same diversity. It means confronting change constructively in order to strive for ways to do things better, providing equitable services to the whole community, and letting its members' deeds speak for themselves.

Global Theme # 5 – Business and Performance Measures

Another recurring theme experienced by the three teams is a growing interest by agencies to improve performance management through strong reporting and measurement protocols. Several agencies have well-developed and complex systems of metrics which are “*the basic building blocks of performance management*”. In many jurisdictions, this goes beyond the traditional measurement of crime rates or the collection of statistics around police activity such as traffic enforcement contacts, calls-for-service workload, or amount of drugs seized. Rather, the trend is to introduce independent and professional evaluation that traces the effectiveness or value derived from the investment (outcomes), as opposed to merely monitoring and measuring the use of resources (inputs) and their allocation to programs (outputs).

To some extent, police managers often see improving performance management as the application of modern business practices to the work of policing. For the most part, this is driven by higher levels of accountability demanded by governments and oversight boards and the linking of outcomes to resource supports. Simply stated, limited government funding is allocated to areas of highest priority. These areas of highest priority are often judged on perceptions of value and best overall return. Government is motivated to find the right “*cocktail mix of resources*” for the greatest overall good of citizens across a myriad of mandates.

Internal to police agencies, the availability of resources will never match the service and project demands. Police leadership, similar to government leadership, needs a way to ensure that priorities are supported, resources are allocated effectively, business plans are achieved and outputs are aligned to desired outcomes. A performance management system that incorporates balanced and effective measures, external evaluation and agreed-to definitions of success is such a way. For instance, the Australian Federal Police has recognized that the collection of appropriate performance information “. . . assist[s] managers in the evaluation and design of both policy and procedure. . . becoming increasingly central to the process of government . . . giv[ing] ministers, agencies, Parliament and other interested parties a database of information on performance and effectiveness. . . [a] basis . . . to develop robust performance management systems that allow them [the police and government] to maintain a cycle of continuous improvement.”

The growing shift to measuring effectiveness of the Australian Police relative to other government programs has led to some interesting studies. For example, the cost-benefit analysis of fraud and drug investigations has demonstrated a return of over five dollars to the community for every dollar invested in drug and fraud policing, “*comparing the price of an output to the value of an outcome*”. Similarly, through benchmarking with 18 North American and European countries on heroin seizure rates, the AFP articulated the positive social and community impacts of reducing the supply of heroin at the street level. As a result, the AFP has been able to link and highlight its contribution to making Australia a healthier and safer community in which to live.

This type of effective performance management, which also works across several other agencies such as Health, Customs, Social Services and local government, supports advancement of the organization and improves understanding of the value provided relative to other public policy choices.

This growing sophistication in performance management is not limited to Australia. The New Zealand Police use a building block framework of seven themes to achieve the strategic goals of Community Safety and Crime Reduction. The last two themes “resource allocation” and “monitoring and evaluation” are used to improve overall police effectiveness. Sub-strategies include: *to improve resource allocation using intelligence, to respond to changing needs, to develop greater organizational flexibility, and to invest in evaluation, research and international benchmarking of most effective police practices.*

Our studies of European agencies, focused around integration, also support the belief that robust performance management is required to sustain and build the commitment of agencies to work together. The value of integration must be more than a perception to maintain interagency cooperation. Demonstrating the value derived by way of performance management helps to build support and funding commitments across different governments, and to sustain the necessary drivers for action.

Bridging the expanding and more informed use of performance management principles with day to day police operations takes a significant investment in knowledge management and supportive technology. For instance, both New Zealand Police and Australian Federal Police are making noteworthy commitments to re-engineer work processes and integrate technology in support of their performance management frameworks. These systems are going beyond operational case management and reporting systems, to imbedded supports that are attempting to combine business planning, finance, human resources, and operations (intelligence, case management, file management) that track time and resources to better link inputs to outcomes. Although both agencies would state they were “early” in this process, they are learning and growing into better approaches and more informed decision-making because of their efforts.

Some Risks to Consider

There is one area of concern going forward. As performance management becomes more pervasive, it will be important to get the metrics right and not make them an end in themselves. Some studies suggest that over-focusing police objectives on the measurable and the quantifiable, risks moving the police away from proactive community policing to reactive policing. Equally, an over abundance of metrics without regard for the cost of collecting and managing them relative to their value can also be a problem.

The Challenge for Canada

The concepts and practices of performance measurement are not new to Canada, and many different approaches continue to evolve at the leading edge. However, our field observations have demonstrated that the degree of commitment to this science could well be enhanced and intensified in Canada. The “business-minded” accountability evident in some of the host agencies, and in particular, as practiced at the parade-room level by the New Zealand Police, may represent a worthwhile opportunity for many

Canadian agencies to explore. With the increasing demands as identified and discussed throughout this report, scarce resources must now be deployed and evaluated on a dynamic basis. Advanced systems of performance measurement may provide a means to engage stakeholders in an ongoing, value-for-money review of priorities and choices. The stakeholders in New Zealand, Australia, and to some degree in Europe, have taken great steps in recognizing police budgets as an “investment” in public safety and security priorities, with appropriate expectations for the accounting of returns on a short cycle. Could this represent the basis for new dialogue in the Canadian context?

SECTION 3 – FINDINGS RELATED TO STUDY TOPICS AND TOURS

TEAM ONE - Transnational Organized Crime and Counter Terrorism

Team #1 consisted of the following members:

Supt. John Ferguson	RCMP Ottawa
Supt. Tom Grue	Edmonton Police Service
C/Supt. Rod Knecht	RCMP Toronto
D/Chief Michael Mann	Waterloo Regional Police

Overview

The team was assigned to travel to Germany and the United Kingdom to identify “Best Practices” in the area of Integration of Law Enforcement efforts, Performance Management and Measurement Systems, and the Sharing of Intelligence. Specifically, we examined efforts in combating anti-terrorism and organized crime. The focus of our research took us to the following agencies:

Germany:

Federal Ministry of the Interior – Berlin
Federal Border Patrol (Bundesgrenzschutz) BGS
Federal Police (Bundeskriminalamt) BKA - Wiesbaden and Meckenheim
Federal Justice Department – Bonn
Customs Department (Zollkriminalamt) ZKA
State Police (Landeskriminalamt) LKA

United Kingdom – London:

MI5 - British Security Service
National Crime Squad
Her Majesty’s Customs Service (Organized Crime and Cross-border Crime)
Home Office – Local Policing
MET – Scotland Yard Anti Terrorism Branch, National Security
National Criminal Intelligence Service

Objective

“To examine the mandates, systems, structures and strategies used by agencies and organizations in Germany and the United Kingdom toward effectively and efficiently attacking Organized Crime and Terrorism, for the identification and application of Best Practices in Canada.”

Observations and Insights

The underlying theme of this research project was to look at three concepts of law enforcement in terms of the specific areas of study. The first concept dealt with the integration of law enforcement efforts, the second dealt with performance management

and measurement systems, and the third, the sharing of information. To that end, Team #1 was assigned the responsibility of examining efforts towards combating anti-terrorism and organized crime in terms of the foregoing.

For these purposes, the team decided to focus its research on two countries, Germany and England. Although these two countries are dissimilar in political and institutional structures, they are very similar in their enforcement strategies. Both countries are part of the European Union, although Germany, probably due in large part to geographical considerations, is a much more active participant within the Union. Both countries are democracies, which have for decades had to deal with the realities of terrorism and organized crime. Consequently, both countries have evolved enforcement practices based on the successes and failures of the past.

Germany is a country comprised of 16 states in a federated union. Each state has its own police force that provides all the policing services within a city or rural environment. Over-arching this is the system of federal police and justice which links together the state police and provides the national and international direction for the country.

Extensive interviews were undertaken with representatives of the two predominant levels of enforcement across a number of cities within Germany. Both the federal and state law enforcement agencies have distinct departments within their structures that are dedicated to anti-terrorism and combating organized crime. Although they recognized a link between the two entities of terrorism and organized crime, such as the funding for terrorist activities that may originate from organized crime pursuits, clearly their strategies are separate, yet linked.

Germany actively supports integrated enforcement in both fields. This is largely due to the changing globalization within Europe, which necessitates distinct lines of communication and greater cooperation between the European countries.

For Germany, this is manifest, for example, by their strong support for the establishment of border liaison posts in other European countries in order to create a buffer against illegal immigration to Germany as orchestrated by organized crime. They believe that by being proactive in an integrated fashion with the other European countries, they will have a greater impact against organized crime, than by working in isolation within their own country.

Another example of Germany's support for law enforcement integration is reflected in its strong support for the creation of the European warrant, which will permit seamless enforcement for outstanding criminal warrants within any of the participating European countries. Historically, extradition between European countries has typically taken significant time. The introduction of the European warrant will break down the barriers to enforcement cooperation and lead to a more transparent and integrated European enforcement that is projected to have significant impact on organized crime groups.

With regard to information and intelligence sharing, Germany has established 'information boards' which they believe facilitate the sharing of information in a timely fashion. These 'information boards' are comprised of senior representatives from the various participating departments who meet on a regularly scheduled basis to ensure that information and intelligence is effectively shared. Through this concept of sharing,

Germany believes that each of its departments can effectively develop enforcement strategies that complement the efforts of each department. The collective is stronger and more effective than a sum of its parts.

One area that remains to be addressed, and one that all the representatives interviewed agreed upon, was that of performance measurement and management systems. Those interviewed clearly indicated the need to develop performance measurements within the strategies they have implemented but to this point in time, this area was still lacking. Consequently, much of their belief in the success of their strategies is subjective in nature and not premised upon objective criteria or empirical research.

England's law enforcement efforts, as previously indicated, are similar but different. They are similar to Germany in that England also has departments dedicated towards combating terrorism and organized crime. However, they are different, in that England also has the dynamics of city, town, county and federal police to take into consideration, whereas Germany operates only at the state and federal level within the domain of law enforcement. Consequently, internally within England, the challenge to integrate law enforcement efforts may be greater comparatively due to the dynamics in play.

To overcome this interplay of many-leveled enforcement activity, England introduced two separate approaches for combating organized crime and terrorism. To integrate efforts and ensure the timely sharing of information to fight terrorism, England established 'Special Branch' positions within each police departments across England. This ensured that information being developed at a local level was being channeled to the central agency for analysis, while ensuring intelligence developed at the national level was flowing to the field for enforcement action. By its very nature, this approach facilitated enforcement action by its integration of information exchange.

With regard to combating organized crime, England created the 'National Crime Squad' by seconding funding and representatives from all police departments within England. The mandate of this investigative body is a very succinct and strict focus on combating organized crime. The seconding of representatives from different police departments has naturally led to integration of information sharing and enforcement activity due to the ties back to the parent police departments. However, there is a current proposal to make this a permanent standing department with its own dedicated funding that is not reliant on the largesse of a participating police department that may have competing priorities. Further, it is intended that they move towards separate recruitment, and away from seconded investigators, which may or may not diminish information exchange and interaction. The National Crime Squad is considered a living success story for integration and information sharing by the Home Office.

Like Germany, England has integrated its enforcement efforts between police departments within the country but unlike Germany, England has only been proactive on the international level on a case-by-case basis. For example, England has focused its international enforcement on targeted enforcement such as dealing with the organized crime, drug and people-smuggling originating from Jamaica. The "Project Air-bridge" example involves liaison officers working in cooperation with international partners in the apprehension and suppression of suspect individuals while en-route to the United Kingdom. Here a passenger manifest is reduced to a compact disc and provided to HMCS in the United Kingdom, prior to the flight departure from source. Contents of the

manifest are processed through a common database and suspect individuals are identified prior to arrival at their destination. This process has been highly successful for the removal of couriers at the source, and facilities prioritization at a higher level within those agencies conducting organized crime investigations. "Project Air-bridge" has established a very successful enforcement approach in cooperation with Jamaican authorities, and it is a model, which may have application within the Canadian context.

Authorities in England have tremendous experience in dealing with terrorism but more recently, their largest challenge has been dealing with the loss of this corporate knowledge through attrition, which leaves behind the inexperience of youth to come to terms with this global problem. Those interviewed from both the anti-terrorism and organized crime areas agreed that they have also been deficient in establishing comprehensive performance measurements in order to determine the degree of success of their strategies.

Commentary

Both countries agree, and this was underscored throughout the experience of Team #1, that integrated enforcement activities, combined with the sharing of information and intelligence, is critical to the successful fight against terrorism and organized crime. Both countries also agreed that effective performance measurements must be introduced to ensure that the scarce human resources and funding available are invested in the most effective and appropriate manner.

For Canada, many lessons of integration and information sharing can be learned from these two countries. However, the strongest messages that our research revealed were:

- we live in a global world of law enforcement, and
- success within our respective areas of responsibility is interdependent, and
- success can only be achieved by transparent forms of enforcement integration and information sharing
- to confirm success, and demonstrate to stakeholders at the local, provincial or federal level, clear and meaningful performance measurements must be created and implemented.

As stated by investigators with the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the German Federal Police, *"Our success in our fight against terrorism and organized crime is based on integration with our counterparts within the European Union, and it is predicated upon reliability, co-operation, trust, relationships and preparedness"*.

TEAM TWO - Diversity Practices and Emerging Crime Issues

Team #2 consisted of the following members:

Deputy Chief Larry Hill	Ottawa Police Service
Chief Superintendent Steve Graham	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Inspector Paul Morrison	Hamilton Police Service
Gwen Strachan, Provincial Commander	Ontario Provincial Police

Overview

The team was assigned the task of travelling to Australia and New Zealand to investigate innovative best practices in the area of diversity management and emerging crime issues. Both Australia and New Zealand share similar experiences to Canada in the evolution of their countries: justice systems based on British jurisprudence and traditions, large identifiable aboriginal populations, and significant multicultural influences from immigration. Further, as modern democracies, they are being impacted by emerging crime issues that require proactive and innovative responses that respect a tradition of individual rights.

Objective

To examine diversity practices and emerging crime issues in Australia and New Zealand, identifying best practices that may be adaptable and relevant to Canadian Policing. The study focused on the following areas:

- service to diverse communities, including aboriginal service responses;
- integration of diversity into police organizations and human resource systems;
- emerging crime trends, issues and responses from police services.

After a literature review and preliminary discussions with the hosting agencies, the study was focused more specifically around:

- how do the target police agencies in Australia and New Zealand provide policing services to diverse communities, with special understanding around aboriginal community services?
- what internal processes are in place in target police agencies to recruit, retain and develop a diverse workforce that is responsive to communities?
- what emerging (or expected to emerge) crime issues are impacting the target police agencies?

Time constraints and preliminary research question development resulted in the hosting organizations recommending visits to the following agencies and locations:

Australia

Australian Federal Police
Commonwealth Headquarters - Canberra

Eastern Region Headquarters - Sydney
Southern Region Headquarters - Melbourne
Australian Capital Territory Community Police Service

Australian Crime Commission
Commonwealth Headquarters - Canberra

New South Wales Police
Headquarters - Sydney

Victoria Police
Headquarters - Melbourne

New Zealand

New Zealand Police
National Headquarters - Wellington
Wellington District Headquarters - Wellington
Central District Headquarters - Palmerston North
Royal New Zealand Police College - Wellington
Bay of Plenty District Headquarters - Rotorua
Auckland City District - Auckland

Observations and Insights

Australian Federal Police

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) mandate is to protect the Commonwealth of Australia against crimes such as drug importation and distribution, people smuggling and immigration, organized crime groups, financial crimes, transnational crimes, terrorism, and to provide services like close-protection (VIP) and international police operations and liaison. Additionally, they are responsible through a service contract relationship with the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) to deliver a community police service. The AFP mandate is growing in importance to the Commonwealth, especially since the events of 9/11. Organizational focus is becoming more international, particularly in the area of counter terrorism and transnational crime, as it expands operations with emphasis on the South Pacific, Asia, and Europe. Relative to diversity, the AFP has undertaken a strategy to link diversity to work-life balance, calling it the Worklife Diversity Program. The program has three goals: be employer of choice by increasing workplace diversity, instil a culture of flexible workforce policies that provide the individual and organization positive benefits, and promote an harmonious work environment for all, enhancing organizational performance. This strategy links as well to their recognition that in order to be successful internationally, they must have a workforce that possesses skills around cultural sensitivity, language, and international understanding, and supported by educational qualifications and broad experiences. The ACT operation, a more traditional municipal, community policing service, places more emphasis on culturally sensitive service delivery, especially to aboriginal communities. The AFP is placing great emphasis on improving performance management through establishing clear targets, integrating technological supports, and realigning resources regularly in keeping with emerging challenges. Relative to emerging crime issues, the AFP predicts a continuing and potentially growing need to respond to terrorism threats, bio-technology

and technology threats, major financial frauds, drug importations, identity thefts, and sexual predators.

Australian Crime Commission

The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) is a recent amalgamation of three Commonwealth agencies: the Australian Crime Authority, Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, and the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments. The ACC has regional offices in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, and Perth, as well as the Commonwealth Headquarters at Canberra. It is managed by a Board, and chaired by the Commissioner of the AFP. The board also includes the commissioners from the eight states, ACT and territorial police services, as well as agency heads of Commonwealth Security, Securities and Investments Commission, Customs Service, and Commonwealth Office of the Attorney General. The ACC's mandate is to maintain a national database that collects, collates, correlates, analyses and disseminates criminal information and intelligence to authorized agencies, to undertake intelligence operations, investigations, and enquiries when authorized by the Board, and to provide strategic criminal assessments and priorities for Australia. Much of the personnel for the ACC are seconded from member agencies. Relative to diversity issues, the ACC is governed by Commonwealth Government regulations and expectations around building a diverse workforce free of discrimination. The ACC recognizes the need for an educated and culturally sensitive staff to achieve its aims. Of particular note are the ACC's investigative and enquiry powers to compel witnesses to appear and testify in support of gathering intelligence and assisting in the fight against crime. The ACC sees emerging and continuing crime challenges as being identity theft, sex crimes, people smuggling, large-scale financial crimes and drug importation.

New South Wales Police

The New South Wales Police (NSWP) provides a unitary community policing service to the state of New South Wales, including the city of Sydney, where their Headquarters resides. With more than 17,000 employees, 13,700 of whom are sworn officers, it provides a community policing service to a diverse population of more than 7,000,000. The NSWP uses a liaison officer model to provide targeted services to their diverse communities which they have defined as aboriginal, ethnic, gay and lesbian, youth, victims of domestic violence, and tourists. The organization has developed a view that its responsibility is to deliver "culturally competent policing services" to a broad spectrum of citizens through innovative programs, sensitized and culturally educated staff, and strong relationships with target communities. They are using such tools as the Intranet-delivered knowledge maps, cultural awareness training, Police Accountability Community Teams, Aboriginal Advisory Groups, and target recruiting to improve their performance. Equally, they are empowering Local Area Commands (LAC) to better deliver on priorities that are locally determined and that lead away from central control, toward central performance management of outcomes.

Victoria Police

The Victoria Police (VP) provides a unitary community policing service to the state of Victoria, including the city of Melbourne, where their Headquarters resides. With more than 12,000 employees, 10,680 of whom are sworn members, it provides services to a

diverse population of nearly 5,000,000. Similar to the NSW, the VP uses a liaison officer model to reach diverse communities, with targeted emphasis on women, aboriginal - Torres Strait Islander, multicultural, and gay and lesbian groups. The organization is undergoing significant transition as it strives to better align itself to the progress made by other Australian state police agencies, and this places it in a catch-up situation. The organization is very much at the early point of the transition, developing plans, creating strategic linkages, and focussing on changing organizational culture in a transformational way.

New Zealand Police

The New Zealand Police (NZP) is the unitary national community police service for the country, with approximately 8,800 personnel, 7,000 of whom are sworn members. Through 12 relatively autonomous district commands, service is provided to a diverse population of more than 4,000,000. The NZP use a liaison officer approach to provide culturally sensitive services to Maori, South Pacific Islanders, and ethnic communities. Maori representation and sensitivity is well integrated in the organization, supported by a strong commitment to respect the Treaty of Witangi. Maori Advisory Groups at the local level, as well as the Commissioner's Maori Focus Forum, have greatly supported the building of an organizational culture that is community-focussed, and attempts to define priorities through strong community involvement. Further, the NZP have a robust performance management system which permits districts significant autonomy to meet community needs through intelligence-led crime data resource allocation, while concurrently meeting national goals. There are clear HR engagement targets that have a goal of better reflecting the diverse communities of New Zealand, improving overall responsiveness, and achieving the key priorities of: Improved Community Safety, Crime Reduction, and Police Integrity.

Commentary

Across all organizations visited, it is apparent that delivering a "culturally competent policing service" is a challenge that is being fully embraced by organizations. For the most part, both responding to citizens in a culturally and diversity sensitive manner, as well as actively creating an organizational culture that supports and values diversity among its personnel, are seen as foundation pieces in creating modern police organizations in Australia and New Zealand. Of particular note are the integration and embracing of Maori culture into the service delivery models and recruitment and retention strategies of the New Zealand Police.

The fundamental change occurring within all agencies visited often was the result of key drivers such as Royal Commissions, historical discord between the police and aboriginal communities, growing influence of diverse groups brought about by growing immigration, changing societal views relative to gender and lifestyle, and broader international influences. The recognition that the police were falling out of step with the needs of the citizens being served has resulted in strengthening contact and consultation with various communities, more client-centred service models, and broader perspectives on what is the role of the police in a modern, democratic society.

Equally, Australian and New Zealand police services recognize that educating their workforces, building strong understanding across diverse communities, and creating

supportive cultures that embrace difference are critical success factors for modern police agencies. The creation and sustaining of supportive work cultures is founded on the principle that public actions of the police are very much driven by the internal views of the organization and the confidence of its membership. Recruiting people from diverse communities, and making police organizations a good cultural fit, will further advance the goal of cultural competence.

TEAM THREE - Multi-Jurisdictional Policing and Technology Based Crime Prevention

Team # 3 consisted of the following members:

Inspector Mike Ewles	Durham Regional Police Service
Chief Superintendent Al Macintyre	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Deputy Commissioner Maurice Pilon	Ontario Provincial Police

Due to a sudden serious illness Inspector Ewles did not participate in the travel portion of the project. However, he was an active member of the team both prior to and following the travel.

Overview

The team was assigned travel to Washington D.C., Lyon France and Rome, Italy. The pre-travel research into the organizations suggested for examination led the team to believe that some common elements existed. The team determined that the research should focus on how not only the common elements, but also the differences in these organizations, could be studied to enhance our knowledge and apply this knowledge to the Canadian context.

Team members focused their attention on the structure of these organizations as they clearly presented different models that appeared to be effective in carrying out their responsibilities within different structural modes. The objective of the study related to the overall topic was thus modified as described below:

Objective

To examine how the governance structures of organizations in the United States, France and Italy effectively and efficiently address multi-jurisdictional issues and use emerging technologies.

The study would focus its inquiries into the following areas:

- Assess the structure of each organization by comparing intelligence led outputs and outcomes
- Assess the extent to which technology drives or limits the organization's capacity
- Examine Italy's response to judicial intimidation.

Given the allotted time frames for travel, the organizations to be visited were narrowed down to the following for each location, with a view to examining different structural models as indicated:

Washington D.C.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Integrated Structure)
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (Stand Alone Structure)
U.S. Department of Justice (Legislated Structure)
Regional Information Sharing System (R.I.S.S.) (Collaborative Structure)
U.S. Coast Guard (now part of Homeland Security)

Lyon, France

Interpol - with specific emphasis on "Project Fusion" (Collaborative Structure)

Rome, Italy

Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (D.I.A.) (Legislated Structure)

Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (D.N.A.) (Legislated Structure)

Note: Unfortunately, planned meetings with U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast Guard were cancelled by those agencies due to operational matters.

Observations and Insights

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.)

The CIA is a stand-alone agency that engages in research, development and deployment of high-leverage technology for Intelligence purposes with a focus on foreign issues. The CIA has modified its service delivery in response to the terrorist events of 9/11. It maintains its focus on non-domestic issues, however, it has developed systems to ensure better collaboration with law enforcement agencies. This collaboration has raised new concerns with respect to protecting sources and other disclosure issues. Internally, the CIA has also modified its processes to ensure a more effective output. The CIA, due to its structure and deployed nature, was well suited to responding quickly on behalf of the U.S. government following the events of 9/11. In addition, the CIA operates one main database accessible to all its personnel no matter where they are located. Controls are maintained through varying degrees of access.

U.S. Department of Justice (D.O.J.)

DOJ performs many roles related to the law enforcement function in the United States. One of those roles is to provide support by means of funding or researching issues that are significant to all levels of law enforcement (local, state and federal). One such issue relates to the coordination of multi-jurisdictional investigations and connectivity in terms of technology. We were briefed on the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative that has as its main focus to guide and facilitate information sharing by law enforcement at all levels. Included in this initiative are the development of minimum standards for interoperability, a data element dictionary, and the inclusion of private sector service providers on the project. The intent is to ensure that before any agency purchases technology, they will have complied with the standards. Knowledge by the private sector as to standards will provide greater assurances of interoperability as well.

Regional Information Sharing Systems (R.I.S.S.)

The RISS program is a national program comprised of six regional intelligence sharing centres providing services to over 6,000 state, federal, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. RISS is entirely funded by the U.S. Department of Justice and, while their traditional focus was on organized crime, drugs and gangs, this focus was affected

dramatically by the events of 9/11. Member agencies clearly were looking for a means to share terrorist-related information, and RISS has significantly enhanced its technology base to accommodate the growth in members and information sharing requirements. They advocate interconnectivity of existing systems rather than a single merged system. RISS has successfully created a secure intranet system to accommodate the needs of all member agencies. While criteria are in place to ensure qualified membership in RISS, they nonetheless rely on the voluntary participation of agencies to make it effective. They do provide operational support upon the request of member agencies, however they do not engage directly in operations.

Interpol

Interpol is an organization in transition. Their mission is to be the world's pre-eminent organization in support of all organizations involved in preventing or detecting international crime. They are currently restructuring to increase their responsiveness to member issues and to enhance the quality of the services it delivers. The "Fusion Task Force" is an initiative aimed at assisting member agencies in identifying and linking suspects with terrorist links. Intelligence driven analysis is shared with member agencies to alert them to the potential of terrorist activities within their respective countries. The success of this program has been limited thus far, but the foundation pieces of this program are now in place with success being limited only by the voluntary submissions of member agencies. Trust amongst member agencies is a critical success factor for Interpol itself, and specifically for this relatively new program. There are many successful programs being offered currently by Interpol. These should only be enhanced by their current efforts.

Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (DNA)

The DNA is comprised of specially trained public prosecutors and judges who focus solely on the coordination of Antimafia initiatives. In 1991, legislation was enacted in a direct response to an assassination and threats to other justice officials by the mafia. This unit works regularly with the law enforcement community, but primarily with the DIA (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia). They have a national office, with personnel deployed in the districts of Italy as well. They attribute to their tenacity and continued diligence the significant decrease in threats to justice officials. This clear and continuous message diminishes the motivation of the mafia to engage in such activity. If a threat is made, systems are in place to assess and provide the appropriate response.

Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA)

The DIA is part of the Department of Public Security within the Italian Ministry of the Interior. It brings together the three major federal law enforcement agencies (Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza) with a sole focus on gathering intelligence and investigating the mafia and related matters. The 1991 legislation, enacted following an assassination and other threats to justice officials by the mafia, also created this unit. They operate within the parameters of special legislation with special tools to enhance their chances of success. Some examples of these tools are access to all law enforcement databases in Italy, the ability to debrief convicted persons, to summons persons to be interviewed, and to gain access to financial data as part of their investigative authorities. This unit confirms the need for vigilance regarding threats to

justice officials, and that there does not exist a formula to deal with these matters. Each threat is dealt with on an individual basis and an appropriate response is made. A system is in place to assess and prioritize responses to threats as they are encountered. The DIA has also seen a significant decline in threats and believes this can be attributed to their success at investigating and prosecuting the mafia.

Commentary

In conducting the interviews and examining the models reviewed it was evident that there are some benefits to creating a structure that supports a singular focused organization. One could argue that the singular focus would lend itself to a more simplistic approach to problem identification and problem solving. However, within the structures reviewed, there exist many complexities with which each organization has had to deal. The CIA, the DNA and the DIA are prime examples of agencies who have a single focus. Interestingly, the DIA in particular operates as a singular organization, despite being made up of three separate organizations who have put aside jurisdiction in favour of a primary focus for all. The other agencies reviewed had trust, cooperation (voluntary) and collaboration at the foundation of their structure. While clearly having some success, one must question why there is a constant effort to improve cooperation and information sharing in these cases.

A key issue identified in each and every organization is what drove it to be the way it is. It is clear that there was an outside influence which prompted certain structures, while reshaping the focus of others. Facilitating multi-jurisdictional investigations would appear to require more than goodwill on the part of the agencies involved.

One possible solution lies within the technology solutions being developed by the U.S. Department of Justice. Essentially, if agencies are going to continue to build their own technology solutions, we must make sure that these systems are at the very least capable of connecting to each other to facilitate information sharing and avoid duplication.

Canada can be proud of its accomplishments in the field of law enforcement. Our hosts in the United States, France and Italy treated us with a great deal of respect. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, through their liaison officers and other members in these countries, facilitated our meetings and went beyond the call of duty to ensure our visits were meaningful.

SECTION 4 – SNAPSHOTS

Introducing the Snapshots

The study team believes that the most significant findings from the study tours are those that have been interpreted, integrated and expressed within the Global Themes that emerged. It is within these broader directions that the current high quality of policing and criminal justice administration in Canada may find the stimulus for new directions and enhancements. In fact, the team members were proud to discover that very few specific programs or initiatives were encountered that could genuinely qualify, on their own, as “best practices” from the perspective of our Canadian system.

Along the way, however, certain items of interest were encountered and the team believes that these “snapshots” may be useful in stimulating dialogue and creative thinking within various agencies across Canada. These brief summaries are offered with this intent. The team wishes to stress that these are not practices which are being directly advocated or promoted. We offer the following for consideration and discussion only.

European Arrest Warrant

The European Union consists of seventeen member states or countries. After the formation of this borderless union, extradition still remained a slow and complex process.

The purpose of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is to expedite the process through the enforced transfer of a person from one member state to another. It allows a person to be arrested, if in one member state he or she has been convicted and sentenced to immediate imprisonment of four months or more, or remanded in custody for an offence of which the term is one year or more.

This process makes it easier for justice to be administered across borders between member states, as the European Union is considered one state for this purpose. In this respect, the EAW is a major contribution in the fight against transnational organized crime. This concept of an international arrest warrant can also be extended to the collection of fines, seizure of assets and search warrants.

The EAW is in line with the International Human Rights and United Nations Convention. No one under the age of fourteen can be the subject of an EAW and specific restrictions apply to those individuals between 16-18 years of age. To make the system work effectively, there must be trust, teamwork and open communication between all parties involved.

The European warrant concept may have application within the Canadian context. It may have the potential to reduce required resources and associated costs while expediting the process, if applied during the execution of Canada Wide Warrants.

Common Language

The ability to combat organized crime and terrorism is built upon the sharing of information and intelligence through conversations and relationships. For the seventeen member states and countries that make up the European Union (EU), diverse languages, cultures and religious beliefs only compound the difficulties in sharing information and intelligence in a timely and meaningful manner. Policing agencies within the European Union (EU) have collaborated on a common language strategy, underpinned by technology, in order to elicit, integrate, and illuminate the knowledge of the collective.

The critical first step was to establish a glossary of terms. There is a single agreed upon legal definition of terrorism, organized crime and other language. Legislation has been harmonized in order to facilitate investigations and the arrest of international criminals. EU participants have standardized procedures for both the preparation, and dissemination, of information, which is fed through a single point of contact within each policing agency so there is neither exaggeration nor suppression of threats. Clear protocols have been established for the dissemination of intelligence and the dissemination of police information along two separate tracks, in anticipation of court proceedings, in order to protect sources.

To facilitate these processes, there has been a comprehensive linking and integration of local and national databases for greater information sharing, while establishing a common repository among the seventeen nations, for the accumulation, analysis, and distribution of intelligence for real-time responses. This becomes the essential means of accessing an integrated view of how things should be done. This open and participatory approach enlists police personnel from all agencies in a dynamic information environment that fosters a collaborative information-sharing culture across borders.

Disruption vs. Dismantlement – Seizing Contraband Without Laying Charges

Is disrupting a criminal organization by lawfully seizing contraband without laying charges a valid tactic? This issue came to light several times and in diverse locations during our field studies.

For the purposes of this discussion, the following definitions apply (taken from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration):

"disruption" occurs when the normal effective operation of an identified organization is significantly impacted so that it is unable to conduct criminal operations for a significant period of time.

"dismantlement" occurs when an identified organization is incapacitated and no longer capable of operating as a coordinated criminal enterprise.

Seizing contraband without laying charges may include the following advantages.

- ◆ Avoiding the oftentimes onerous disclosure process.
- ◆ Ensuring that the identity of an agent/informant (if any are used) is protected.
- ◆ Avoiding prolonged and costly trials.

- ◆ Seizing contraband (some of which is inherently dangerous) in a more expeditious manner.
- ◆ Disrupting the operations of a criminal organization, possibly to the point of total collapse – i.e., dismantlement.
- ◆ Providing opportunities for the development of human intelligence sources.

Seizing contraband without laying charges may also include the following disadvantages:

- ◆ Such action may actually embolden the criminal organization in that the loss of product has little impact on its activities, and there is, otherwise, no adverse consequences to their illegal operations.
- ◆ It provides members of the criminal organization an opportunity to learn from their “mistakes” (the contraband being discovered and seized by the police) and adapt to police tactics.
- ◆ This practice, if used persistently, might engender a quick-fix attitude of expediency in the minds of investigators, rather than an outlook that would promote enduring results (i.e., dismantlement).

The ultimate goal for law enforcement must remain the complete dismantling of a criminal organization. However, sometimes there may be valid reasons why disruption without charges can be a legitimate short-term tactic. The key to the appropriate use of this method requires a comprehensive analysis of the aforementioned pros and cons in the context of the investigation in question.

The Integration of Maori Culture

In the mid-1990’s, a number of external inquiries confirmed that negative perceptions and relationships continued to exist between the Maori community and the police. With the New Zealand government providing the driver for change, the New Zealand (NZ) Police made a determined effort to be more responsive to the Maori community.

Strategic objectives were developed to build greater responsiveness to Maori. They included goals to:

- improve the perception of Maori towards the police
- increase police officers’ understanding and acceptance of the significance of the Treaty of Witangi in their work
- develop more effective consultation between police and Maori
- and bring the voice of Maori into police policy planning and decision making.

The NZ Police has implemented a number of strategies beginning with police executive commitment and coordination. The establishment of community police advisory groups has enabled police and Maori to communicate at both strategic and localized levels, while a network of Iwi (Maori) Liaison Officers and Maori Responsiveness Coordinators has developed responsiveness capacities in the police districts.

The New Zealand Police has been even more progressive by working to integrate Maori customs into the organizational culture. Visitors to New Zealand Police are welcomed,

and organizational meetings are initiated, with a unique greeting. This typically involves a European/North American style greeting followed by the Maori welcome with prayers, songs and *hongi* (nose and forehead touching).

Recruit training at the Royal New Zealand Police College includes education in Maori culture awareness. This sensitivity training involves an overnight session in a Marae, a spiritual meeting place, conducted by Maori elders. The integration of Maori traditions are no more dramatically represented than by the graduating recruit classes performing the *haka*, a traditional Maori dance. Weeks of practice precede this featured event at Recruit Graduation ceremonies in front of families and friends. The dance represents a positive challenge from one class to another as they emerge from the College to apply what they learned in the communities served. This preliminary training is followed by annual Maori training support for all officers. The New Zealand Police recognize the need to inject sensitivity into front line policing. The intended outcome of this training is that it will continue to foster positive models in the Maori community and changed attitudes in the Police community.

Use of the Maori language, in addition to English, is prevalent in the NZ Police, and Maori language training is available to members to further the integration of the culture.

Police sensitivity to elements of Maori culture is exhibited by the establishment of a sudden death policy and training package. The policy was developed by the Maori community in partnership with the Central Police District. In the Wellington District, members demonstrate responsiveness by arranging for Maori spiritual leaders to conduct prayers at scenes of fatal collisions involving members of the Maori community.

The Bay of Plenty Police District in Rotorua has embraced Maori Responsiveness by establishing partnerships, for young offender diversion programs, with external service agencies such as the Mana Social Services Trust. They are working with outside partners to conduct Police Recruit Prep Courses for prospective Maori applicants to the Police Service, and they support a Maori cultural curriculum component for a community college program.

Providing a Maori voice in police decision-making not only means participation in advisory groups, but community members are also invited to sit on Police Iwi Liaison Officer selection panels.

The November 2002 Review of New Zealand Police Service Delivery to Maori determined that more positive steps have been taken to close the gap between the police and Maori communities and encouraged the continuation of partnerships in strategic planning for the future.

The New Zealand Police have been successful in integrating a high level of respect for Maori and Pacific Peoples cultures into daily operations and organizational culture. Still, the NZ Police realize that there is still much left to accomplish to further their commitment to Maori Responsiveness along with their culturally diverse communities. A five-year human resources strategy includes objectives involving recruitment and retention policies involving Maori, Pacific Peoples, women and ethnic groups, and improved training for all applicable areas.

The experience in New Zealand, with these wide-ranging examples of commitment and sustained effort, may be instructive to how Canadian agencies might build further on the positive steps being taken with our own First Nations peoples and other minority cultures.

Investigative Tribunals

The “success” of any criminal organization is in large part contingent upon the secrecy and trust associated with closed circles of family and friends. The Anti Mafia Task Force (DIA) has achieved some measure of success developing intelligence regarding the closed community that is the Mafia. The DIA has utilized legislated investigative authorities afforded it in response to assassinations of justice officials and intimidation of the judiciary.

In essence, the 1991 legislation that created the DIA also empowered investigators actively engaged in an investigation of the Mafia, providing the authority to summons and interrogate individuals who are suspected of having knowledge regarding Mafia activities. The individuals themselves need not be suspected of any criminal activities. Merely having information that might advance the investigation is sufficient to compel them before the DIA to be interviewed.

The DIA also has the authority to debrief convicted persons regarding information that might assist investigations of the Mafia, related activities and criminal associations. In the Italian context, the need to curtail the influence of the Mafia, and protect the judiciary drove the specific legislated authorities. It must be stressed these authorities are limited exclusively to the DIA, only during active criminal investigations, and only with respect to the Mafia.

In the Canadian context, these investigative powers would arguably infringe upon individual rights and freedoms. Have the 1997 murders of corrections officers in Quebec by outlaw motorcycle gangs forewarned us of similar attempts at intimidation of the criminal justice community? Might we reach that threshold or tipping point, and be driven to similar action?

SECTION 5 - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The Host Agencies (Note: Please see Site Visit Summaries for details)

Australian Crime Commission	Australia
Australian Federal Police	Australia
British Security Service (MI5)	The United Kingdom
Central Intelligence Agency	The United States of America
Customs Department (ZKA)	Germany
Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA)	Italy
Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (DNA)	Italy
Federal Border Patrol (BGS)	Germany
Federal Criminal Policing Agency (BKA)	Germany
Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ)	Germany
Her Majesty's Customs Service	The United Kingdom
Interpol Project Fusion	France
National Crime Squad	The United Kingdom
National Criminal Intelligence Service	The United Kingdom
New South Wales Police	Australia
New Zealand Police	New Zealand
Scotland Yard - Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorism Branch	The United Kingdom
State Police Agency - Hamburg (LKA)	Germany
The Home Office	The United Kingdom
US Department of Justice	The United States of America
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SECTION 7 – SITE VISIT SUMMARIES

Quick Reference Guide

Section 7-1 – Team One

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SITE LOCATION: Berlin, Germany

DATE: 2003-05-26 **TIME:** 0900 hrs.

PERSONS INTERVIEWED: Dr. Angelika SCHLUNCK
Dr. Stephanie UHRIG
Dr. Robert R. SCHNABL (Judge)

FOCUS OF INTERVIEW: International Suppression of Terrorism, Organized Crime & Drug-Related Crime

CONTEXT: Interviewees were judiciary with the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Directorate General for Police Matters on Organized Crime & Drug Related Matters and the Federal Ministry of Justice, Section on Criminal Procedure (Investigation Proceeding; Compulsory Measures). Interviewees were responsible for the prosecution and direction of organized crime and terrorism offences working very closely with federal, state and municipal policing agencies within Germany.

The Ministries are also responsible for tasks which arose in the wake of German Reunification concerned with rehabilitation under criminal and administrative law.

The Ministry plays a major role in the co-operation within the European Union in the areas of justice and interior affairs which was agreed on in the Maastricht Treaty. It is participating in the expansion and institutional improvement of this co-operation within the framework of the Government Conference to revise International Treaties.

The perspective of the interview was from a judicial/prosecutorial perspective.

DISCUSSION POINTS:

- 1 Police and prosecutor relationship
 - Distinct relationship between police and judiciary. This is essential for the effective functioning of the criminal justice system.
 - Recognition that there is a relationship between organized crime and terrorism whereby monies obtained through criminal activity support the terrorist mandate.
- 2 Road Maps
 - Germany has created a series of seventy (70) road maps that are a template and a quick response mechanism for dealing with acts of terrorism. These were created prior to 911 and provided for a focused response.
 - There is a common definition of terrorism that has been agreed upon by the EU countries.
- 3 Integration & Cooperation
 - EuroJust
 - Created due to a lack of an institution that would support the flow of information

within the European Union (EU). Has demonstrated a significant contribution by evaluating terrorism information and creating intelligence.

- Legal Issues
 - “Screen Searching” is a permissible method used by police based on profiling;
 - European Arrest Warrant is the result of a harmonization of legislation within the European Union in order to facilitate the arrest of fugitives/criminals anywhere in Europe.
 - DNA Information Exchange is a bi-lateral agreement and pilot project with Austria to share databases and if successful, expand throughout the European Union (EU).
 - “Warding off Danger” clause in German law allows police to profile using criteria that includes age, sex, religious affiliation, nationality and profession in order to fight terrorism.
- Integrated Task Force on Terrorism
 - Enhances cooperation in the sharing of information through a multi-jurisdictional, integrated approach.

4 Information Boards

- Comprised of representatives of participating agencies chaired by the Ministry of Justice who meet once a week in order to accommodate the immediate sharing of sensitive information

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 Information Boards and Road Maps (contingency plans) that have the participation of all federal justice partners, facilitate an immediate response to terrorist activity, both proactively and reactively.
- 2 There should be one common repository for the accumulation, analysis and distribution of intelligence.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 The lack of a common definition of terrorism and/or organized crime inhibits the ability to investigate and prosecute these groups on an international scale.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 Single repository for the international accumulation of terrorist and international organized crime intelligence;
- 2 Multi-agency “Information Boards” facilitate the immediate sharing of critical information.

SUMMARY:

The Bundesministerium der Justiz sponsors and supports a series of initiatives that promote integration of the criminal justice system and the sharing of information on a national and international scale. Because of the high degree of cooperation between the police and the Justice Department, there are amendments and revisions to the law that respond to organized criminal and terrorist activity.

REFERENCE MATERIAL

German Federal Ministry of Justice Home Page

SITE LOCATION: Berlin, Germany

DATE: 2003-05-26 **TIME:** 1300 hrs.

PERSONS INTERVIEWED: Udo BURKHOLDER
Friedrich-Alexander HOPPE
Dr. SCHNABL (I had additional names)
Herr KOHLMETZ
Herr THOMAS
Herr SCHAEF
Herr KRUEGER

FOCUS OF INTERVIEW: Organized Crime and Terrorism specific to Border Integrity

CONTEXT: In Germany, the Federal Border Patrol (Bundesgrenzschutz, or BGS) is administered by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. As such it is designated as an internal police force, not a military organization. It is responsible for protecting Germany's boundaries with Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, Austria, the Czech Republic, and Poland, as well as, protection of public safety at airports, railways and territorial waters including Sky Marshalling. Additionally, the BGS provides security for all federal buildings and officials.

As the political, military and economic imperatives of Europe have changed, so has the mandated tasks of the BGS. With the advent of the European Union (EU), the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the opening of Germany's eastern borders, the BGS now place most emphasis on patrolling borders with Poland and the Czech Republic. Of greatest concern is international smuggling operations - cars, drugs and humans.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- 1 Joint Management of Border Protection Projects
 - Evaluated and funded by the European Union (EU) in Brussels, Belgium.
 - Countries/Agencies submit business plans for improving border security and same is funded by the EU. Germany has received \$12 million Euros in funding to date.
 - One of the Border Protection Projects ("Outer Border Philosophy) involves international inter-agency secondments with a central coordinator, creating a single touch-point for facilitation.
 - Germans train the trainers to help build better leadership in their own country and better relationships in foreign jurisdictions.
 - This heightens the level of competence and border integrity in

neighbouring countries which reciprocally increases German border security (ie. Partnership with Poland reduced illegal immigrants by 25%).

- “Solidarity with Responsibility”

2 Strategic Belt

- BGS have created a “strategic belt” around Germany through influence with partner agencies in the countries that surround Germany. This model has a common standard for enforcement.
- The BGS conducts an evaluation of other countries to determine if they are in compliance with a set standard.
- Standard must be met in order to participate in the European Union (EU) with three month reporting in order to account financially and operationally.
- The philosophy behind this is to proactively set up a first line of German border integrity beyond the physical borders of Germany.
 - BGS Liaison Officers are established in fifteen countries where border integrity issues are most prevalent with respect to their impact on Germany.
 - Liaison Officers facilitate information sharing and analysis of intelligence. This is considered a long-term investment in border integrity through a knowledge transfer.
- This philosophy is being taken up by the EU whereby there is a proposal for the “European Border Police” with a Committee and a study being undertaken with a goal of cross-functional coordination and increased border control.
- This is engaged in as a self-interest initiative as opposed to an altruistic activity.

3 Three Models of Border Security

- German Model
 - Joint structures
 - Boundary-less-ness
 - Target migration strategy whereby police agency of original jurisdiction follows criminals as they move geographically through out the EU.
- Comprehensive Model
 - Unified European Border Police (single structure)
 - Legislative & Language challenges
 - Lack of a credible infrastructure
- Network Model
 - Cross-functional teams focused on a single issue on a priority basis (ie. Air borders).
 - Working language is English
 - Joint teams at external borders
 - Utilize focused approach through global risk analysis, prioritization and cost/benefit analysis.

4 Post September 11

- Resources were shifted from organized crime to terrorism
- Security package provided for greater investigative powers and increased resources.
- Rapid Response Unit

ASSESSMENT

POSTIVES:

- 1 “Outer Border Philosophy & Strategic Belt” provides for enhanced leadership, competence, cooperation and quality toward increased border integrity. This is a highly adaptable model for drug enforcement, migrant and commodity smuggling while enhancing international

partnerships and benchmarking enforcement on an international scale. "Solidarity with Responsibility".

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 2 "Good will is not sufficient. Joint structures are required".

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 3 Using program specific liaison personnel for a particular criminal activity or focused initiative provides for a leveraging of resources, partnerships and more accurate and timely intelligence that can be utilized proactively as opposed to reactively.

SUMMARY:

In response to changing political, military and economic imperatives within Europe and Germany (ie. advent of the European Union (EU), the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the opening of Germany's eastern borders) the BGS was able to re-define its mandate within a series of value-added enforcement initiatives. The BGS has advanced a series of highly effective initiatives at airports, rail stations and foreign jurisdictions that strengthen national, EU and international border integrity.

REFERENCE MATERIAL

www.bundesgrenzschutz.de/start.htm
www.sfu.ca/casa/ft-bgsdd1

SITE LOCATION:	Wiesbaden, Germany
DATE: 2003-05-27	TIME: 0830 hrs.
PERSONS INTERVIEWED:	Hans Joachim NEUMER Klaus HEIL Michael-Erich GAJIC
FOCUS OF INTERVIEW:	Organized Crime
CONTEXT:	BUNDESKRIMINALAMT, OA11 (BKA) Federal criminal policing agency that focuses on national and international investigations. This particular interview group focuses on organized crime investigations, and the suppression of crime at both the national and international levels. 5000 thousand employees; 2400 agents; 850 personnel in organized crime. 3 physical locations, Berlin, Wiesbaden and Mechinheim Interviewees provided a general overview of the organization which includes organized crime, central CID, forensic science, central & administrative services,

information technology, training, anti-terrorism, counter-espionage, VIP

Conduit for information/intelligence sharing pertaining to organized crime, nationally and internationally.

DISCUSSION POINTS:

- 1 Informant/agent handling
 - Discussed centralized informant handling being introduced in order to enhance professionalism in dealing with sources due to focused training and experience. They believe this protects against treacherous and manipulative sources. Only five percent (5%) of sources have been lost by going to a centralized system.
- 2 Undercover operations
 - Discussed the use of long-term storefront operations for intelligence gathering.
- 3 Intelligence analysis
 - Analysts are a shared resource in furtherance of a criminal investigation. These experts are provided to other policing agencies on a project basis.
 - There is a three to one ratio of analysts to investigators which creates a situation of identifying more crime than resources available to investigate.
 - Investigations are prioritized based on intelligence available
- 4 International/intra-national cooperation
 - Special liaison unit to facilitate international and intra-national investigations
- 5 Oversight Committee
 - Provides an annual report to government that provides for priority setting and resource delegation. All complaints that are received must be investigated. The Committee receives recommendations from the BKA and it is the Committee that establishes investigational priorities.
- 6 Risk Assessment/Prioritization
 - Criteria for prioritization similar to SLEIPNIR..
 - "We are not trying to predict the future, but rather be in a position to react to the future." (Forecasting is 10-20 years).
 - Use of agency analysts and academics for the forecasting process.
- 7 Money Laundering
 - There are fifty (50) international liaison officers dealing specifically with money laundering.
 - Centralized database for banking information with police access at no cost.
 - Overview of money laundering act.
- 8 Resourcing
 - Re-allocation of organized crime investigators to anti-terrorism initiatives post - 911.
 - Loss of expertise and capacity was the outcome.

ASSESSMENT:

POSITIVES:

- 1 Centralization of informant handling.

- 2 Centralized dissemination of international/intra-national intelligence on organized crime.
- 3 Long-term (10-20 years) approach to organized crime analysis and enforcement.
- 4 Sharing analysts dedicated to specific projects.
- 5 Centralized computer system for dissemination of National Intelligence with more than 8000 links nationally.
- 6 Conduit for the relaying of intelligence to Interpol
- 7 56 Liaison officers serving in 40 countries around the world.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Loss of expertise and capacity due to 911.
- 2 Dissolution of borders (European Union) has increased legal issues and language issues.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 “Cooperation through collaboration”
- 2 “We are not trying to predict the future, but rather be in a position to react to the future.”

SUMMARY:

Although this interview focused on Organized Crime, this group’s position was that terrorism was the top priority. The law is unable to keep up with changing trends in organized crime. Although the mantra is that integration is embraced and practiced, it is not a reality at the operational level of policing.

REFERENCE MATERIALS:

Bundeskriminalamt
 65173 Wiesbaden
 The Bundeskriminalamt: “Its Mandate” & “Profile”
 Copyright 2002

SITE LOCATION:	Meckenheim, Germany
DATE:	May 27, 2003
PERSONS INTERVIEWED:	Steffen RUSS Klaus WITTLING
FOCUS OF INTERVIEW:	Counter-Terrorism
CONTEXT:	BUNDESKRIMINALAMT(BKA) - Internationale Zusammenarbeit Federal criminal policing agency that focuses on national and international investigations. This particular interview group focuses on counter-terrorism. The BKA has extensive historical experience in dealing with national terrorism as a result of terrorist acts in the 1970s including acts by the Red Army Faction and the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. In Germany the police

to citizen ratio is 1:327. The BKA found no change in counter-terrorism subsequent to 911 due to earlier responses.

Current budget is twice that of employee costs.

DISCUSSION POINTS:

- 1 History
 - European cooperation on anti-terrorism founded in early 1960s in order to counter emerging terrorist groups.
 - Structured information sharing emerged in late 1970s.
 - Birth of liaison program for counter-terrorism trained liaison personnel. Commenced with five (5) and has grown to twenty (20).
- 2 Inter-agency cooperation
 - Success is dependant upon integration with counterparts within the European Union (EU).
 - Internationally integrated investigative teams.
 - BKA is central repository for all terrorist information in Germany fed by all police agencies. This role was negotiated by all policing agencies and hence the BKA does all threat assessments and passes this information onto the police service of jurisdiction.
 - Linking of international databases (Schengen Agreement) which creates a centralized information database designed to detect illegal immigrants within the European Union.
 - “September 11th made us aware of the closed shop mentality”
 - “Everything’s possible”
 - Success is predicated upon, “. . . reliability, cooperation, trust, relationships and preparedness.”
- 3 Legislative issues
 - Religion has no special protection under law and can be dismantled if ruled as extremist.
- 4 Standardization
 - Legislated definition of terrorism.
 - European Warrant developed as a response to public and political will following 911
 - Common Language on Terrorism (European Union). Catalogue of speech for common understanding of terms.
 - BKA responsible for Threat Assessments for all of Germany (BKA procedures have been adopted by European Union)
 - Centralized approach facilitates a standardized procedure with respect to the preparation and dissemination of information so there is no exaggeration or suppression of threats.
- 5 International Liaison Program
 - 56 liaison officers in 56 countries for which 50% of workload relates to terrorism.
 - “The exchange of information should be through one point of contact in each country so there can be the establishment of clear channels of communication and information is not missed”. Intelligence channels should be distinct from policing channels in order to protect information for court purposes.
 - “In order to overcome most difficulties in cross-jurisdictional situations, you must develop personal relationships with the officers of other countries.”
- 6 Technology
 - Proactive pattern searches (profiles) in order to identify “sleeper groups” or individuals.

- 7 Information Boards
 - Coordinating the collection, comparison, analysis and dissemination of intelligence/information between the BKA, Border Police, State Police, BND and the BFV on terrorist activity.
 - Creates one point of contact
- 8 Integrated First Response Unit
 - Incident preparedness unit in anticipation of a terrorist act proactively trained to gather evidence, conduct follow-up, analyze in order to provide a crime scene response to a terrorist incident.
 - 600 person unit.

ASSESSMENT:

POSITIVES:

- 1 one centralized repository for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of terrorist intelligence
- 2 European Union developed common language on terrorism, as well as developing and introducing the European Arrest Warrant.
- 3 Centralized informant handling
- 4 International liaison program specific to terrorism

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Lack of integration of data banks
- 2 “The exchange of information should be through one point of contact in each country so there can be the establishment of clear channels of communication and information is not missed”. Intelligence channels should be distinct from policing channels in order to protect information for court purposes.
- 3 “In order to overcome most difficulties in cross-jurisdictional situations, you must develop personal relationships with the officers of other countries.”

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 “Everything’s possible”
- 2 Success is predicated upon, “. . . reliability, cooperation, trust, relationships and preparedness.”

SITE LOCATION: Bonn, Germany

DATE: 2003-05-28 **TIME:** 0900 hr

PERSONS INTERVIEWED: Christoph Schonberg
Jürgen Schnigula
Carsten Runkel

FOCUS OF INTERVIEW: Organized Crime from a prosecution viewpoint.
International Communication and Cooperation.

CONTEXT:

The Federal Justice department coordinates the prosecution of organized crime cases and assists police with the gathering and dissemination of information/evidence on an international basis. In particular, they coordinate MLAT and extradition requests.

DISCUSSION POINTS:

- 1 European Warrant
 - The warrant has no priority over other warrant internally to Germany
 - EW treated on equal basis with EW warrants from other countries
 - if several competing requests (warrants) are received, the government will decide the priority.
 - The European Arrest Warrant is in line with International Human Rights and United Nations Conventions.
 - This is the first step in going from national states to super-national states.
 - The European Warrant would eliminate the need for extradition treaties and layers of bureaucracy that undermine principles of justice.
 - Faith and Trust are implied by the existence of the European Warrant. Execution of the warrant implies co-operation.
 - The EW does not apply to minors (those under the age of 11).
- 2 Extradition
 - Commencing on December 31, 2003, extraditions will be “fast-tracked meaning that they have to take place within a three month period.
 - There must be deadlines implemented for international arrest warrants and extraditions.
 - The key issue that undermines the process is a lack of trust in the requesting country.
 - To make the system effectively work, there must be trust, team work and open communication.
 - “Co-operation and trust between competent authorities” is key to success among partners.
- 3 Schengen agreement
 - Discussed the agreement in overview
 - Briefly discussed SIS, which is the computer system accessible to all countries at ports of entry. This database contains entries for outstanding EW warrants as well as ‘look outs’ for suspects pertaining to cross border smuggling investigations

ASSESSMENT:**POSITIVES:**

- 1 they believe they are integrated with all agencies

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Predominantly reactive work and no strategic planning taking place with partners.
- 2 The international community must respond to the mobility of Organized Crime and Terrorism.
- 3 Personal relationships with foreign officials facilitates MLAT requests.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 European warrant concept - has application within the Canadian context and the potential to

reduce resources and associated funding requirements while expediting the process if applied to Canada wide warrants.

- 2 An international arrest warrant would remove the need for an extradition process for certain offences and respond better to the new global criminal.
- 3 The concept of an international arrest warrant can be extended to fine collection, seizure of assets and search warrants.

SUMMARY:

This department is not an investigative body and responds to requests initiated by other law enforcement agencies. They streamline the process and facilitate/coordinate domestic and international legal requests.

SITE LOCATION: Cologne, Germany

DATE: 2003-05-28 **TIME:** 1400

PERSONS INTERVIEWED: Norbert Steilen
Uwe Brucher

FOCUS OF INTERVIEW: Organized crime and cross border smuggling enforcement

CONTEXT: The ZKA (Zollkriminalamt) is the Customs department for Germany. The primary responsibility of the investigative branch within the ZKA is focused on cross border smuggling by organized crime groups. Collects, evaluates and disseminates information for customs investigative service.

DISCUSSION POINTS:

- 1 Integrated enforcement
 - Success is interdependent upon successful integration with other law enforcement partners.
 - Perception that the diversity of countries within EU inhibits integrated activities.
 - Local cooperation but no strategic overarching effort .
 - No formal structure for cooperation.
 - They are presently exploring treaties whereby police powers would follow with the investigators (ie. Power to arrest in foreign jurisdiction signing onto treaty).
 - Partnerships are predicated on necessity on a case by case basis.
- 2 Information/intelligence sharing
 - Focus has been predominantly on drugs.
 - Too much time analyzing such that the feedback is too dated.
 - Germany is a lead in this area.
 - The ZKA has eight liaison officers abroad for the first time.
 - There is an exchange program that is issue specific.
- 3 Europol
 - Europol is the coordinating agency for collecting and analysis, distribution and coordination of organized crime and terrorism information. It also provides strategic

- advice.
- There is investigator apathy toward Europol (“Politically established at the will of a few”) due to a political foundation as opposed to the police foundation of Interpol. Resulting in “Stubborn Compliance”.
 - The philosophy behind Europol is solid, however, practically, it is in its infancy. Intelligence return is “dated”.
 - Advised that Europol has had some success but more likely more failures than successes.
 - There is a reluctance to share sensitive information by participating countries.
 - Customs have supplied significant intelligence to Europol with little response or feedback resulting in a poor perception of this organization.
 - Created to bring together intelligence related to criminal organizations in 2 or more member states.

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 They are attempting to integrate their enforcement activities with both domestic and international partners.
- 2 Recognize the need to improve their information/intelligence collection and dissemination processes.
- 3 “Only if we work together, do we have a chance against organized crime”.
- 4 “Anything is possible”.
- 5 Existing treaties allow for exchange of information that otherwise might not exist.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Success dependent on integration.
- 2 Limited intelligence process as it has been focused on drugs and has not been integrated with other agencies to the extent they desire.
- 3 A lack of inter-agency trust is a disabler in any major organized crime investigation.
- 4 Without co-operation there is no success.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 The European Union (EU) facilitates integrated policing among participating countries through motivators such as money, support, training, etc.
 - There is an EU “Controlled Delivery” manual;
 - There is an undercover manual for the EU;
 - Surveillance standards for the EU
- 2 Success is predicated on sharing.

SUMMARY

The Customs service operates to a large extent independently of other enforcement areas. They involve potential partners on an apparent case by case basis. They recognize that they can improve in areas such as integrated enforcement and intelligence sharing which would have a reciprocating positive affect on their overall mandate.

REFERENCE MATERIAL:

Internet Site: www.zollkriminalamt.de
Hand out package titled "ZKA – Zollkriminalamt"

SITE LOCATION: Landeskriminalamt (LKA) Hamburg German Police Authority

DATE: May 30, 2003 **TIME:** 10:00

PERSONS INTERVIEWED: Mr Bernd Schulz-Eckhardt
Mr Franz

FOCUS OF INTERVIEW: Organized Crime and Intelligence/Information Sharing

CONTEXT: The Hamburg Landeskriminalamt, (LKA) are one of the 16 State Police Services in Germany. Like Berlin, Hamburg is recognized as both a State and City, within the policing environment. The LKA are responsible for enforcing all Federal and State laws within the State of Hamburg and have jurisdiction throughout Germany..

DISCUSSION POINTS:

- 1 Information /Intelligence Sharing
 - The State Police are responsible for providing intelligence/information to one central repository, the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA)
 - Information Boards
 - Information from the BKA tends to be of little value and not as detailed as required for investigative purposes. Limited or peripheral information is provided by the 16 states.
 - Fear, lack of trust and insecurity among officers tends to limit the flow of information through the LKA to the BKA. Information sharing within their organization is problematic. "We don't know what we know"
 - Education, Training and Feedback to front line officers is required to enhance the flow of information. Some members tend to be lazy, too busy or fail to understand the importance of the information they possess.
 - Lack of analysts to manage information
 - Although not possible a Police State may be more efficient for information sharing purposes
 - The data base of the LKA is incompatible with that of the BKA, requiring duplication for intelligence submissions.
 - Although data systems are helpful, the ultimate success of an operation depends on the quality of the investigators
- 2 Operations
 - Reinforce the need for intelligence submissions from front line officers
 - Promote co-operation among 16 state police and BKA for enhanced communication and information sharing
 - Progressive policing philosophy enhanced moral among members.
 - Within German law, undercover operators do not testify in court and are not allowed to commit any criminal act. Coverpersons testify on behalf of the undercover operator in order to protect the undercover operator's identity.
 - At the state level, organized crime is not the priority.
 - Terrorist profiling has served to assist in targeting high risk individuals in a manner that is more commensurate with available policing resources.
 - JFOs are often difficult to arrange as each state has a different economy and the police

are not funded equally (some agencies are not able to afford to participate in a JFO).

3 Source Handling

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 Information /Intelligence Sharing
- 2 One centralized information repository accessible by all state police
- 3 Good computer systems and software help but "people make the difference". (Page 100)
- 4 One common data system throughout all 16 states

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Need to educate, train and provide feedback to officers on what information needs to be submitted and its significance/importance. I.T. systems alone cannot overcome the problem of info sharing. Although data systems are strongly beneficial, the ultimate success of an operation depends on the quality of the investigators.
- 2 Significant work involved for all states to provide information to BKA.
- 3 Cumbersome systems and structures frustrate the sharing of information.
- 4 With a fewer policing agencies, a consistency of approach would better facilitate cooperation and communication.
- 5 A common database for all police is very effective because it breaks down information sharing barriers.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 No definition in law of Organized Crime, common theme only
- 2 "Direct co-operation" required to streamline the two systems for ease of access
- 3 One centralized data base shared by both the LKA and BKA would enhance relationships, reduce workload and simplify information sharing.
- 4 "We don't know what we know" . . . because within one organization, information is left in pockets or it is in someone's head. "The police know many things but is not all in one place." Investigators do not know what is terrorist or organized crime information, so it may not be recorded and passed on. "All police officers must be educated on what is relevant."
- 5 Quality of personnel is the foundation for effectively combating organized crime and terrorism.

REFERENCE MATERIALS:

- copy of presentation titled - Polizei Hamburg
- "OK - Bekämpfung in Hamburg

SITE LOCATION:

London, England.

DATE: 2003-06-02

TIME: 10:00 hr.

PERSONS INTERVIEWED:

Peter Mason
Lisa Gurney-Nichols
Steve Pickering
Richard Fudge - Liaison from Metropolitan Police

FOCUS OF INTERVIEW:

Counter Terrorism, integration, and intelligence/information sharing

CONTEXT:

MI5, British Security Service, is responsible for counter terrorism activities throughout Britain. They have extensive experience due to their experience with Irish terrorist acts. They are currently undergoing considerable change due to demographics and the retirement of senior personnel. The average age at this time is between 24 and 34 yr. They have little or no police background which poses a problem. They recruit in many instances directly from the universities which has left a gap between intelligence and operations.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- 1 Intelligence/information sharing
 - Targeted national and international intelligence gathering against perceived threats to UK interests.
 - No powers of arrest, gather intelligence and advise appropriate agency. Relationships with partners is paramount for operational purposes and success.
 - Link into all police forces via 'Special Branch' which is/are intelligence specific resources for terrorism and organized crime that must exist within all the departments.
 - All 51 police forces have a separate special branch. There is a need to link all police forces through a smaller number of special branches (8-10) for ease of communication sharing of information and for the retention of local knowledge.
 - They do not view themselves as the lead which alleviates friction with other police departments
 - The mandate of the organization is to amalgamate tactical and strategic information to get the bigger picture.
 - If there is no value-added, then an effort is immediately abandoned.
 - A "firewall" is essential between intelligence and operations.
 - Definitions of organized crime and terrorism can be restrictive.
- 2 Internal study
 - Recommends funding for operations should be clearer
 - Recommends proper IT standard to Special Branches
 - Recommends non-executive co-ordinator at national level
 - Recommends the regionalization of Special Branch offices under a separate central command & control - they agree with this position but do have a concern about the loss of local knowledge.
- 3 Risk Assessment
 - government decides priorities and they determine tactical strategy
 - assess requests for support from local police based on national priorities and availability of resources, expertise and funding
 - senior law enforcement committee to assess strategic direction
 - NCIS provides the strategic overview based on security service and police departments
 - no local strategic analysis unless police department requests it
 - no formal prioritization process other than overall strategic assessment at government level - prioritize based on current threat.
- 4 Integration

- exchange program with other police departments within Britain
 - international exchange program involving Canada (CSIS) and Australia
 - exchange program with other departments other than police to facilitate the sharing of information and intelligence
 - “Working together in the same building is a tremendous benefit”.
- 5 European Union
- prefer to keep structures informal due to perceived flexibility
 - “Increased co-operation at the international level can become a mantra - easy for a politician to say.”

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 dedicated units imbedded within the various police departments ensures timely exchange/sharing of information and intelligence
- 2 recognize that integration between various law enforcement services is critical to success
- 3 promote information/intelligence sharing and infrastructure in support of same
- 4 the mandate of MI5 plays to the strengths of the organization.
- 5 Personalities make it work through an open approach to doing business.
- 6 Information is classified for dissemination at the most appropriate level for widest access without compromise.
- 7 Liaison between MET and BSS since September 11, has benefited both agencies. Police experience compliments the Intelligence Analyst, bridging the gap that may otherwise exist.
- 8 Clear role definition enhance relationships

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 no independent work - support role - reactive rather than proactive
- 2 attrition impact on expertise within service - loss of corporate knowledge
- 3 MI5 view problems from and strategic perspective and the police view the problems from a tactical perspective. The gap exists when these two separate perspectives are not appreciated or accommodated and can only be filled through cooperation.
- 4 911 accelerated the process of cooperation and we realized that we need everyone internationally.
- 5 BSS bridge the gap between the intelligence and the source of the intelligence acting as a firewall.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 they reflect the philosophy of ‘intelligence-led’ in that they collect and analyze information with the view to identifying targets for investigation by police agencies
- 2 they have both an informal and formal infrastructure that facilitates the flow of information
- 3 the key to a successful organized crime investigation is to “shop around for the skills and information that you need” and analyze the intelligence in order to uncover a syndicates weaknesses.
- 4 “We feel privileged to work with the police”.
- 5 Priorities are reviewed weekly in consideration of available resources.
- 6 In order to function with sustainability there must be “drip-feeding and sanitization of information between intelligence and operations.
- 7 Proactive, dynamic, open-minded and operationally knowledge-based leadership is essential to success.
- 8 *“If you are not careful, integration can become a mantra as opposed to an opportunity”.*

SUMMARY:

MI5 (Security Service) is a dedicated agency for the collection and dissemination of information/intelligence relative to counter terrorism. Although they do not have arrest powers, they are an integral part of the enforcement team. Youth and inexperience are their biggest risk areas.

SITE LOCATION: London, England

DATE: 2003-06-02 **TIME:** 14:00

PERSONS INTERVIEWED: Rob Ormsby
Jon Murphy
Hannah Tooze
Bradley Jones

FOCUS OF INTERVIEW: Organized Crime and Intelligence/Information Sharing

CONTEXT: The National Crime Squad was created in 1996, initially with 7 teams from representatives from various police departments. Since inception they have been amalgamated into 3 regions. They focus on all serious crime including cross border crime and support the local police departments. Currently they are not funded by the government but rely on funding and in turn resourcing from the British police departments.

The National Crime Squad is made up entirely of seconded personnel from police agencies throughout the United Kingdom. The greatest challenge is getting police agencies to give up top quality investigators and supporting fiscal resource, and therefore initiate investigations that will satisfy the Governments mandate.

The National Crime Squad is mandated by government to focus 70% of their efforts on Drug Enforcement and Human Trafficking. They are evaluated strictly on statistical performance as it relates to arrests, seizures, and asset recovery. The National Crime Squad is only national policing agency in the country.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- 1 information/intelligence sharing
 - challenge to break traditional attitudes and channel energies towards other intelligence gathering rather than just drug related
 - creating their own integrated intelligence data base for their own teams percent of resources intelligence analysts linked to NCIS
- 2 Operations
 - promote U/C operations in selected ethnic communities in order to combat human trafficking

- numerous informal investigative teams - view formal arrangements as problematic
 - target people rather than crime
 - the NCS does not investigate reported crime, but organized crime groups:
 - Level I - local criminals (B & E groups, robbers, etc).
 - Level II - cross border criminals who traverse the boundaries of the local police)
 - Level III - Crime groups that function on a national basis.
 - National Crime Squad targets the leaders in a criminal organization and stay with it until the organization has been dismantled. This is contrary to local law enforcement which often does not have the resource capability to dismantle an organized crime group.
 - The methods of the National Crime Squad are very expensive (eg. surveillance, lawful access techniques), although effective.
 - interact daily with other police departments
 - focus on cross border crime across the borders of the various constabularies
 - no responsibility to investigate any reported crime
 - do not police any specific community
 - National Crime Squad has fifty-four self-sufficient project teams.
 - The NCS uses a broad-based approach by looking at all the Acts and Regulations available and accomplishes its goals through partnerships and integration.
- 3 Source Handling
- coordinate human source handling which provides more professionalism and a greater appearance of integrity
- 4 professional standards
- problems with corruption in the past

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 target people (crime groups) and not the type of crime
- 2 integrate their activities with the police departments
- 3 creation of dedicated human source handling group
- 4 the NCS integrated teams have umbrella powers.
- 5 Jurisdiction is not an issue as members have authority throughout the UK.
- 6 Asset recovery if not granted through the criminal court, will be pursued through civil action.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 require independent funding and not be reliant on the police departments for financial support.
- 2 A regionalized as opposed to a strictly local approach is necessary to be effective against organized crime groups.
- 3 lack of formal arrangements on joint operations inhibits long term strategic/tactical planning.
- 4 Previous policing experience is invaluable prior to coming to the National Crime Squad and working on complex, organized crime projects.
- 5 "leadership and credibility is everything to success".
- 6 It is important to utilize the laws in other countries to achieve the greater goal.
- 7 Disruption as opposed to dismantlement is not the best way to achieve policing goals, however it is a necessary alternative. This is particularly so with respect to the efforts of local law enforcement agencies which often do not have the resources to dismantle a criminal organization.
- 8 Information is not being shared enough.
- 9 Security services sometimes do not produce intelligence upon which evidence can be

gathered as they are not fully aware of restrictions imposed by the rules of evidence.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 focus on channeling police officers energies towards other types of intelligence/information gathering.
- 2 creating a linked integrated intelligence data bank.
- 3 the National Crime Squad uses the concept of “sterile corridors” in order to address disclosure issues and insulate the source of intelligence from being revealed in court prosecutions.
- 4 The NCS has disclosure experts which facilitate the concept of intelligent disclosure and strikes the necessary balance between naïveté and integrity. This is part of protecting sources and technique through the sterile corridor.
- 5 There is a move toward creating a “National FBI” model, however there is resistance.

SUMMARY

The National Crime Squad emerged in 1996 in response to a growing recognition of organized crime and its operations across various boundaries (constabulary) which inhibited local police enforcement. Due to its recent creation, they are not tied to traditional approaches and are continually expanding how they do business as they experience ‘lessons learned’. Their main inhibitor to their mandate and operations is their reliance on the various police departments for funding. They recognize that success is interdependent upon integrating their activities with potential partners but seem to shy away from any formal arrangements. They are looking forward and not back.

REFERENCE MATERIAL:

- NCS - Disrupt/Dismantle Return
- NCS - Performance - 2003-04-01 to 2003-04-30
- NCS - Performance Indicators and Targets 2002-04-01 to 2003-03-31
- NCS - Organization Chart
- NCS - Corporate Plan 2003-2006
- NCS - Copy of presentation by Jon Murphy of Acc (Operations)

SITE LOCATION:	London, England
DATE: 2003-06-03	TIME: 1500
PERSONS INTERVIEWED:	Nick Baker Euan Stewart
FOCUS OF INTERVIEW:	Organized Crime and Cross Border smuggling
CONTEXT:	HM Customs Service has a rich tradition of customs service to Britain. It is comprised of over 7,000 employees of which 2073 are investigators, 1300 are intelligence officers and 100 are intelligence analysts.

DISCUSSION POINTS:

- 1 Information/Intelligence Sharing

- structure of intelligence operations
 - central coordination with respect to overseas liaison officers
 - regional coordination looking inland within Britain
 - operational coordination for undercover operations, technical support and Part VI - wiretaps
 - prioritize nationally based on identified strategies - do not have a SLEIPNIR process
 - most of their intelligence operations is focused on reactive and little proactive intelligence taking place
- 2 Disruption versus dismantling of organized crime groups
 - focus of operations is on disruption - believe it has more of an impact, based on probability of successful prosecution, cost, and protection of source identification.
 - concern that organized crime is beginning to adjust to this tactic
 - reduces time in court and assists in alleviating disclosure issues
 - 3 Electronic surveillance
 - their wire tap surveillance is not entered in court and is only used for intelligence purposes, unless it can be proven by an alternate source.
 - no requirement to disclose
 - internal capability to approve electronic tracking devices without having to seek approval from judiciary
 - however, there is a judicial oversight committee that periodically reviews the authorization given.
 - 4 Integrated enforcement
 - they integrate their enforcement strategy with other agencies as a lead to the implementation of the strategy
 - discussed an example of international integration - Project Airbridge which involves law enforcement in Jamaica - through this exchange/integration they were able to create tools to profile drug couriers and as a result had a greater impact.
 - 5 Performance measurements
 - they are using a model similar to the 'Balance Scorecard' performance measurement process. They report on a 14 day cycle and do not perceive this as onerous
 - 6 Risk assessments
 - They both informally and formally prioritize targets
 - The central and 3 regional managers meet every 2 weeks but subjectively discuss submissions and make decisions based on their assessment of what is going on and balanced against the national strategic direction

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 disruption versus dismantle stream lines operations and reduces disclosure concerns
- 2 three tiered approach to intelligence structure
- 3 structured performance measurement tool being used to assess success
- 4 support and implement integration as an enforcement strategy
- 5 in order to maintain responsibility and accountability, judges audit police files.
- 6 Centralized data bases serve to break down barriers among police agencies and provide for a consistency of payment to sources among agencies and there is no duplication of services or payment for the same information.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 disclosure significantly impacts ability to effectively dismantle organized crime groups
- 2 loose framework of rules which may prove problematic in the long term
- 3 their structure/focus has been primarily on reactive intelligence and does not address long term - proactive needs.
- 4 Continuously evaluate all your operations in order to get the “biggest bang for your buck”.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 capability to approve technical/electronic tracking devices without approval from judiciary - to ensure integrity of process, they are accountable to a judicial oversight committee.
- 2 Court is only one option - disruption as opposed to dismantlement serves to take the drugs and supporting assets away from organized criminals to the point of destroying their structure. If there is not a good chance of a successful prosecution, a cost/benefit analysis may lead to disruption as opposed to dismantlement.
- 3 International policing provides the opportunity to take-down a criminal organization at the most suitable point and engaging a foreign jurisdiction is often a viable alternative. However, it is essential for investigators to be familiar with jurisprudence in other countries.
- 4 There is a reluctance to pass intelligence to Canadian agencies due to disclosure laws in Canada.
- 5 Canadian Disclosure laws do not facilitate intelligence sharing.
- 6 “partnerships and information sharing are established for a purpose, not for posturing”.
- 7 “Always target the money”.
- 8 Customs officers have more authority than Police Officer
- 9 Centralized Organization.

SUMMARY

HM Customs Service aggressively targets organized crime groups within the confines of the national strategic direction. They use traditional law enforcement approaches while introducing new strategies such as disruption vs dismantle. They effectively use the tools available to them in the form of intelligence gathering processes, electronic surveillance, and technical support, however, are not geared to developing long term targets/strategies on a proactive basis. Their operations are reactive in nature and balanced against the government strategic direction.

REFERENCE MATERIAL

- HM customs and Excise Law Enforcement Business Plan 2003/04 - 2005/06
- Dismantle/Disruption Guidelines

SITE LOCATION: London England Home Office

DATE: 2003-06-04 **TIME:** 09:00 hr

PERSONS INTERVIEWED: Kate Collins
Giles Herbert
Alexander Fraser
Kevin Wallace

FOCUS OF INTERVIEW: Organized Crime, Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence/Information Sharing

CONTEXT:

The Home Office Organized Crime, Drugs and International Group are responsible for maintaining law and order, with an emphasis on local policing initiatives in the reduction and prevention of specific crime. Their focus is on Counter Terrorism, Criminal Justice, Immigration, Corrections and Probation and maintain many of the responsibilities of the Ministry of the Solicitor General in Canada.

The Home Office promotes a National Intelligence Model which tells police how to respond to organized crime through multi-functional, multi-agency integration of resources with a focus on drugs and money laundering.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- 1 Information /Intelligence Sharing
 - Gulf between organized crime and local crime has deepened with the latter being neglected.
 - Same level of information sharing as with NCIS
 - NCS and NCIS both reasonably new organizations and still “finding their place”.
 - Legislation created to enhance the powers of police for the collection and dissemination of information
- 2 Operations
 - National Policing Plan before parliament, however police feel the expectations are too high
 - The *Police Reform Act (2002)* gave the British government the authority to direct Police Chiefs on certain matters.
 - Parliament has created fifty-one objectives and priorities within this plan which is far too aggressive for the number of available resources.
 - Many of the smaller police forces are unable to focus on serious high level crime.
 - Organized Crime is not hindered by legislation, the amount of money involved is enormous and the relationship to other forms of criminal activity significant
 - People smuggling continues to be significant cross border problem
 - Emphasis on placing Immigration liaison officers overseas in strategic locations
 - “Focus on Disruption and Dismantlement of the process” of organized crime activities (page 15)
 - Intelligence Operations require follow through with Legal and Legislative changes and funding of multi agency teams.
 - Proactive responses are required in dealing with organized crime because it is not reported.
 - They are implementing radiological detection devices at all ports.

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 Source handling
- 2 Better equipped for an intelligence response to a situation
- 3 Establishment of Public Support Unit to enhance initial police response
- 4 Proceeds of crime act 2002, allows for seizure of assets in disruption cases
- 5 Ability to tax property obtained by proceeds of crime - civil and asset recovery.
- 6 “Information Gateways” have been established within legislation in order to allow agencies to

effectively communicate.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Difficulty obtaining “co-ordinated response” from all chiefs and other police services
- 2 The quality of intelligence is paramount to any successful organized crime investigation (garbage in/garbage out).
- 3 The Home Office has taken the proactive approach in that they provide their needs to the scientists and have them develop something as opposed to working with present technology.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 No definition in law of Organized Crime, common theme only. However, it is defined by the Association of Chief Police Officers.
- 2 Immigration personnel are posted at various nexus points around the world.
- 3 The Home Office promotes overseas initiatives that serve national policing interests and national interests.
- 4 The Home Office has established links between organized crime and terrorism.
- 5 The Home Office is presently focusing on the training of front-line police officers so they do not become the second victims of a terrorist attack.
- 6 They have implemented a National Coordination Team to respond to a terrorist attack with three practice sessions annually in order to move, “. . . crisis to consequence . . .” with a focus on detection and intelligence.

SUMMARY

The Home Office performs a role similar to the Ministry of the Solicitor General and plans, promotes, coordinates and funds policing on a national and international scale. The Home Office maintains a very open and close relationship with policing and acts as a strong advocate for policing needs within parliament by obtaining the necessary funding and accommodating legislative changes that respond to public needs and public safety.

REFERENCE MATERIAL

- Seizing Criminal's Wealth - The Proceeds of Crime Act
- The National Policing Plan 2003-2006
- Extremism - Protecting People and Property
- Business as Usual - Maximising business resilience to terrorist bombings
- Bombs - Protecting People and Property
- Bomb? - The Police Response
- ACPO submission to Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 2002 - The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland

SITE LOCATION: London, England

DATE: 2003-06-04 **TIME:** 13:30 hr

PERSONS INTERVIEWED: Peter Clarke
Roger Pearce
Colin Black
John Hughes
Andrew Atwood

Roy Coborne
Joe Cornell
Phil King

FOCUS OF INTERVIEW: Counter-terrorism and Intelligence sharing

CONTEXT: Scotland Yard, Metropolitan Police, Anti-terrorism Branch is focused on the investigative enforcement with respect to Britain's national security and counter terrorism work. They link with the Security Service who gather the information and generate the intelligence. Through their 'Special Branch' structure, they oversee the investigations at the local level. Although they are a large municipal policing agency, they are the lead for all terrorist investigations in the United Kingdom due to their capacity, experience and skill.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- 1 Executive Liaison Group
 - When the Security Service develops a case to the point of possible charges, they convene an Executive Liaison Group (Security Service, relevant police force, Special Branch of the Met).
 - Manages the transition from intelligence to evidence for prosecution, while protecting the source. Creates firewalls for disclosure.
 - Deploys resources in support of smaller police forces - numbers and skills (ie. Bali terrorist act - specialist support to Indonesian government).
- 2 Intelligence/information sharing
 - the national coordinator from the anti-terrorism branch chairs a committee between the affected police departments, Security Service, and Special Branch to manage the transition from intelligence into investigations/evidence
 - intell from arrests very significant, possibly more significant than intell gathered through traditional ways
 - MOU's with key partners to formalize the sharing of information
 - Gateway provisions permits access to information held at Inland Revenue
 - Executive Action/Intelligence Cycle - Intelligence is fed by executive action (law enforcement), not the other way around as had been the case in Northern Ireland. This means that the Secret Service and the Met must work seamlessly.
- 3 Operations
 - the challenge is to manage crisis vs consequence
 - international terrorism enforcement requires considerable travel and supportive funding
 - conduct table top exercise periodically around country that involves all levels of participation
 - discussed contraband smuggling in Northern Ireland by organized crime - integrated enforcement approach with southern Ireland.
- 4 Integration
 - integrated alert process to government, ,military, police, commerce, industry and transport
 - integrate their risk assessment process
 - discussed a special undercover operation dependent upon significant international cooperation

- Guardian Group which is comprised of all police agencies that meet frequently to create tactical strategies
 - IRIS database - integrated and accessible by all
 - Another example of integration of the Environmental Intelligence Group
 - Key integration partners - Foreign Office, NCIS, Security Service, SIS, local police
 - Borough Liaison program via Special Branch at local police departments - raises awareness and facilitates communication
5. Training
- discussed EDICTS program which pertains to advice and training to partner agencies including local police
 - training provided at all levels
 - internal website across law enforcement agencies
 - business awareness program
6. Risk Assessment
- identify probable target sites including vulnerable politicians. This includes major event sites, tourist sites, major food suppliers and high profile companies
 - contingency plans developed in partnership with local police
 - Security Review Committee for London meets once a week. Includes police, transport, ambulance, mayor's office etc to examine strategic priorities - from this committee they create sub-committees to examine more specific issues
7. National terrorist financial investigative unit
- dedicated to examining terrorist finances
 - direct financial link between organized crime and terrorism
 - no investigated well until 6 months ago with legislative changes
8. Legislation
- seeking changes to legislation to increase detention time for suspects in custody from the current 7 to 14 days - 7 days insufficient time to make international inquiries.
 - how they approach counter terrorism is driven by the legislation
 - recent changes to legislation expands focus from Irish terrorists to world terrorism (Terrorism Act)
 - Human Rights Act is fundamentally changing policing as well.
9. Ports of entry security - air, land and sea
- discussed operation Trident and Operation Helmsman which were major international integrated projects at Heathrow airport targeting drug couriers from Jamaica
 - discussed an associated project 'Eborder' which is being run by the Immigration Service
10. Event security and management
- this is focused on the counter terrorism for major events and not the actual security planning - prevention
 - develop tactical approaches in consultation with local police force of jurisdiction - multi-agency environment
 - intelligence at the beginning, prevention in the middle and post event investigation at the end

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 reliance on intelligence gathered from arrests - target those taken into custody for intelligence either from interviews or what may be on their person
- 2 preventive counter terrorism strategy at major events
- 3 integrated enforcement activities, domestically and internationally play significant role in success
- 4 strong infrastructure/process for the sharing of information/intelligence
- 5 involve community elements in their intelligence process and tactical operations.
- 6 converting intelligence to evidence is an enormous challenge that requires innovation, creativity and knowledge.
- 7 Recruit training now has sessions on terrorism.
- 8 Provide resources to other agencies during the arrest and investigation where such resources don't exist.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 IT and radio systems not compatible - need strategy to address this issue
- 2 like all agencies - funding a problem
- 3 Utilize a two stage response to terrorism - crisis response and consequence response.
- 4 When conducting covert operations, there must always be the balance between public safety and notification of the threat.
- 5 By using "drive-down profiling" police focus on tangible indicators which lead to other indicators that do not undermine human rights issues.
- 6 Performance measurement is based strictly on statistics.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 table top exercise which assists in identifying potential gaps and promotes participation
- 2 business awareness program within prevention strategy
- 3 There must be consistency in all terrorist investigations to ensure longevity of new policing powers and credibility that leads to public support.
- 4 Scotland Yard proactively identifies vulnerabilities, assesses the threat and provides contingency plans.
- 5 Front-line policing is the "life's blood" in battling international terrorism as it is the front-line uniform officer that most likely encounters the terrorist at the national level. The best efforts have come from informed uniform police officers who develop information for intelligence (aforementioned executive action/intelligence cycle) . In order to capitalize on this reality they:
 - Train front-line personnel on indicators
 - Utilize the media to assist through a public alert system.
 - Implement a Security Alert system to notify government agencies, NGO's, public and private organizations.
- 6 Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) is a computer/camera system that will scan vehicles traveling down the road and identify potential threat vehicles.
- 7 Every police force in the UK must have a "Counter-Terrorism Security Advisor".
- 8 Operation "Helmsman" involves UK police at origin of international flights to Great Britain analyzing flight manifests prior to passengers arriving which allows for targeting. There is a direct correlation between this process and a drop in homicide and other crimes.
- 9 "E-Border" strategy is a form of extending borders through the use of computer technology to gather security, intelligence and enforcement information at the point of departure of all people coming to the UK.
- 10 New Scotland Yard is de-glamorizing "sacrifice" (suicide bombing) by publicizing it as "coward bombing".
- 11 They have switched from policing a threat to policing a vulnerability.
- 12 Terrorism is funded by organized crime, tobacco smuggling, credit card fraud, drugs and

people smuggling. When a threat or risk assessment of major events BSS provides the intelligence to the SB working with the MET in order to keep everyone in the “communication loop.”

SUMMARY

The ‘Met’ Anti-terrorism Branch relies heavily on integrated intelligence and investigative enforcement. Although they believe they are the lead in this area, they recognize some areas need improvement such as IT, radio systems and associated funding issues. Due to their extensive experience in anti-terrorist matters, they have learned much over the past years.

SITE LOCATION:	National Criminal Intelligence Service Headquarters - London England
DATE: 2003-06-05	TIME: 0930hrs
PERSONS INTERVIEWED:	Brian Flood, Head of Corporate Development
FOCUS OF INTERVIEW:	Mandate and Operations of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (United Kingdom) with a focus on the National Intelligence Model.
CONTEXT:	<p>In the late 1980's early 1990's, crime in the U.K. was out of control. The gap between reported crime and resources to investigate kept growing. Crime Management Units were established. However, this system simply managed the crime statistics and reports, but did nothing to redress the actual crime problem. The National Intelligence model was developed to introduce Intelligence Led Policing to police agencies in the U.K. for the purpose of attending to the crime problem.</p> <p>The National Criminal Intelligence Service was established pursuant to the <i>Police Act of 1997</i>. Its mandate is to “prepare national threat assessments and recommend priorities and to facilitate the flow of intelligence to and from the police”.</p>

DISCUSSION POINTS

- 1 National Intelligence Model
 - Based upon the premise that "You Have to Know Your Business", looks at:
 - Volume Crime - know the victims, places and perpetrators of crime. This is accomplished through a crime pattern analysis.
 - Specialist Criminals - (drugs, complicated frauds, etc.). Dealt with by knowing the leaders and understanding how the criminal business works - ie., how the criminals are networked together to make their business work by undertaking a network analysis.
 - Local police commanders must establish the intelligence requirements for the intelligence officers. Otherwise the intelligence will be unfocussed.
 - Each commander must give direction to with respect to their local problems and cross-border problems.
 - Intelligence starts from the bottom and works upward, not the other way around. If the

people at the front line do not participate in intelligence gathering, the intelligence process will not work.

- There are only four things you can do to address crime through intelligence:
 - Target individuals;
 - Connect a series of crimes;
 - Identify the geographical hot spots;
 - Apply prevention techniques (eg., community based policing initiatives).
- The proper use of intelligence allows you to use limited resources to most efficiently and effectively apply these four methods of dealing with crime.
- Community policing is not a strategy, but a prevention tactic.
- The NCIS develops national, regional and local crime profiles based on the information received from police agencies. They also provide linkages between these profiles (which is often a difficult task when the crime issue in question is the same at the national, regional and local levels).

2 Local and Regional Intelligence Tasking and Coordinating Groups

- The National Policing Plan for the U.K. requires that regional cooperation between police forces and that all police agencies follow the National Intelligence Model.
- With respect to regional crime problems, delegates from area police forces agree to a regional profile. Target profiles are developed after the regional crime profile has been developed and agreed upon.
- In order to encourage the Local and Regional Intelligence Tasking and Coordinating Groups to provide intelligence on national priorities, they require all of the targets they have identified to be flagged with NCIS. The flagging process requires the local or regional groups intelligence on the target to be provided to NCIS. If a target is not flagged with the NCIS, they will not be able to undertake such investigative techniques such as a wiretap. At the end of an operation, the flag must be removed. This requires that the rest of the intelligence obtained on the target during the operation be provided to the NCIS.

3 Organized Crime Strategy Group

- Representatives review the threat assessments prepared by the NCIS. The OC Strategy Group is then responsible for developing a tactical response to the threat in question. In doing so, they commission the NCIS to prepare a problem profile on the particular crime problem being considered.

4 Intelligence Management Units

- Responsible for ensuring incoming intelligence is properly assessed AND disseminated. A policy unit also ensures the integrity of this process.

5 Intelligence Officers

- Intelligence officers are not investigators, but specialists. It is an emerging discipline for which there needs to be a clearly defined set of competencies and skills developed. Additionally, a clearly defined training regime needs to be established.

SITE LOCATION: Australian Federal Police

DATE: 2003-06-02 through 2003-06-07

PERSONS INTERVIEWED:

<i>Headquarters</i>	John Lawler Shane Castles Mark Walters Ian Peterson Chris Black Michael Murphy Cath Grassick Luke Cornelius Stuart Turner Brad Marden Michael McFadden Keiran Miller Natalie Davis Victoria LeBas	General Manager, Executive Services General Manager, International Operations Director, International Operations Principal Policy Officer Senior Policy Officer Coordinator Workplace Relations Coordinator People Strategies Worklife Diversity Worklife Diversity Leader, People Smuggling Intelligence Team Performance Evaluation Law Enforcement Cooperation Program Psychologist AFP- NZP secondee
<i>Australian Federal Police College</i>	Rod Walker Donna Hall	AFPC AFPC - On-line Learning
<i>Australian Capital Territory</i>	John Murray Mandy Newton Andy Hughes Chris Lines Charmaine Quade Leanne Close Ray Sweeny Mark Johnsen Francis Polach Bob Sobey	CPO Commander Operations Deputy CPO Det. Supt. Crime Prevention Det Supt. South District Cdr Det Supt. OMIS Det Supt. Specialist Response & Security Det Supt. Specialist Response & Security Sgt. Crime Prevention, Business Liaison Officer Sgt., General Manager, Canberra Police Citizens Youth Clubs, Inc. ACT
<i>Eastern District</i>	Tony Negus John Rankin Peter Drennan Ken Hardiman John Lehmann Andrew Singh Karen Kirkby Tiago Ferreira	General Manager, Eastern Operations Director Support, Eastern Operations F/A F/A Det. Insp. JACG-AFP/NSW F/A - Intelligence, Eastern Operations F/A F/A
<i>Southern District</i>	Neil Burnage Andrea Humphries Brian Cooney Frank Predergast Graham Ashton	F/A Operations F/A Coordinator Operations Director Operations Support Director Operations General Manager, Operations

FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS: Diversity - services to diverse communities
Integration of diversity into Police Service
Emerging Crime Issues

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

Australian Federal Police have responsibilities to protect the Commonwealth of Australia in the realm of federal law enforcement; drug importation, people smuggling, immigration, anti-terrorism services, close-protection services, international police operations. There is also a community policing service provided under contract to the Australian Capital Territory, predominantly the area in and around Canberra. The ACT services mirror most municipal policing roles in Canada in terms of responsibilities and types of crime prevention programs in operation.

CONTEXT:

- Population of Australia 19.4 million
- Commonwealth/federation country comprised of 7 states and a central government - capital at Canberra
- Headquarters (Canberra), Australian Capital Territory (Canberra), Australian Federal Police College (Canberra), Eastern Region (Sydney), and Southern Region (Melbourne)
- 3,500 sworn and non-sworn staff - 3 categories, Agent, Commercial, and Community
- Operations in 26 countries, 50 LO's
- Priorities: counter-terrorism, drug syndicates, transnational crime, sex slavery, people smuggling, family law, international cooperation

The AFP is growing in importance to the Commonwealth Government, particularly in protecting Australia and its people at home and abroad since the events of September 11, 2001, as well as the Bali bombings and the heightened concern over terrorism and crime in the South Pacific and Asia. Funding for the agency has nearly doubled in the past two years, and the organization has been trying to reinvent its operations along the lines of the FBI, albeit on a smaller scale. The focus is becoming increasingly international, and counter terrorism concerns are a significant driver. Drug operations and people smuggling have been refocused off-shore in partnership with Pacific, European and Asia areas of most interest. Community policing is becoming less a model of their overall operations and the ACT services are somewhat of an anomaly. This changing focus is manifested in their investment in Liaison Officers and International Partnership programs. Ironically though, several of the AFP Headquarters staff mentioned that ACT-experienced personnel were often successful in promotion processes and generally were better prepared to take on leadership and investigational roles within the AFP. Equally, managers within the ACT management team seemed to greatly enjoy their operational commands over returning to AFP HQ. In support of the AFP's international efforts, they are looking to recruit a more diverse and higher educated workforce into the future. Similarly, ACT management see the importance of reflecting the broader community in providing services with emphasis on aboriginal and non-traditional roles of women as components. Indeed, approximately 50% of the management team are women.

DISCUSSION POINTS

Headquarters

- 1 Organization is in transition and trying to convert from a traditional policing agency to a business model driven by modern management principles and practices - intelligence-led, flexible, responsive, and rigorous performance management.
- 2 AFP sees itself as a coordinator of policing information services, provider of close-protection services (VIP), and leader in attacking high technology crimes domestically, while internationally leading the charge against drug syndicate disruption, people smuggling, terrorism, and foreign law enforcement liaison roles - a modern police leader in their part of the world.
- 3 Re-working their intelligence processes and systems away from ethnic groups and commodities, to syndicates and international entities. They use a matrix system to plot

- groups by ethnicity and commodity in an attempt to determine criminal syndicate networks, liaisons, mergers, and collaborations.
- 4 AFP reinforces to its three employee groups (Agent, Community and Commercial) that life is more important than work - there is articulated support for work/life balance and employee wellness - success here will ensure a successful organization.
 - 5 SOAR Survey of staff - one in 1999 and follow-up March 2003 provide basis for strategic HR planning, including the AFP Certified Agreement currently under negotiation (collective agreement). A key element of the agreement is the amount of time employees "can" work prior to the organization being penalized. The Certified Agreement, although managed by the AFP, is also subject to external oversight by the Commonwealth.
 - 6 Diversity for the AFP encompasses difference, work/life balance and a workplace free from harassment/bullying/discrimination - termed *work/life diversity*.
 - 7 Their *Worklife Diversity Program 2001-2003* has three aims:
 - o be employer of choice by maximizing workplace diversity,
 - o introduce and maintain flexible work/life balance arrangements that deliver positive benefits to the AFP and the individual, and to
 - o foster a harmonious work environment.
 - 8 Established strong networks for specific groups such as Malunggang Indigenous Officer Network (aboriginee), National Women's Consultative Team, Regional Women's Networks, and Gay & Lesbian Liaison Officer Network. Relative to the Canadian experience, there appears to be much more sensitivity to gay, lesbian and other transsexual groups both in terms of service delivery and being a welcoming organization.
 - 9 Overt aboriginee presence is less noticeable; comprise <1% of the workforce. The international focus and small community policing presence does not seem to bring the average AFP member into regular contact with aboriginees.
 - 10 Informal discussions with younger employees, particularly women, would indicate that they believe there are many supportive options open to them to find work/life balance, and taking advantage of such programs does not adversely impact their progress or opportunities.
 - 11 Targeted recruitment campaigns underway for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (ATSI), and through the National Indigenous Cadetship Program. The AFP recognizes that it can do better in this area.
 - 12 There is a confidante network in place which supports employees coming forward with concerns on anything - including non-criminal actions which are considered inappropriate or contrary to the *core values of the AFP - integrity, commitment, excellence, accountability, fairness and trust*. The confidentiality of the process is supportive to people bringing forward concerns on how they are treated, or others are treated relative to diversity.
 - 13 AFP uses the PROMIS system which is their operational occurrence management program, and it is also linked to HR and Finance systems. They use a time and dollar allocation model approximating activity-based costing. The driver for this integration, beside better performance management, was an episode of missed financial targets a few years ago; now manage using technology to fully integrate operations, HR and Finance.
 - 14 Senior managers speak in terms of the "cocktail mix of resources" and the need to annually reallocate resources to the most pressing and important priorities as determined by intelligence and government concerns.
 - 15 approximately 500 women/3,500 staff

ACT - Community Policing Agency Within AFP

- 1 One-half of the management team is women, holding key operational roles. The work environment appeared harmonious with women and non-whites occupying key roles.
- 2 Progressive work environment that fosters the development of employees through identified group networks.
- 3 Command staff are given latitude to be innovative in their approach, and in supporting employees in finding balance in their lives.
- 4 Support to employees and their families is a valued attribute of management.

- 5 Emphasis on crime prevention strategies, community development and youth programming - Rec.Lync and Police & Citizens Youth Clubs. The Youth Club is seen as a valuable asset working closer with the community, preventing juvenile crime and addressing other problems facing youth which ultimately reduces crime and victimization.
- 6 Outreach programs for the aboriginee community were also in place and expanding - they have a dedicated aboriginee liaison officer and cultural sensitivity training is starting to be used.
- 7 Emphasis on academic evaluation of crime prevention programs and policing strategic initiatives with clear performance management processes in place. Management believes that police cannot evaluate program effectiveness as lacks distance and credibility; rely on partnerships with universities to undertake evaluation to provide credibility and rigour. This strengthens resource arguments with government - local ACT administration.
- 8 Overt programs in place to work with the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender and intersex communities - officers who have received the liaison training proudly display a universal pin that identifies them for contact by target groups.
- 9 Promotion and transfer policies value ability to work harmoniously internally and externally.
- 10 Specific programs in place for multicultural and aboriginal communities through liaison officers, networks, and community interaction - this is not evident as a corporate operation at AFP HQ.
- 11 Community policing component is working effectively with diverse communities and groups through active liaison, dedicated programs and positive networking.
- 12 Just under 80% of personnel have less than 5 year service - very young demographic relative to the general Canadian experience - may provide some insight for the near future.
- 13 Not enough mentoring staff available - "enormous pressure for junior staff to produce and deliver" (CPO Murray).
- 14 High rate of job stress in the ACT according to managers.
- 15 Women are approximately 100/450, and nearly 50% of management ranks.

AFP College

- 1 Interesting on-line training being developed such as the e-crime investigators level one course.
- 2 Gave overview of the diversity course that is mandatory for each employee - is an off-the-shelf purchased course that is fairly basic and not specific to the AFP - general to Commonwealth.
- 3 They do not see electronic training replacing all training - simply an enabler to reduce time of residence and on-site training, making time spent more effective and efficient.
- 4 hours per month can be done at home - managers must give time and it must be recognized in their agent performance evaluation/management program for development for either current role or future position as part of their overall development plan/learning plan.
- 5 Training offered is costed back to the section or unit - big on allocating costs as part of their performance management. Also helps track commitment and performance of managers in developing their staff.
- 6 Courses are available through the Inter and Intranets - training taken, performance, time, etc. are tracked through the PROMIS system. This serves both a documentation function as well as a management evaluation function.

Eastern District – Sydney

- 1 Diversity program not as successful as would like - Sydney district is multi-cultural, large Asian and aboriginee populations. Nationally AFP approximately 70%M, 30% F.
- 2 Programs for attracting aboriginal staff - not as successful as would like - targeted recruiting and cadet education/experience program.
- 3 Sponsor NAIDOC Week - identify ethnic days and recruit around festivals, etc.

- 4 Support national *Work/life Diversity Program*, trying to inculcate into what they do and not a program.
- 5 All staff take on-line diversity training program and is part of their performance evaluation/management program for individuals and supervisors.
- 6 Confidante program is in operation and most problems identified come back to local management for resolution.
- 7 SOAR Survey has identified confidante program good for lower-level workplace issues and viewed as culturally important by front-line.
- 8 Culture shift underway where policies being reduced - core organizational values should provide foundation for decisions wherever possible.
- 9 Entrepreneurship is one of the things they are striving for - creativity, diverse workforce, sensitive HR policies supporting a strong business-style climate.
- 10 Use a competency-based HR system, complemented by robust business planning and priority setting.
- 11 Study assistance program for employees in place which provides 6 hours/week plus book and tuition subsidy.
- 12 Link PROMIS and HR/Finance (SAP) applications together for a manager's dashboard using an Enterprise Intelligence Software (EIS) - this is the foundation to decision-making and planning.

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 Organization in transition to a new business model that is designed to better align them to their stated international and counter-terrorism goals.
- 2 Senior management have created a vision and are putting the pieces in place for a stronger and more diverse workforce.
- 3 Actively engaged in translating vision into action-oriented strategies.
- 4 Strong support system for work/life diversity for employees - emphasis is on an entrepreneurial workforce.
- 5 Policies around work/life diversity are being entrenched in the certified agreement.
- 6 Engaging women actively in management roles for the ACT - all levels.
- 7 Work at home, job sharing, mentoring, and flexible work arrangements are encouraged wherever operational needs can permit.
- 8 Gay & Lesbian and other sexual alternative lifestyles are supported through networks and work policies.
- 9 Work/life diversity program is driven by information gleaned from employees surveys that they are trying to act on.
- 10 Integrating technology in all facets of the operation with a goal of using information to lead.
- 11 Fairly robust reporting and performance management regimen to the federal and ACT governments - ACT buys police service based on strict deliverables in terms of service delivery.
- 12 Constant theme across employee groups that organization had made much progress in the past couple of years resulting in new investment, raised profile, and wanting to be a desired./attractive employer.
- 13 Diversity is seen as a good business goal by senior managers because it is seen "as good business"
- 14 availability of Commissioner's Diary on line for all employees

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 use of technology to improve performance management and better business planning and decision-making.
- 2 adherence to performance measurement system

- 3 Target Group liaison programs - Aboriginal Officers, G&L, Women, Ethnic.
- 4 Sees ACT as key development ground for investigational skills for the broader AFP. In competitions ACT personnel are often successful as they have operational front-line experience.
- 5 Organization is clearly in transition.
- 6 Enlightened employment policies - employer of choice mindset - driven by employee surveys and attractive work culture.
- 7 Do not use conventional overtime systems as part of compensation model.
- 8 Performance agreements are used for all employees that have a developmental component, advancement component, a performance component and a compensation component. These are aligned to priorities and building organizational capacity.
- 9 Recruitment seeks people with life experience and skills so tend to average 27 years of age and better educated than state police agencies.
- 10 Working to become better integrated with state police - more needed here.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 Part VI and affidavits - administrative tribunals instead of courts. Average affidavit is 6-20 pages and they meet regularly with the Tribunal members to discuss ways to improve process, etc.
- 2 Women comprise 50% of management team within ACT
- 3 Building strong "dashboard" to enhance performance management.
- 4 Significant resource growth and heightened role within Commonwealth.

SUMMARY

AFP is undergoing a significant redesign brought about by a changing focus to concerns external to Australia. One of their key stated goals is to disrupt crime syndicates and transnational crime where it originates, and before it reaches Australia's shores.

To support this goal, the AFP is developing diversity and work/life balance as an integrated way they do business, rather than a separate program. They encourage networks for Aboriginal, GLO, Women and other groups, and actively recruit people of diversity. They appear to embrace very family friendly policies and supports for their people. They have maximum hours of work in a week, and have mandatory holiday usage requirements. Employees can bank reasonable amounts of time, buy time from others, as well as sell time back within defined parameters. They also receive two weeks at Christmas/New Years unless operations do not permit the taking of the time.

Technology is used to integrate HR, Finance and Operational information. Their language around "changing the cocktail mix" refers to a flexible response and moving resources in support of their priorities - reviewed officially annually as part of their strategic planning process.

The AFP is moving away from being a traditional community-based policing agency to a modern security agency that is charged with increasing Australia's influence in the world, and by extension, protecting it.

REFERENCE MATERIAL, QUOTATIONS

Certified Agreement - AFP - 2003
 SOAR - Staff Opinion Analysis & Review 2003
 Corporate Directions - 2001-2004
 Indigenous Community Liaison Officers - AFP
 Diversity Within the AFP
 AFP Complaints & Positive Feedback

Worklife Diversity Program, Beyond Compliance - AFP
Workplace Bullying - AFP
Harassment at Work, It's Not OK - AFP
Community Policing - ACT
Employee Assistance Program - AFP
Joining the AFP - Lateral Recruitment - AFP
Confidante Program - AFP
The Journal for Women and Policing - Commemorative Edition IAWP Conference

"The AFP must not only benchmark what it does internally and domestically, but must also learn to compare itself against other world-leading organizations." - John Lawler, Executive Services, AFP

"Police agencies cannot do their own assessment of what works and does not work in crime prevention. We have very strong relationships with leading academics to ensure we have rigour and independence in our evaluation. This works very well at convincing government of what is the right thing to do - what the balance between enforcement and prevention needs to be and the value in funding it." - John Murray, Chief Police Officer, ACT.

SITE LOCATION: Australian Crime Commission

DATE: 2003-06-04 **TIME:** 13:30 hrs

PERSON (S) INTERVIEWED:

AFP Headquarters – Canberra	Dr. Grant Wardlaw	Chief Executive Officer and National Director General of Criminal Intelligence
	Carol Kiernan	Analyst – ACC
	Troy Kalzik	Analyst - seconded from NSW Police

FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS/MEETING:

Diversity - services to diverse communities
Integration of diversity into Police Service
Emerging Crime Issues

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

The Australian Crime Commission is an amalgamation of three previous agencies (Australian Crime Authority, Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, and the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments) in response to an effectiveness audit by the Commonwealth Government to better respond to organized crime and emerging crime issues. The ACC has offices in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, and Perth. It is managed by a Board, which consists of thirteen members. The chair is the Commissioner of the AFP, eight State, ACT and Territorial Police Commissioners, Four Commonwealth Agency Heads - Director General of Security, Chair Australian Securities & Investments Commission, CEO Australian Customs Service, and the Secretary of the Attorney General's Department.

CONTEXT:

- Headquarters of ACC (Canberra)
- Replaced the National Crime Authority, Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence and the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments - ACC new agency with integrated mandate

- Operates with secondees from State and AFP
- Priorities and Functions
 - collect, correlate, analyze and disseminate criminal information and intelligence and to maintain a national database of that information and intelligence.
 - undertake, when authorized by the board, intelligence operations.
 - investigate, when authorized by the Board, matter relating to federally relevant criminal activity.
 - provide reports to the Board on the outcome of operations/investigations.
 - provide strategic criminal intelligence assessments and any other criminal information and intelligence to the Board.
 - provide advice to the Board on national criminal intelligence priorities.

This new agency is seen as providing the foundation to improve overall crime management for the country, as well as providing a cohesive overlay for the various state police agencies. It has been recognized in Australia that they have not had a coordinated and focused way of managing information, analyzing intelligence, and targeting groups or issues that are national in scope, and may not fall to the AFP or be the unique worry of a state agency. The ACC has interesting investigative and enquiry powers wherein those called before a tribunal must testify their knowledge relative to crime, subjects and topics of interest. Although the rule of self-incrimination applies for those testifying, it appears to be a powerful tool to gather information and intelligence under oath that police/security agencies can act upon.

DISCUSSION POINTS

AFP Headquarters

The ACC has no real diversity management approaches outside of those of the broader Commonwealth government. The predominant issue of interest during the interview was emerging crime for Australia and neighbouring countries; intelligence indicates emerging crime issues to be *Identity Fraud, vehicle re-birthing, heroin/ICE importation/trafficking, Internet Child Porn/Victimization, and e-crime.*

ASSESSMENT

The ACC is an interesting concept to better integrate intelligence collection and management within a federation. However, they readily admit that the system is still very much being designed in terms of better integration with state agencies. They are developing a national database of intelligence, but a factual integrated system like CPIC is not currently planned. This Agency is a mixture of police and civilian staff, with some sensitivity about becoming too “police cultured” in nature. There is a management Board who is comprised of the key police leaders from across the country, as well as key federal agencies with an intelligence interest/mandate such as Customs, the Attorney General, National Security and Securities and Investment. The investigative powers are quite powerful, and the effectiveness of this power seems confirmed in discussions held with the AFP Eastern Region and the NSW Police Joint Asian Crime Group (JACG).

POSITIVES:

- 1 ACC has potential to be an effective criminal intelligence system in the future.
- 2 ACC is housed jointly with the AFP at their Canberra Headquarters.
- 3 ACC is composed and managed through its Board by the major enforcement agencies in the Commonwealth.
- 4 Indications are that well-funded by the Australian government and seen as a key plank in integrating various policing agencies.
- 5 “Early days” relative to the overall effectiveness of the model.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Useful to contributing agencies due to their broad and sweeping powers.
- 2 Agency appears pragmatic in how it supports policing.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 Investigative capacity to hold tribunals that compel targets and persons of interest to come and testify is very powerful. However, in discussions, there was not overly powerful anecdotal evidence where it had been used beneficially - this may reflect the relative short time the ACC has been in place and its current abilities to collect and analyze information from a fairly fragmented system.

SUMMARY

This may be of some interest to the other groups, but relative to diversity they had little to discuss around direct service delivery or recruiting. However, the ACC agreed it will be a more important issue in the future for agencies to have diverse work forces in order to respond to international crime syndicates impacting Australia and New Zealand, and ultimately North America. They also are experiencing some challenge in terms of culturally awareness analysts and understanding some of the crime syndicates originating along ethnic lines.

REFERENCE MATERIALS, QUOTATIONS

- Australian Crime Commission In Focus
 - Australia Illicit Drug Report 2001-02 - ACC Publication
-

SITE LOCATION: New South Wales Police

DATE: June 2, 2003

PERSON (S) INTERVIEWED:

Headquarters Assistant Commissioner Mark Goodwin
Superintendent Terry Dalton
Catherine Mackson, Executive Officer Policy & Programs
Kevin Gardner, Team Leader Policy and Programs
Chitrita Mukerjee, Organizational Policy & Development

FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS/MEETING:

Services to diverse communities
Integration of diversity into the Police Service

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

Australia's oldest and largest police organization, New South Wales Police is a state wide police service with a complement of 17,000 employees – including 13,700 sworn. The demographics of the New South Wales Police reveal that women make up almost 23% of the sworn compliment, officers of culturally diverse backgrounds 2 %, people with physical disabilities almost 2%, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders less than 1%.

The organization is divided into five regions with operational services administered through 80 Local Area Commands.

CONTEXT:

The State of New South Wales is the largest of the Australian states with a population of 7 million within an overall Australian population of 19.8 million. Sydney is the major urban centre with almost four million residents.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- 1 Gay and Lesbians policy statement along with the existence of 130 Gay Lesbian Liaison Officers across the state.
- 2 Community Policing structure involving Local Area Commands (LAC) with autonomous crime management units and high visibility policing. LAC commanders are given significant control over their people and resources and are more accountable and responsible for performance. LAC tag line is "local solutions to local problems".
- 3 Aboriginal Strategic Direction with 4 year timeline with performance indicators. An Aboriginal Employment Strategy involving a multi-focused Aboriginal Action Plan - 2% target for employment of aboriginals across all areas.

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 Intranet Knowledge Maps – well developed, informative and user friendly effective intranet system.
- 2 Intranet-based cultural awareness training and self test. A 100% pass rate is required to successfully complete in order to qualify for promotion.
- 3 Police Accountability Community Team (PACT) – formed under the auspices of the State Minister of Police aimed at helping police improve the response to community needs and expectations.
- 4 PASAC (Aboriginal Advisory Group) – chaired by the Police Commissioner – meets 2 times per year.
- 5 Aboriginal Policy – a three-tiered community consultation process – Commissioner, Regional and Local Area Commands (LAC). LAC's are viewed to be the most effective in formulating community action plans
- 6 Cultural Diversity & Aboriginal Coordination teams in place with the objective of supporting the delivery of culturally competent policing services, delivery of disability awareness and cultural training.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 Random drug and alcohol testing - based on a healthy lifestyles approach rather than being perceived as discipline-focused. In 2002, some 8,560 random alcohol tests were conducted (8 officers failed the test), along with 416 random (no officers tested positive) and 24 targeted drug tests (5 tested positive). In addition, mandatory drug and alcohol tests are required following any police operation where an individual is killed or seriously injured (251 tests conducted with no failures).

- 2 NSW have had a Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer program for over 12 years. A part-time sworn function with a full time coordinator, there are 130 GLLO's across the state.
- 3 57 Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers state wide – these are civilian members of the New South Wales Police responsible for assisting in resolving issues affecting Aboriginal people and establishing positive partnerships and relations.
- 4 80 Youth Liaison Officers state wide in every who have enhanced training and are positioned as key contact points between Local Area Commands and Juvenile Justice diversion programming.
- 5 Community Police Employment – part of a state government program, similar to Ontario's workfare (welfare). Police Service utilizes the resources to augment existing staff resources in their Local Area Commands.
- 6 Recruitment drive will increase the sworn complement to 14,407 by December 2003. There is a corresponding Aboriginal employment strategy aimed at increasing the demographic to 2% of the Police Service.

SUMMARY

The Study Team spent the better part of one day interviewing members of the New South Wales Police (NSWP) staff thus findings were limited. NSWP staff were open and accommodating.

The NSWP use a liaison officer model to provide specialized services to the community in the form of Aboriginal Communities, Ethnic Communities, Gay & Lesbian, Youth, Domestic Violence and Tourist Liaison Officers. Liaison officers are sworn police, civilian, or volunteer members of the Service.

Programs involving the NSWP Service's relationship with Gay and Lesbian communities are progressive, well developed and considered by them to be a best practice in Australia if not the world. Evidence of openness and acceptance is seen in the recruiting elements of the NSWP website where several police officers identify as being gay.

The Cultural Diversity Team of the Policy and Programs Unit are in the process of advancing existing programs and developing new initiatives to increase internal sensitization as well as the hiring of the Aboriginal and diverse people from the community. Progressive tools involving the Police Intranet Knowledge Maps, provide maximum exposure and easy access to cultural information and programming.

New South Wales Police staff used the description "culturally competent policing services" to describe their mission. While limited discussions with community members indicated that there is much yet to accomplish in relation to Aboriginal community development, the Police Service appears to continue to be working to fulfill that mission.

REFERENCE MATERIALS, QUOTATIONS

"Culturally competent policing services."

- Cultural Diversity Team, New South Wales Police

"Poo – Poo's – Passed over and pissed off."

- Mike Goodwin, A/Commissioner New South Wales Police

- NSW Police Command Management Framework
- NSW Police Website

- NSW Annual Report 2001 – 2002
- Other documentation currently unavailable (in transit)

SITE LOCATION: Victoria Police

DATE: 2003-06-04 through 2003-06-07

PERSON(S) INTERVIEWED:

Victoria Police Headquarters	Chief Commissioner Christine Nixon Ken Latta, Executive Director Corporate Services Sanjib Roy, Director, Human Resources David Allen, Human Resources Robyn Hicks, HR Development Robyn Crawford, HR Development Inspector Jill Wood, Women's Consultative Network Inspector Dan Bodycoat, HR Health & Support Supt. Rod Norman, Community & Cultural Division Debbie Sonin, Equity & Diversity Unit Bob Watson, A/Director Human Resources Kate Buckeridge, Manager Aboriginal Advisory Unit Kathy McKenzie, Organization Health Project Con Allimonos, Multicultural Advisory Unit
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FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS/MEETING:

Services to diverse communities
Integration of diversity into the Police Service

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

Victoria Police is a state police service with a complement of 10,680 sworn and 1,920 civilian members. Police Service demographics indicate a 17% female, 0.001% Aboriginal make-up of the Service. Victoria Police is currently celebrating 150 years of providing policing services to the state.

CONTEXT:

The State of Victoria in southeast Australia has a population of 4.9 million within an overall Australian population of 19.8 million. Melbourne is the major urban centre with a metropolitan area population of approximately 3.5 million people.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- 1 Diversity reform is currently and predominantly gender-focused. Strategic hiring targets in relation to women, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, and people with disabilities will be aligned with State legislated priorities. An example is the recent Wur-cum barra ('work' in the Wathawurrung Aboriginal language) strategy that commits the public service to double the number of jobs for Indigenous Victorians.
- 2 Police and Community Multicultural Advisory Committee (PACMAC) established to as an advisory body to Victoria Police Service and state government at the strategic level. It is a

joint Committee of Victoria Police and the Victorian Multicultural Commission, whose membership is drawn from relevant sections of the police and culturally and linguistically diverse communities.

- 3 Change management issues exist in the current environment of modifications to structural, staffing and corporate policies.

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 Effective and proactive internal Gay & Lesbian employee network and support mechanisms.
- 2 Liaison officer model is the organizational mechanism to reach out and work with diverse communities (eg. Multicultural, Aboriginal, Women's, and Gay & Lesbian Liaison officers).
- 3 Conducting review of recruitment process with the objective of reducing bias. For example, the first screen occurs at the local police station where the Senior Sergeant will interview applicants from the local community. The Victoria Police have identified this initial part of the process as being a potential systemic barrier.
- 4 Stress and Morale surveys – a three-year study in partnership with University of Melbourne. Findings for year one showed morale was high, but it showed a decline in years two and three - organization demonstrated courage in identifying and then addressing these types of significant internal issues.
- 5 Youth Work Experience Program within Victoria Police – increased participation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students.
- 6 A Recruitment Bridging Course, arranged in partnership with Adult Multicultural Education Services, is designed to effectively prepare aboriginal applicants for the recruitment process. The initial offering had 16 participants.

SUMMARY

Victoria Police describe themselves as lagging far behind the rest of Australian police services in dealing with gender-based diversity within their organization - in terms of effective networks as well as the staff make-up of the service. The State Government hired Chief Commissioner Christine Nixon, the first female police commissioner in Australia, to affect positive change in relation to gender and diversity issues. The Chief Commissioner has begun to fundamentally remodel the organization and this has resulted in change issues impacting the Service. A large number of programs and policy changes have occurred, and short as well as long term plans are in place to continue that trend. The current organizational priority is clearly placed on increasing the hiring of female officers and civilians. In terms of diverse and Aboriginal hiring, Victoria Police are relying on Commission, State or external review-based change drivers rather than internal or community-identified need.

Community advisory linkages are at the strategic level and involve the Chief Commissioner and her senior staff. Regional Multicultural Liaison Units are planned in each of the five policing regions. Local diverse community input is relegated to police liaison officers who are responsible for engaging local communities through partnerships and solving problems. In working to provide internal and community supports and linkages, there are a number of work groups with overlapping responsibilities that tend to cause confusion in setting and working toward corporate

objectives (i.e. Equity & Diversity office, Community & Cultural Division, Multicultural Advisory, Aboriginal Advisory, and Gay & Lesbian Liaison offices).

Victoria Police are well-advanced in providing long-standing internal staff and contracted resources in relation to health, fitness and employee wellness, gay and lesbian, faith and peer supports.

REFERENCE MATERIALS, QUOTATIONS:

“Implementation of the Plan relies heavily on the integration of equity and diversity principles and the removal of any barriers preventing individuals and groups from performing and achieving their highest level and potential. I would encourage employee to look at the broad range of barriers that can confront them in their work environment and at ways of overcoming any barriers that are unfair or discriminatory. The Plan is only the start of the process. Cultural change will be essential to driving and implementing it, and change strategies will be required at both strategic and operational levels, as well as the support of all Victoria Police employees.”

- Christine Nixon, Chief Commissioner - Victoria Police

“Consultative networks for women are currently operating, or being formally developed, in all police organizations in Australia and New Zealand except Victoria.”

- Jill Wood, Inspector - Victoria Police

“Partnership policing is a vital element in ensuring Victorians feel safe, confident and happy in their daily lives.”

- Christine Nixon, Chief Commissioner - Victoria Police

Documents

Victoria Police Equity and Diversity Corporate Five Year Plan 2003 – 2008.

Workplace Diversity Report 2001-02 – Australian Public Service Commission.

Wur Cum Barra Strategy 2002 – Premier of Victoria Website

Victoria Police Annual Report 2001-2002

Victoria Police Website

Other documentation currently in transit

SITE LOCATION:

New Zealand Police

DATE:

2003-06-09 through 2003-06-13

PERSON (S) INTERVIEWED:

Headquarters

Commissioner Rob Robinson
Superintendent Pieri Munro
Inspector Tania Eden
Inspector Api Fiso
Kefeng Chu, Strategic Ethnic Advisor
Inspector Steve Darroch
Superintendent Mike Wilson
Tracey O’Callaghan, HR Manager

Wellington District	Inspector Wayne Rogers Sergeant Luke...
Central District	Superintendent Mark Lammas Inspector Grant Nicholls, Palmerston North Station Frank Moul, Youth Co-ordinator, Palmerston North Senior Sergeant Gordon Rongonui, MLO
Bay of Plenty District	Superintendent Gary Smith Maxine Rennie, Mana Social Services Trust Donna Grant, Manaakitanga Aotearoa Trust
Auckland District	Superintendent Senior Sergeant Huri Dennis Senior Sergeant Lou Alofa Senior Constable Nick Tuitasi
Royal New Zealand Police College	Superintendent Alistair 'Olly' Beckett Jocelyn Brace, Manager Research & Development Claire Bibby, Research & Development Group

FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS/MEETING:

Services to diverse communities
Integration of diversity into Police Service

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

The New Zealand Police (NZP) is a single national police service with a complement of 7,000 sworn and 1,800 civilian members. NZP is divided into 12 Districts, each lead by a Superintendent responsible for the delivery of operational services and programming. Current Police Service demographics are 16% female, 11% Maori, 3.7% Pacific, and 0.7% Asian.

CONTEXT:

New Zealand is an island nation with a population of about 3.9 million. It lies about 1,600 kilometers southeast of Australia. The New Zealand population is comprised of 80% European, 15 % Maori, 6% Pacific and 5% Asian cultures. Two of the main urban centers are situated on the North Island – the cities of Auckland (population 1.1 million) and the national capital, Wellington (population 340,000).

The Treaty of Witangi, granting the Maori legal protection and rights to perpetual ownership of their lands and resources, was signed in 1840. On June 4, 1996 former Police Commissioner Peter Duune interpreted, in practical terms, the meaning of the Treaty to the operations of the New Zealand Police Service. This began the serious integration of Maori culture internally and externally – something that is clearly demonstrated in the current NZP Strategic Plan where a key priority is reducing Maori and Pacific Peoples offending, re-offending and victimization rates.

DISCUSSION POINTS

Headquarters

- 1 New Zealand government has made a commitment to the Treaty of Witangi requiring each agency to uphold the Treaty principles. NZP contribution to the Government goals by having

a comprehensive Maori Responsiveness approach.

- 2 Maori culture was seen to be integrated and embedded into daily Police Service life. This was demonstrated in the two standard greetings offered in each location visited. The European/North American style greeting and then the traditional Maori greeting with prayers, songs and hongi (nose-touching).
- 3 Maori responsiveness is reinforced through community advisory bodies ranging from the Commissioner's Maori Focus Forum to the District-level Maori Advisory Groups, to the various area community advisory groups involving the Police Iwi (tribal) Liaison Officers.
- 4 NZP 2006 Strategic Plan has three key priorities: Community Safety, Crime Reduction and Policing Integrity, Capability & Style. To achieve those priorities, strategies include building partnerships and engaging central, local governments and non government organizations, Maori groups, individuals and other agencies; crime priorities in consultation with local communities; staff diversity to better reflect New Zealand communities; and increasing the responsiveness of Police to Maori, Pacific Peoples and other ethnic groups.
- 5 Human Resources have hiring targets for 2005 that are: 12.5% Maori, 6% Pacific Islanders, 20% Women.

District

- 1 A standard District community-oriented policing structure across the country with significant components of community liaison officers, and resource deployment according to intelligence crime data.
- 2 Different districts are encouraged to develop their own 60-40 intelligence-led crime reduction approach that will work best for their circumstances and will be aligned to and supportive of the national strategies. This approach allows for the formulation of effective strategies to deal with crime in diverse communities. The intelligence function includes examining other drivers/factors that contribute to the problems (i.e. socio-economic factors). This allows for more effective strategies and partnerships.
- 3 Bay of Plenty (Rotorua) – have established effective partnerships involving the devolution of responsibility from police to the appropriate agency/authority with the Police Service providing support. (Mana Social Services Trust and the Maori recruit prep training course).

Area

- 1 Palmerston North Area – 13% of Maori commit 42% of the crime based on population. Developed strategies around the issue. Restorative Justice model – family group conferencing, youth diversion, and truancy programs all involving all local stakeholders. A community wraparound model to deal with at risk

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 2 Maori responsiveness is integrated into the key themes of improving police effectiveness in the Strategic Plan (rather than via specific objectives).
- 3 Annual Maori training support for all officers recognizing the need to inject sensitivity into front line policing. The intended outcome of this training is that it will foster positive models in the Maori community and changed attitudes in the Police community.

- 4 Maori Advisory Group structure – at all levels (Commissioner’s, Districts, and Areas).
- 5 Clear and well-communicated performance measures, embraced by all levels of the organization, and are aligned to the strategic priorities of the organization. The corresponding performance measurement system includes information received from community surveys. Signage, brochures and written materials are effective in communicating progress toward clear goals.
- 6 Recruit Maori and diversity foundation training at the Royal New Zealand Police College. The commitment to integrating Maori culture is evident when the Haka, a Maori cultural ritual, is conducted at each recruit wing graduation involving the graduating class and the group scheduled next to complete recruit training.
- 7 United Kingdom officers’ recruit class cultural awareness training – classes and Marae (the spiritual carved meeting house) site visits.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 The NZP Human Resources area has plans to look at potential systemic bias in their recruiting system, but have yet to start their review. Additionally, they have no established recruiting priorities.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 2 Maori Liaison Officer structure that is effectively embraced by local communities where officers are encouraged to go and be part of the communities they are serving.
- 3 Local Maori community members participate on their respective liaison officer selection interview panels.
- 4 Maori Sudden death policy – commenced and completed in partnership between the Police Service and the community in the Central District. Being sensitive to and respecting spiritual needs at scenes of road fatalities involving Maori victims.
- 5 Maori language training is being offered to members to augment the integration of the culture.
- 6 Community walking patrols exist in some areas involving community volunteers, or Maori Wardens, who are best positioned to provide an information link to police and social agencies. The NZP vet the volunteers and provide rudimentary identification cards.

SUMMARY

The New Zealand Police staff have demonstrated themselves to be open, accessible and caring in their approach to diversity and community relations. There was a spirit of allowing the community to express themselves freely during our visits – both good and bad.

The New Zealand Police have been successful in integrating a high level of respect for Maori and Pacific Peoples cultures into daily operations and organizational culture. Both European and Maori greetings are a normal part of meetings involving the Police Service, the community and those visiting. This has been driven by the New Zealand government and facilitated to a significant degree by having one single national police service.

Still, the NZP realize that there is still much left to accomplish to further their commitment to Maori Responsiveness and their cultural diverse communities. A five-year human resources strategy

includes objectives involving recruitment and retention policies involving Maori, Pacific Peoples, women and ethnic groups, and improved training for all applicable areas.

The New Zealand Police structure and accountability systems revolve around the need to be intelligence-led. This effective problem-oriented policing process facilitates more effective strategies to deal with crime and disorder issues. The analysis encompasses existing socio-economic issues to facilitate more comprehensive initiatives for problem-solving.

New Zealand accountability mechanisms (i.e. individual performance contracts for District commanders) and the funding process for police operations drive the service members at all levels to achieve results. The goals for each District and Area, along with progress toward achievement are clearly and continuously communicated to all members. This means that achievable goals and objectives are formulated and consistently met.

REFERENCE MATERIALS, QUOTATIONS:

"If you can't get bicultural then you won't get multicultural"

"You need good people in the right place to do the work"

- Billy, a Maori community advisor, Wellington District

"How can we help each other', rather than the police saying, 'How can we help you - and here is how we will do it.'"

- Senior Sergeant Gordon Rongonui, Maori Liaison Officer, Central District

"Police are in the position of waiting at the bottom of the cliff for youth to sail off and hit the ground. But once the youth is loaded into the ambulance, we find it has no gas!"

- S/Cst. Nick Tuitasi, Youth Aid Officer, Auckland District

"The way Government assistance programs are set up, it's like trying to teach people to swim while they are drowning"

- S/Cst. Nick Tuitasi, Youth Aid Officer, Auckland District

Documents

Review of New Zealand Police – Service Delivery to Maori

Statement of Intent 2003/2004

Police Strategic Plan to 2006

Review of New Zealand Police Service Delivery to Maori – Ministry of Maori Development (Nov. 2002)

People in Policing: A Five Year HR Strategy to 2006

Mount Roskill Community Approach, Avondale, Balmoral

SITE LOCATION: Central Intelligence Agency
Washington D.C.

DATE: 2003-05-28 **TIME:** 10:00 hrs

PERSON (S) INTERVIEWED:

James Bernazzani Federal Bureau of Investigations
Deputy Director Terrorist Threat Integration Centre (T.T.I.C.)
Gene Coyle Operations Officer
Mike Freeman Operations Officer- Centre for Terrorism (C.T.C.)

FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS/MEETING:

To examine the mandate and operation of an independent intelligence agency for effectiveness and efficiency
To investigate their strategy to collate information from multiple sources
To develop an understanding of what it is they do with the information they gather, in light of the terrorist events of 9/11
To investigate the relative advantages/disadvantages of a single agency warehousing approach

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

The Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947 as an independent agency, responsible to the president through its Director. It is accountable to the American people through Intelligence oversight committees of the United States Congress. The CIA engages in research, development and deployment of high-leverage technology for intelligence purposes. The CIA serves as an independent source of analysis to provide accurate, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence on national security topics.

CONTEXT:

The C.I.A. has modified service delivery in response to world events of 9/11. They have maintained organizational independence, while providing intelligence data to both the White House and newly created Department of Homeland Security.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>1 Central repository for foreign intelligence- focus on international activities-not involved in domestic issues.</p> <p>2 Large library of intelligence information on single database.</p> <p>3 Centralized structure- Headquarters authorizes action.</p> <p>4 Recognized international/domestic linkages</p> <p>5 Creation of Terrorist Threat Integration Centre. T.T.I.C.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Organizational assets best positioned to respond in time of crises.• One C.I.A system administered centrally but accessible to all based on security clearance. Recognized need to declassify and share information. Identified risk associated with integration and disclosure issues.• Enhanced coordination of effort and readiness to respond.• Established relations and information sharing processes with domestic agencies.• Response to Presidential directive regarding inter-agency cooperation. T.T.I.C. acts as central repository or "hub" being fed by existing Federal, State and Local agencies with <u>mandated</u> information |
|--|---|

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | Creation of new Website | sharing. |
| 7 | Internal restructuring of Centre for Terrorism | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reference Library for participating agencies • Integration of Investigators with analysts – creation of targeting officers- operationally trained and intelligence driven. Recognized linkage not only International/domestic but also terrorism and other crimes. |
| 8 | New initiative involving terrorism and electronic telephone databases | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To establish linkages between suspects using available electronic data systems. |

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 Integration- wealth of knowledge now being shared among agencies. Recognized role as international intelligence agency, with information sharing that can assist in domestic terrorism.
- 2 TTIC – established to coordinate efforts at Federal State, and local level.
- 3 TTIC- Targeting officers who are operationally trained and intelligence driven
- 4 Centralized structure with single database

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Integration efforts place CIA at risk during prosecutions and disclosure during domestic terrorist investigations. Potential to cloud CIA mandate (foreign versus domestic).

SUMMARY

The interview revealed that integration has forced the CIA to deal with issues of disclosure and declassification of documents. Recognizing 9/11 as a “tipping point” that necessitated action and integration between international and domestic agencies.

REFERENCE MATERIALS, QUOTATIONS:

Bernazzani, James - Deputy Director-Terrorist Threat Integration Centre, Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 28 May 2003.
 Contact Information: Phone- (703) 482-0067

Coyle, Gene- CIA-Operations Officer, Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 28 May 2003.

“We don’t do law enforcement”. (MacIntyre interview notes)
“Not much use in having a unit that does not have arrest powers”. (MacIntyre interview notes)
“CIA does things quickly because they don’t have any bureaucracy”. (Pilon interview notes)
 Contact Information: Phone- (703) 482-6579_

CIA website: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/info.html>- May 3 2003.

SITE LOCATION: Washington D.C- Department of Justice
 Regional Information Sharing Systems (R.I.S.S.)

DATE: 2003-05-29

PERSON (S) INTERVIEWED:

Bruce C. Edwards
J. Patrick McCreary

Policy Director
Program Manager Information Technology Initiative

FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS/MEETING:

To examine the mandate and operation of a collaborative venture focused on intelligence/information sharing for efficiency and effectiveness
To investigate strategies to collate and share information from multiple sources
To examine the benefits / drawbacks that result from integration through voluntary collaboration

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

A national program comprised of six regional intelligence sharing centers operating in mutually exclusive geographic regions. The six centers combined currently serve over 6,000 state, federal and tribal law enforcement member agencies by facilitating and encouraging information sharing and communications to support their investigative and prosecution efforts.

CONTEXT:

R.I.S.S. had focused on organized crime prior to terrorist activities of 9/11. Since then its membership has increased, and there has been an increased focus on anti-terrorism activities.

DISCUSSION POINTS:

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|--|---|
| 1 R.I.S.S. receives 100% funding from Department of Justice | • Anti-Terrorism focus has had negative effect on DOJ support to other areas of local law enforcement. |
| 2 D.C. Sniper Situation | • 77 Local, State, and Federal agencies responded to single situation. No common information system. Discussion identified need for integration of systems, and methods of operation. |
| 3 R.I.S.S. does not advocate a single merged information system but rather advocates interconnecting existing systems. | • Recognizes cost prohibitive implications for member agencies. |
| 4 Discussion on history of R.I.S.S. | • R.I.S.S. originally created to support local and State agencies. |
| 5 Federal linkages occurred through the six regional centers | • R.I.S.S. now acting regionally, and thinking nationally. With local, State and Federal participation the focus has shifted to encompass national perspective. |
| 6 National and Regional Policy Boards | • Support the individual and collective concerns at all levels of investigations. |
| 7 RISS centers not involved in operations | • Focus is on sharing and analysis of information. |
| 8 Main focus since 9/11 has been to have all member agencies connected through a secure intranet | • Intranet has the advantage of strong security features that instills confidence of members regarding the integrity of shared information. |
| 9 Membership is voluntary but is screened by governing body. | • Applying agencies must meet identified standards for intelligence capacities. |

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 Desire by member agencies to work collaboratively
- 2 Realization that fiscal/political realities preclude single information system. Focus on real world practicality associated with inter-connectivity.
- 3 Support for law enforcement at all levels to exchange intelligence information. Not involved in operations.
- 4 Recognized and addressed need for high security requirements of member agencies.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Because participation is voluntary they must maintain the confidence of participating agencies.
- 2 Will never have full participation by all law enforcement agencies.
- 3 Information is still submitted on a voluntary basis by member agencies. Can result in limited analysis, and incomplete assessments.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 Shifted focus and increased resources in connecting members through technology since 9/11. Advanced their capacity to share information and interconnect agencies.

SUMMARY

The terrorist event of 9/11 has proven a tipping point for R.I.S.S. to refocus on interconnectivity of member agencies. This expanded capacity has increased the potential for integration at local, State and Federal levels. This capacity is limited only by the voluntary nature and contributions of member agencies. Trust is a big factor.

REFERENCE MATERIALS, QUOTATIONS:

Edwards, Bruce C. - Policy Director U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs- Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al MacIntyre, 29 May 2003. Contact information: 4th Floor- #4311 810 7th St. N.W. Washington, DC 20531 Tel # (202) 514-9155.

McCreary , J. Patrick - Program Manager Information Technology Initiative- U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Assistant Attorney General - Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 29 May 2003. Contact information: #810 7th St. Washington, DC 20531 . Tel# (202) 616-0532.

United States of America. R.I.S.S. Program Brief. Report, 2002.

United States of America. R.I.S.S. Annual Report. Report, 2001

Powerpoint presentation notes - Meeting May 29 2003.

SITE LOCATION:

Department of Justice
Washington DC.

DATE:

2003-05-29

PERSON (S) INTERVIEWED:

J. Patrick McCreary

Program Manager Information Technology Initiative

FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS/MEETING:

To examine technology- based solutions for information sharing

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. Information technology initiatives seek to guide and facilitate information sharing through strategic focus areas, which include:

- National leadership
- Collaborative Partnerships
- Standards
- Governance
- Architecture
- Security and Privacy
- Technical assistance and Training

CONTEXT:

An effort by federal authorities to facilitate information sharing by all levels of law enforcement with a specific focus on technology.

DISCUSSION POINTS

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|---|--|---|
| 1 | Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Advisory Committee (GAC) | • Steering Committee to address privacy/information quality, Security, Intelligence, Infrastructure & Standards. |
| 2 | Justice Extensible Markup Language (XML) Data Reference Model | • An enabler for increasing the sharing of information, assisting commercial and government organizations in exchanging information and conducting business over the Internet and Intranets by increasing interoperability. Minimum standards established for development of hardware/software for law enforcement. |
| 3 | Deliverables, training and Technical Assistance | • Information and explanation of standards to both law enforcement and private sector providers. |

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 Creating Standards of adherence by all law enforcement agencies to ensure interoperability.
- 2 Providing standards, guidance and direction to private sector technology providers. Implications for future products to ensure maximum interoperability.
- 3 Data element dictionary developed to ensure commonality across justice sector
- 4 Despite proliferation of technology systems, minimum standards to ensure interoperability are being created.
- 5 Creation of online Justice Standards Clearinghouse for all end users and technology providers.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Justice sector agencies not compelled to participate and meet standards.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 Data element Dictionary is an excellent concept for Canadian context
- 2 Minimum standards for interoperability to be built in to every emerging product.

SUMMARY

There was recognition of the need to have common standards between Justice sector partners. Sharing those standards with private sector technology providers for emerging products will ensure future inter-operability.

REFERENCE MATERIALS, QUOTATIONS:

Mcreary, J. Patrick - Program Manager Information Technology Initiative- U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Assistant Attorney General. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 29 May 2003. Contact Information- - #810 7th St. Washington, DC 20531 . Tel# (202) 616-0532.

Mcreary, J. Patrick- Powerpoint presentation notes.

Department of Justice XML Data Model CD

Department of Justice Standards Clearinghouse for Information Sharing- leaflet

Department of Justice XML Data Model - fact sheet.

SITE LOCATION:

Interpol
Lyon, France

DATE:

2003-06-02

PERSON (S) INTERVIEWED:

Gwen McClure	Chief Fusion Task Force
Martin Kastov	Fugitive Issues Coordinator
Claire McKeon	Crim. Intel. Officer - Trafficking in Human Beings Sub-Directorate
Timothy Holman	Crim. Intel. Analyst - Criminal Analysis Sub-Directorate Operational Police Support Directorate
Stuart Cameron Waller	Project Manager
Peter Vowe	Director Regional & National Police Services
Dennis Talarmin	Administrator specialized in databases Quality Control Branch Criminal Data Processing Sub-Directorate Operational Police Support Directorate
Chris Merchant	Management Advisor
Erin Dewitte	Assistant Director for Europe
Marie-Jacques Garcia-Anton	Senior Criminal Data Compiler Operational Notices Branch Criminal Data Sub-Directorate Operational Police Support Directorate

FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS/MEETING:

Particular focus on Fusion Task force based on research.. The Interpol Fusion Task Force was designed to expand the capacity to understand the relationships between organized criminal groups and terrorists organizations. The specific focus was to develop targeted packages to facilitate the disruption and dismantling of criminal entities that play a central role in the funding or support of terrorist activities. The group had a specific interest in recent re-structuring efforts of Interpol to address emerging issues.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

Agency aim is to provide a unique range of essential services for the law enforcement community to optimize the international effort to combat crime. Mission is to be the world's pre-eminent organization in support of all organizations whose mission is preventing or detecting international crime.

CONTEXT:

Interpol has undertaken recent re-structuring efforts intended to increase capacities for the provision of services.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1 Fusion Task Force- Background and operation | • Provided context for program implementation |
| 2 Services available to member agencies- Fugitive apprehension, Illegal Immigration, Child abuse and pornography, trafficking in women for sexual exploitation, criminal analysis, training, Information technology solutions, policies, projects, and management. | • Efforts to increase capacity of existing and new issues. Understand emerging criminal activities as sources of funding, and provide meaningful multi-disciplinary methodology in terrorism-related investigations. |

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 Interpol restructuring to increase responsiveness and quality of service in addressing needs of members.
- 2 Interpol rolling out and providing a new technology system for member agencies. Wide variation in capacities amongst member countries.
- 3 Recognized the potential to act as "Broker" amongst member agencies that may be at variance on political, socioeconomic levels.
- 4 Uses one intelligence criminal information system, with varying levels of security access.
- 5 Fusion Task Force provides intelligence driven analysis that identifies and links suspects with terrorist organizations to member agencies.
- 6 Unforseen benefit is that Fusion Task Force has been able to broker terrorist intelligence amongst member agencies.
- 7 Fusion is in early stages- potential exists but has yet to be fully realized.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Interpol relies on voluntary support of member agencies. Trust amongst agencies is critical for effectiveness.

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 With approval of National Central Bureau (NCB), local agencies can have access to Interpol central database.
- 2 Interpol re-focused on responding to member needs through quality of services.

SUMMARY

Interpol has identified the need to re-define their commitment to quality service. Trust and voluntary nature are key principles to successful production of meaningful deliverables.

REFERENCE MATERIALS, QUOTATIONS:

Dewitte, Erin- Assistant Director for Europe. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 02 June 2003.

Garcia-Anton, Marie-Jacques – Senior Criminal Data Compiler Operational Notices Branch Criminal Data Sub-Directorate Operational Police Support Directorate. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 02 June 2003.

Holman, Timothy- Criminal Intelligence Analyst Criminal Analysis Sub-Directorate Operational Police Support Directorate. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 02 June 2003.

Kastov, Martin - Fugitive Issues Coordinator. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 02 June 2003.

McClure, Gwen - Chief Fusion Task Force- O.I.P.C. Interpol Secretariat General. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 02 June 2003.
Contact Information- quai Charles de Gaulle, 69006 Lyon- France, Tel-(33)472447000.

McKeon, Claire- Crime Intelligence Officer- Trafficking in Human Beings Sub-Directorate. . Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 02 June 2003.

Merchant, Chris - Management Advisor. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 02 June 2003.

Talarmin, Dennis- Administrator specialized in databases Quality Control Branch Criminal Data Processing Sub-Directorate Operational Police Support Directorate. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 02 June 2003.

Vowe, Peter - Director Regional & National Police Services. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 02 June 2003.

Waller, Stuart Cameron - Project Manager. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 02 June 2003.

Interpol- Brochures (9).

SITE LOCATION:

Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (DNA)
Rome, Italy

DATE:

2003-06-05

PERSON (S) INTERVIEWED:

Lucio DiPietro
Emilio Ledone
Giovanni Melillo

Deputy Director nazionale Antimafia
Magistrate
Sostituto Procuratore nazionale antimafia

FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS/MEETING:

To examine the Italian response to the threats and intimidation of the judicial system by organized crime (Mafia).

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

In 1991 The Italian Government issued the Decree Act No. 367 of 20 November to coordinate investigations of proceedings concerning offences committed by criminal organizations. This was a direct response to the Mafia's assassination of a judge and subsequent intimidation of the judicial system. The DNA is comprised of specially trained public prosecutors that focus on specific legislative offences relating to organized criminal activities. The DNA has both a national office to oversee activities and district offices that coordinate local investigations.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- 1 History and operation of DNA
- 2 Sole focus on coordinating investigations and prosecuting the Mafia in relation to threats to judicial officials.
 - Understanding of the political and social context for the creation of specific legislation and task force.
- 3 Single database for analyses, with restricted access for DNA only.
- 4 DNA magistrates can interchange roles between prosecutors or judges.
 - Increased appreciation for magnitude of issue, and implications to judicial system.
- 5 Investigate groups as opposed to individuals. Special laws and investigative authorities to deal with related criminal offences.
 - Understanding of context as it relates to Canadian Constitution.
- 6 Penalties upon conviction for specific offences both increased and mandatory.
 - No opportunity for plea bargaining.

ASSESSMENT**POSITIVES:**

- 1 Specialized structure which is highly coordinated and specifically focused on antimafia activities.
- 2 Legislated authority and specific offences created.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- 1 Database is not normally accessible to police investigators (DIA). Possibility that valuable

information may be lost. Access is provided on a case-by-case basis when an investigation is initiated by the DNA "governing body".

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 Creation of legislated authorities and offences may be applicable to Canadian justice system.
- 2 Following events of 9/11 parliament extended the legislation to include terrorist activities.
- 3 Tenacity and continued diligence both contributed to a decrease and has been sustained in the absence of new threats. This clear and continuous message diminishes the motivation of Mafia to engage in this activity.

SUMMARY

The DNA created to deal with threats expeditiously utilizing both legislated authorities and resources. They focus on security threats and react accordingly, but continue to go about their business in spite of these threats. There is clear messaging that they will not be intimidated, and the messaging itself is designed to diminish efforts at intimidation.

REFERENCE MATERIALS, QUOTATIONS:

Dipietro, Lucio- Deputy Director Nazionale Antimafia . Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 6 June , 2003.

Ledone, Emilio – Magistrate- Nazionale Antimafia . Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 6 June , 2003.

Melillo, Giovanni - Sostituto Procuratore Nazionale Antimafia. Nazionale Antimafia . Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 6 June , 2003. Contact Information- Via Giulia, 52 00186 ROMA, Tel: 06689282257.

" Specialized structure which is highly coordinated is in itself a preventer of some intimidation".
Giovanni MELILLO- Sostituto Procuratore nazionale antimafi.

Melillo, Giovanni- Sostituto Procuratore Nazional Antimafia- Powerpoint presentation by Magistrates.

SITE LOCATION:

Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA)
Rome, Italy

DATE:

2003-06-06

PERSON(S) INTERVIEWED:

Generale Roberto Mantini
Colonello Luciano Annicchiarico
Tenenete Colonello Nunzio Aliberti

FOCUS OF INTERVIEWS/MEETING:

To examine the Italian response to investigation of threats and intimidation of the judicial system by organized crime (Mafia).

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM/AGENCY:

The DIA mission is to carry out intelligence activities targeting organized crime and to conduct investigations exclusively of mafia and mafia-related matters. A specialized investigative agency with a sole strategic objective is the fight against mafia organized crime in all its aspects and connections. The DIA is part of the Department of Public Security of the Ministry of the Interior.

DISCUSSION POINTS

- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| 1 | History and Structure of DIA | • An integrated unit consisting of the three federal policing agencies- Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri, and Guardia di Finanza. |
| 2 | Operations and Strategies | • Intelligence based approach focusing exclusively on mafia activities. Intelligence both derived and shared with law enforcement partners. |
| 3 | Specific discussions regarding threats | • Threats are investigated and security measures implemented as required. |

ASSESSMENT

POSITIVES:

- 1 DIA has narrow investigative focus and specific powers.
- 2 Analysis of information is key component in investigations.
- 3 Integration of three federal policing services successfully achieved.
- 4 Analysts can access all available police databases
- 5 Persistence of judicial system in spite of efforts to intimidate has resulted in Mafia's diminished threats and return to economic crimes.
- 6 Practice of debriefing convicted persons
- 7 Summons people to be interviewed
- 8 Conduct financial inquiries

NOTEWORTHY ITEMS:

- 1 Special powers achieved through legislation. Powers restricted to antimafia investigations.
- 2 Unique focus on mafia activities.

SUMMARY

The DIA has a unique mandate, achieved as result of "tipping point"- executions and intimidation of Judiciary. DIA has specific powers of investigations that are focused on an identified criminal organization. The threats are dealt with as need arises with a committee structure to assess and prioritize activities in response to those threats.

REFERENCE MATERIALS, QUOTATIONS:

Aliberti, Nunzio- Tenenete Colonello DIA. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 6 June , 2003.

Annicchiarico, Luciano- Colonello DIA. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 6 June , 2003. Contact Information- III Reparto- Relazioni Internazionali Cape 1a Divisione, Via di Priscilla 32 00199 Roma- Tel-06-8626021.

Mantini, Roberto- Generale DIA. Interview with Maurice Pilon and Al Macintyre, 6 June 2003.Italy. Direzione Investigativa Antimafia Brochure.

Italy. Direzione Investigativa Antimafia Unit Summary.
